LONDON Printed for J: Magnes and R: Bently.

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PLATO his APOLOGY of SOCRATES, AND PHÆDO or Dialogue concerning the Immortality of Mans Soul, AND Manner of SOCRATES his Death: Carefully translated from the *Greek*, AND Illustrated by Reflections upon both the *Athenian* Laws, and ancient Rites and Traditions concerning the Soul, therein mentioned.

Quintilian. Institut. Orator. lib. 10 cap. 5. Vertere Græca in Latinum *veteres nostri Oratores optimum judicabant. Id se* L. Crassus *in illis* Cicero *de Oratore libris dicit factitasse. Id* Cicero *sua persona frequentissime præcipit: quin etiam libros* Platonis [Timæum *nempe, quem inscripsit* de Universitate] *atq;* Xenophontis *edidit hoc genere translatos.*

LONDON,
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TO THE
RIGHT HONORABLE
the EARL of
ANGLESEY,
Lord Privy Seal, &c.

My LORD,

THE *Manuſcript* now herewith delivered to your Servant, had two days ſince been brought to Your Lordſhip, had I not ſo long diſputed with my ſelf, Whether it were more decent for me to ſend it

ſingle, or to give it an *Epiſtle* for a companion. Nor was it ſo eaſie a matter for me to determin this my doubt; the contrary reaſons that offered themſelves to my perpenſion, ſeeming to me to be of equal weight.

When, on one ſide, I conſidered how immenſe a multiplicity of affairs, and thoſe of great importance too, come hourly crowding into your thoughts, expecting from you to be at once both judged and diſpatched with higheſt *Prudence*; and how few minutes you have to ſpare from cares of *State*: I was inclined to conclude, that the peruſal of the *Book* alone, without the importunity of a *Letter*, might too much interrupt your repoſe, and the public felicity. To this was added, that neither *Socrates* nor *Plato* could need Letters of recommendation to a man ſo well acquainted with the Heroic Virtues of the

the one, and the Divine Doctrin of the other. Nay I thought it a kind of Sacrilege againſt their *Merits*, as well as againſt your *Judgement*, but to imagine, that any thing I could write to introduce them, might increaſe your eſteem of them.

When, on the other, I remember'd that the *Book* contains, not an Original, but a *Copy*; not the intire Images of thoſe two ſo juſtly renowned *Philoſophers*, but only two ſelect *pieces* of them, namely the upright and invincible *Heart* of the one, and the perſpicacious *Eye* of the other (I mean the *Defenſe* of *Socrates*, and the diſcourſe of the *Immortality* of Mans *Soul*) and that I owed Your Lordſhip, not only the free uſe thereof, but alſo an accompt of the reaſons I had to allege in excuſe (I muſt not ſay, juſtification) of the little art ſhewn by me in the *Tranſcript:*

ſcript: remembring this, I ſay, I could not but think it convenient, to draw a few lines more, in order to your ſatisfaction concerning that particular. Beſides this, gratefully re-calling to mind, that you had long before honour'd me, not only with licence, but with expreſs *Command* alſo, to write to you, and that frequently too, eſpecialy concerning matters *Philoſophical*; and being of opinion, that this *Book* contains one of the nobleſt Diſquiſitions any where to be found among the monuments of even the Ancient *Grecian Philoſophers*: I was apt to conceive it to be more probable (your extraordinary *Candor* together conſidered) that my omiſſion to do it, upon this inviting occaſion, might carry the face of *Diſobedience*; than that my doing it would be look'd upon as importune or indecent.

And

And this laſt reaſon, in weight exceeding all the moments put into the oppoſite Scale, at length turned the balance of my ſuſpence; and made me conclude, that certainly I ſhould leſs offend by a fault for which I might plead the authority of Your Lordſhips *Command*, than by one that could not be otherwiſe excuſed, but by confeſſing my diſtruſt of your *Benignity*, and diffidence of your *Favour*, wherein chiefly I eſteem my ſelf to be happy.

Notwithſtanding this, I ſtill found my ſelf obliged, ſo far at leaſt to give ear to the former arguments that would have diſſuaded me from writing, as to reſolve to make my fault as little and venial as was poſſible, by writing no more than ſhould ſeem neceſſary to the defens of the *Plainneſs*, and *familiar Style* uſed by me, in the *verſion* of theſe two ſo excellent

lent Diſcourſes of *Plato* into our Language. For that ſeems chiefly to require an Apology: the admirable *Wiſedom*, great *Utility*, and charming *ſweetneſs* of the *Diſcourſes* themſelves, being already perfectly known to Your Lordſhip, and acknowledged by univerſal conſent of the Learned in all ages, ſince it became a doubt, whether *Athens* were more to be honoured for the birth of *Socrates*, or to be branded with infamy and hatred for the cruel murder of him. And as for the *Occaſion* of my tranſlating them; you are ſo far from needing to be advertiſed thereof, that you made it my Province: that is, from your juſt admiration of the incorruptible Juſtice of *Socrates*, expreſſed in a Colloquy at your Table (where the Minds, no leſs than the bodies of your Gueſts are always feaſted)

I took the first hint of the design, and proceeded therein by your approbation; which with me, is equivalent to an injunction.

Suffer me then, my *Lord*, briefly to acquaint you, that if in this diversion of my pen, I have not only confined it, as strictly as my weak judgement would permit me to do it, within the bounds of the Authors *sense*; but caused it also whersoever I could, to trace out his very *Expressions*, and render them even word for word: it was not that I imagined that way to be either more facil, or more elegant; but because I judged it to be the more *faithful*, and I had design'd, not a Paraphrase, but a *Translation*. By comparing the *Latin* version of *Marsilius Ficinus* with that of *Serranus*, I had found these two great men not seldom various, sometimes dubious, and sometimes

times irreconciliable in their interpretations: ſo that both could not be in the right; and to me who had not been ſufficiently verſed in the dialect and ſtyle of *Plato*, nor competently skilled in the Criticiſms of the Greek, it was extremely difficult to diſcern, which of the two came neareſt to the true and genuine ſenſe of the Author; more eſpecialy where it was probable they had followed different *Exemplars*, and certain that even their beſt Editions of *Plato* were not ſufficiently correct. To extricate my ſelf from this perplexity, I was conſtrained to take this courſe. Where the *Greek Text* appear'd to me to be of it ſelf plain and perſpicuous, I ſeldom conſulted any other Oracle. Where the ſame ſeem'd obſcure by words of ambiguous ſignification, and uſed *Metaphoricaly*: firſt I ſought to let in light

light upon the place, by opening the caſements both of the antecedent and ſubſequent *Context*; and if thereby I could diſcern the mind of thoſe words, I had recourſe to the *Interpreters* alſo, though merely for confirmation. Where I found my ſelf intangled both in the abſtruſeneſs of the Text, and in the diſcrepancy of its interpretations; I choſe to adhere to the more *conſentaneous*, which moſt frequently was that of *Serranus*; and where the interpretations were not only different, but incapable of conſiſtency and reconciliation: there I was forced to grope out my way by probable *Conjecture*, as being deſtitute of other help. Here to expatiate into a particular Catalogue of theſe *Difficulties*, and adfer inſtances of each ſort of them; is neither to my preſent ſcope neceſſary, nor conſiſtent with the module

of

of an Epiſtle: and after this general accompt, it ſeems more decent for me to render a reaſon, why I ſo far mentioned them. Be pleaſed therefore to know, that I have done it, not to derogate from the glory and authority of thoſe two ſo deſervedly celebrated names of *Ficinus* and *Serranus*, from whoſe immortal *Works* I hold my ſelf ſcarcely worthy to wipe the duſt, and without whoſe conduct and manuduction I could not have been able to proceed without ſtumbling at almoſt every ſtep: but only to make your Wonder the leſs, when you ſhall find me, not only ſtumbling, but *Erring* alſo from the direct path of *Plato*'s ſentiments and intention; which I fear I have more than once done. For, if ſuch men as they were, met ſomtimes with Knots they could not unty: what wonder is it, that I who

am

am ſo much their inferior both in learning and judgement, ſhould be often embroil'd in doubts I cannot ſolve? if *They* who have ſhewn themſelves both exquiſitely Critical in the *Greek* of the *Ancients*, and intimately converſant even in the moſt myſterious notions, and profound receſſes of the *Platonic Philoſophy*, openly diſſent from, and claſh one with the other, about the genuin ſenſe of many hundreds of places therein occurring: how much of favour is due to this weak *Eſſay* of one, who is neither good *Grecian*, nor ſo much as a mean *Platoniſt*? I may therefore expect from Your Lordſhip, rather reprhenſion for attempting above my ſtrength, than blame for performing below my hopes. Now, my Lord, that I may draw all the lines of this long Paragraph to a point; this very *Reaſon* here

here brought to excuſe my *Deviations* (if I be found guilty of any ſuch) from the *ſenſe*, may well ſerve alſo to juſtifie my ſtrict *adheſion* to the *Words* of my Author, whereſoever the vaſt diſparity betwixt the moſt ſignificant Idioms of *Plato's Greek*, and thoſe of our *Babel* of Languages, the *Engliſh*, would permit. For, as a Novice in the Art of Painting, though he come ſhort of the life, will yet more certainly repreſent the true dimenſions of the thing he deſigns to paint, and the becoming Symmetry of all its parts; if he tranſgreſs not the lines drawn to his hand by a Maſter, to circumſcribe the image, and confine his pencill to the due proportions thereof: ſo I being to copy the *Sentiments* of Another, believ'd I ſhould be the leſs prone to err, by how much the leſs I receded from the *Marks* he had

had left of them: and hereupon I reſolved to do my beſt devoir, firſt to underſtand thoſe *Marks* diſtinctly, and then to repreſent their *Significations* faithfully: preferring plain *imitation* to more artificial ornament. Not that I had then forgot, there are intruth certain Modes of ſpeaking, and graceful *Phraſes* proper and peculiar to every Language, ſo as to be incapable of alienation or traduction; and certain *Subjects* alſo that are, as by natural congruity, much more agreeably and patheticaly expreſs'd by one Tongue, than by any other: and that therefore a Tranſlator ought to be allowed competent liberty to uſe ſuch words, phraſes and figures of ſpeech, as he ſhall judge moſt fit, as well to conſerve the beauty and elegance of the original conception, as to ſymbolize and ſuit with the argument; and this leſt

his ſtyle become pedantique and flat, and the Matter it ſelf be debaſed, as the beſt Wines loſe their Spirit by transfuſion from veſſel to veſſel. But that I well remembred, that an Eminent *Wit* of Your Lordſhips acquaintance, who had with ſeverity enough declamed againſt *verbal* Tranſlations, was yet at the ſame time ſo ingenuous, as to grant ſome Books to be of ſo great and univerſal importance, as that not only their Senſe, but even their *Words* too ought to be reputed *Sacred*: and that I conceived theſe two pieces of *Plato*, more eſpecialy that of the *Soul*, whereof the Speculations are for the moſt part *Metaphyſical* or *Theological*, deſerved to be of that number. Hereunto was conjoyned a Second conſideration, *viz.* That by keeping cloſe to the Words of the Text, even in the Ornamental parts of the

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Diſcours, I might not only the better avoid the danger of either enervating the Expreſſions, or offering ſuch violence to the Senſe of it, as might make it appear rather mine than my Authors; but alſo retain ſome impreſſions of the civil manner and way uſed by thoſe Ancient *Sages* in their frank *Conferences*, and impaſſionate *Diſputations* concerning matters Philoſophical: a thing not unworthy the ſerious notice of thoſe who are ſtrangers to the *Atticiſm* and admirable Civility of *Plato*; and, the Moroſity and obſtinacy of our Modern Diſputants conſidered, to all Exemplary. Theſe, *my good Lord*, are the *Reaſons* that induced me to labour to ſhew my ſelf, in this diverting Eſſay, rather *fidum Metaphraſten*, than *diſertum Paraphraſten*; rather *juſt* than *polite*. And as for the plainneſs of my *Style* (if that

be a fault) though it be the natural conſequent of my fidelity; yet I have this further to plead in defenſe thereof, that the *gravity* of the *Subject* exacted it: for, as the Prince of Roman Stoics moſt judiciouſly obſerves (*Epiſt.* 40.) *quæ veritati operam dat oratio, incompoſita debet eſſe & ſimplex.*

Hitherto, my *Lord*, I have offended againſt your patience, by forcing you to hear *my* Apology: be pleas'd now to let me expiate that offens, by exerciſing the ſame a minute or two longer, while I recall into your memory ſome of thoſe many Heroic Virtues of *Socrates*, whereof his grateful Diſciple, *Plato*, hath left to us ſuch remarkable inſtances, both in his *Apology*, and in the accurate narration of the manner and circumſtances of his *Death*.

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This poor Philoſopher, *my Lord*, ſeems to be the man upon whom the bounty of Heaven accumulated all the various *Gifts*, it uſeth to diſtribute but ſingly and with a ſparing hand to other Mortals: and the leaſt of his divine Endowments hath often ſufficed to render even private perſons illuſtrous, and *Sceptres* themſelves more auguſt.

Had you beheld him in arms, with his Sword reſcuing *Xenophon*, and ſtanding alone confronting a victorious army, when the *Athenian* forces fled from the battell of *Delium*: you would have ſeen *Wiſedom* reconciled to *Warre*, *Judgement* moving hand in hand with *Fury*, and the *Rational* faculty of the Soul concurring in the ſame action with the *Iraſcible*; and thereupon concluded, that true *Valour* ariſes, not from heat of blood, nor from exceſs of Choler,

but from ſtrength and reſolution of *Mind*; and that a good *Philoſopher* may make an excellent *Captain*. Had you ſeen him in another Expedition, returning a Conquerour from *Potidæa*, and transferring all the honours and rewards due to ſo ſignal a victory, upon his beloved *Alcibiades*, reſerving to himſelf no other place in the Triumph but among the followers of his Friend: You might have ſworn, he had fought ſo bravely rather for *Conſcience*, than for either Glory or Spoyl; and that he deſired no greater name than that of a good *Patriot* and ſincere *Friend*.

When you reflect upon his fearleſs refuſal to execute the Command he had received from the ſupreme Council of *Athens*, to fetch *Leo Salaminius* from *Salamine*, to be put to death, according to the Sentence given againſt him by the Uſurper *Critias*

tias and his Adherents: you will (I preſume) acknowledge, that he fear'd nothing but to do ill, that he diſdain'd to aſſert any power that was not juſt, that *Athens* it ſelf might with more eaſe have been removed to *Salamine*, than he brought to relinquiſh *Right* and *Equity*; and that he was more ready to accompany the oppreſſed in their Sufferings under Tyranny, than to be a ſharer in the adminiſtration of it. Had ſome *Roman* been a witneſs of this virtuous obſtinacy, he would have cried out perhaps, that the *Capitol* itſelf was not more immoveable than the integrity of *Socrates*; and envied *Greece* the glory of ſo rare an Example. What then would he have ſaid, *my Lord*, had he been preſent at the diſpute betwixt the ſame *Socrates* and his moſt faithful Scholar *Crito*, wherein he being with no weak

arguments urged, to evade the execution of that moſt unjuſt Sentence lately paſs'd upon him, and deliver himſelf from violent death by an eſcape plotted and prepared to his hand; nevertheleſs not only rejected that affectionate advice, but by demonſtration convinced the Author of it, that the auctority of Law, and Decrees of Courts of Judicature, are things in their ſanction ſo venerable and ſacred, as to oblige men to ſubmiſſion, even when they are manifeſtly unjuſt; and brought him at length to acquieſce in this Concluſion, *nefas ſibi eſſe è carcere egredi, injuſſu Magiſtratuũ, & contra legum autoritatem?* Herein whether *Socrates* were in the right or not, let our *Civilians* determin: I, for my part, verily believe, he thought he was; and this is moſt evident, that he could never be either overcome by terrors,

or

or won by allurements, to recede ſo much as a hairs bredth from what he had once defined to be *juſt*. This very *Monoſyllable* doubtleſs was his whole *Decalogue*, equivalent to the Laws of the *twelve Tables* among the *Romans*, the *baſis* of his Religion, the Centre of his Counſels, and rule to his actions: nor can I be eaſily perſuaded, that *Aſtrea* left to dwell among men untill after his death. Of his obedience to the Laws and conſtitutions of his City, he gave this further teſtimony; that when the *Athenian* Republic, to repair their people much exhauſted by warre and peſtilence, had made an Edict, that every man of fit years ſhould be obliged to eſpouſe one woman, as principal wife, and have liberty to take another, for procreation: he, notwithſtanding he had his hands full of unquiet *Xantippe* (whoſe peeviſhneſs and moroſity

ſity was grown to be the daily exerciſe of his patience at home, and his reproch abroad) yet in conformity to the Edict, fear'd not to receive into his little houſe and narrow bed, another Conſort alſo, one *Myrto*, daughter of that *Ariſtides* ſurnamed the *Juſt*, but equaly poor with himſelf. This certainly could not but be ſomwhat harſh and diſagreeable to a man already entered into the confines of old age, and underſtanding the pleaſures of ſerenity and repoſe: and yet I muſt not imagin it to have been at all difficult to the wiſedom of our *Socrates*, whoſe tranquillity appears to have been elevated, like the head of mount *Athos*, above the tempeſt of feminin contentions, jealouſies and impertinences, and his Mind incapable of perturbations. However, he put not private cares into the balance againſt a duty

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to the Public: but choſe to be a good Citiſen, by increaſing Poſterity, though he were ſure thereby to multiply his own domeſtic incommodities.

Acting by this infallible principle of *Juſtice* (which is, as *Plato* calls it, μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν, the greateſt of human goods, and Mother of all other virtues) and fully perſuaded of the divinity and immortality of the Soul (which is the fundament of all Religion) and of future rewards and puniſhments: the wonder is the leſs, that this admirable man was able, both to trample upon all the ſplendid and precious things of this momentany life, and to bid defiance to all the terrible: for, ſecure in his own innocence, and confident of happineſs to come; 'twas leſs difficult to him either to contemn dangers, or reſiſt temptations. Nay,

to

to do him right, neither could this *Temperance*, nor that *Fortitude* be at all difficult to him, who by long uſe, and continual practice, had exalted them from Virtues into *Habits*.

In the *firſt*, he appear'd to be ſo perfect, that tho as a man he could not but feel the motions and ſollicitations of Corporeal *Appetites*, yet none of them dared to rebell againſt the Soveraignty of *Reaſon*, by whoſe power he alwaies both ruled and bounded them: nor could even a good Soul ſeparated from its body, and delivered from all encumbrances of Matter, have acted more ſedately, or been leſs incommodated with *Paſſions*. In a word, in his whole life, he ſeem'd not only unconcern'd in, but *inſenſible* of the vain appearance of human things.

Being thus impenetrable to Cupidities, it may be worth our labour to

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enquire alſo, how ſtrong he was againſt *Fear*. That we may therefore take the true hight of his Courage, let us (if it pleaſe Your Lordſhip) obſerve his deportment at the bar, in the priſon, and at his death.

At the *Tribunal*, we hear his *Conſtancy* no leſs than his Innocency triumphing over the power and malice of his combined Accuſers: *the greateſt hurt they can do to me*, ſaith he, *is to think it poſſible to hurt me; ſince God takes care of Good men, and they therefore can never be violated by wicked men.* To a friend whiſpering in his ear, that his Judges had before reſolved to doom him to death: he anſwers ſoftly and with a ſmile (but ſuch a ſmile as retain'd an aire of Gravity and Dignity) *and hath not Nature paſſed the ſame doom upon them?* Retiring after his condemnation, *Adieu my friends,*

friends, ſaith he, *I am now going to ſuffer death, ye to enjoy life: God alone knows, which of the two is better.*

In the *Priſon*, we find him deſpoil'd of whatever Fortune could take from him, his body covered with raggs and loaden with chains, his leggs galled and cramp'd with fetters, his eyes entertain'd with no objects but a wife and Infant weeping: and yet for all this, we hear no complaints, no lamentations, no grones, no not ſo much as one ſigh come from him; but diſcourſes conſolatory and divine. Good God, how great is the power of Wiſedom! how invincible the courage of a Soul armed with virtue! If this mans condition be Happy (as certainly it is) how much are Mortals generaly miſtaken in the notion of Happineſs! Here we behold a

ſhew

ſhew of Miſery in extremity: but realy there is no ſuch thing. For if you look more intently upon *Socrates*, you ſhall diſcern in him all the ſigns of alacrity, all the characters of Joy. To ſee him ſo unconcern'd, a man would think, he were not a Sufferer, but a Comforter. There is (Your Lordſhip well knows) a ſort of *natural Authority* inherent in the very Perſons of ſome men, reſulting perhaps from certain characters of a great Mind, which heroic virtue imprints upon their countenance: and this as it corrects the imperfections of nature, where it meets with any; ſo doth it likewiſe adorn the nakedneſs of its owner expoſed to the outrages of fortune, illuminate his dungeon, and ſtrike fear and reverence into the heart of even Executioners; as you may remember it did into his, who came

to

to kill that noble Roman, *Caius Marius*. Now this indelible Character of true Greatneſs, do I clearly perceive in the face of our *Hero's*, with its rayes enlightning the obſcurity of his priſon, conſecrating his diſgraces, chains and raggs, and rendring his afflictions holy and venerable. Nor can his Executioner endure the flaſhes of it, without aſtoniſhment, veneration and tears: and you may hear him, after a little recollection of himſelf, ſobbing forth this acknowledgement. *Farewell* Socrates, ſaith he, *The moſt generous and beſt of Men that ever came into this place.* Which words being imperfectly pronounced, he inſtantly retires; and unable to perform the duety of his place, he ſends in another with the poyſon.

Which being preſented to *Socrates*, behold with what calmneſs of

Spirit,

Spirit, what gravity of aſpect, and how ſteady a hand he receives it, and drinks, as if that draught were to extinguiſh, not his life, but thirſt. Nor did his *Fortitude* grow cold with his blood, or ſink with his vital powers; for even in the extreme agony of death, in the laſt pulſe of his heart, when the vital flame ceaſed to warm him: then did the flame of his Courage ſtill continue, and animated him to breath forth words that ſignifie, his diſſolution was moſt grateful to him, as a deliverance from the Sickneſs of Mortality, and paſſage to immortal Happineſs. Which I am verily perſuaded, he now enjoys: his whole life ſeeming to me, as *Eraſmus* (in Νηφαλ Συμπ.) ingenuouſly declared it did to him, nothing but a great Example of *juſtice*, *temperance* and *patience*; ſo that if ever any among the *Ethnics* came neer to the perfection

of

of a *Chriſtian* life, it cannot be denied but *Socrates* was the man. It is not (I profeſs) my cuſtom to addreſs my praiers to any but God alone, who (I am moſt certain) both hears, and hath power to grant my petitions: and yet I bluſh not to confeſs, that whenever I read what *Plato*, *Plutarch*, *Diogenes Laertius*, *Eunapius Sardianus* among the Greeks, and *Cicero* and *Seneca* among the Latins, have written in commemoration of the admirable virtues of this righteous man; I find my ſelf ſtrongly inclined to exclame, *O ſancte Socrates ora pro nobis!* an ejaculation expreſly owned even by *Eraſmus* himſelf, whom Your Lordſhip well knows to have been free enough from Superſtition: nor raſhly to be condemned; *nam fortaſſe latius ſe diffundit Spiritus Chriſti, quam nos interpretamur; & multi ſunt in conſortio Sanctorum, qui non ſunt apud nos in catalogo.* As

As the actions of our *Socrates* in the theatre of life were a wonder of virtue to even the beſt and wiſeſt Philoſophers, ſo was his *Exit* truly glorious. But how infinitely more glorious ought we to eſteem it, if we aſſent to the judgement of thoſe many pious & learned men, who conceive him to have died a Martyr of the *Unity of God?* Whether he did ſo, or not; I have neither place here, nor will to diſpute. Leaving therefore that nice queſtion to be decided by Your Lordſhip after you have revolved his *Apologie*; and in the mean time humbly deprecating your diſpleaſure at my prolixity: I ſhall add only toward the excuſe of it, this brief remark; *that the very aſhes of things ſoveraignly excellent are for ever auguſt and venerable.*

I am, my good Lord,

Your Lordſhips

January 8. 1673.

infinitely obliged and equaly devote Servant.

de *Socrate* teſtimonium.

Si exemplum deſideratis, accipite Socratem, *perpeſſicium ſenem, per omnia aſpera jactatum, invictum tamen & paupertate, quam graviorem illi domeſtica onera faciebant; & laboribus, quos militares quoq; pertulit, & quibus ille domi exercitus, ſive uxorem ejus ſpectes moribus feram, lingua petulantem; ſive liberos indociles, & matri quam patri ſimiliores. Sic fere aut in bello fuit, aut in tyrannide, aut in libertate, bellis ac tyrannis ſæviore. Viginti & ſeptem annis pugnatum eſt: poſt finita arma, triginta tyrannis noxæ dedita eſt civitas, ex quibus pleriq; inimici erant. Nociſſima damnatio eſt, ſub graviſſimis hominibus impleta. Objecta eſt & religionum violatio, & juventutis corruptela: quam immittere in Deos, in patres, in remp. dictus eſt. Poſt hæc carcer, & venenum. Hæc uſq; eo animum* Socratis *non moverunt, ut ne vultum quidem moverint. Illam mirabilem laudem, & ſingularem, uſq; ad extremum ſervavit: non hilariorem quiſquam, non triſtiorem* Socratem *vidit: æqualis fuit in tanta inæqualitate fortunæ.* Epiſtol. 104.

Marc.

Marc. Antoninus Imperator, περὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν, *lib. 7. Sect. 66.*

Ex verſione *Gatakeri* noſtrat.

UNde conſtat nobis Socratem *clara fuiſſe reliquiſq; præſtantiore indole? neq; enim hoc ſufficit, quod mortem glorioſiſſime oppetebat; aut quod cum Sophiſtis acutiſſime diſſerebat; aut quod in frigore ſummo patientiſſime ſub dio pernoctabat: aut quod Saliminium illum ſiſtere juſſus, reſiſtere generoſiſſime malebat; aut quod per compita faſtuoſe incedebat (quod tamen an verum fuerit, merito dubitaveris) verum illud conſiderare oportet, quomodo affectam animam habuerit* Socrates; *utrum hoc contentus agere poterat, quod in rebus humanis juſtus, in divinis pius exiſteret, nec malitiæ cujuſquam fruſtra indignatus, nec cujuſquam inſcitiæ aſſentatus, nec ab univerſo aſſumptum quicquam, aut tanquam peregrinum quid excipiens, aut tanquam intolerandum ſuſtinens, nec carunculæ affectionibus mentem paſſus coaffici.*

Quin-

Quintiliani de *Socratis* Apologia judicium,

Inſtitut. Orator. lib. XI. cap. 1.

QVis neſcit nihil magis profuturum ad abſolutionem Socrati *fuiſſe, quam ſi eſſet uſus illo judiciali genere defenſionis, & oratione ſummiſſa conciliaſſet judicum animos ſibi, crimenq; ipſum ſolicite redarguiſſet? Verum id eum minime decebat: ideoq; ſic egit, ut qui pœnam ſuam honoribus ſummis eſſet æſtimaturus. Maluit enim vir Sapientiſſimus, quod ſupereſſet ex vita, ſibi perire, quam quod præteriſſet. Et quando ab hominibus ſui temporis parum intelligebatur, poſterorum ſe judiciis reſervavit; brevi detrimento jam ultimæ ſenectutis, ævum ſeculorum omnium conſecutus. Itaq; quamvis* Lyſias, *qui tum in dicendo præſtantiſſimus habebatur, defenſionem illi ſcriptam attuliſſet, uti ea noluit: cum bonam quidem, ſed parum ſibi convenientem judicaſſet.*

Adver-

Advertisement
Of the Printer to the READER.

THo it hath so hapned, that the Errors *of this impression be for the most part only* Litteral, *such as every* Judicious *man may as easily correct as find: yet because the Book perhaps may come into the hands of some whose Understandeng is not incapable to be retarded or seduced by even the smallest* Pseudographical *rubs cast in their way by the incurious* Compositor; *I therefore think it one part of my duty, so far to prevent the offens, and assist the apprehension of Readers of this sort, as to intreat them, first to pardon the faults that shall occur to them in reading, and then to amend them (so many at least, as* I *have in a hasty review observed) in this manner.*

Page 12. line 23. read *Prodicus Ceus*, p. 15. l. 22. r. *how vehement*, p 19. l. 1. r. *Dithyrambics*, p. 22. l. 11. r. *delighted*, p. 24. l. 24. r *youth*, p. 44. l. 14. r. *recalls*, p. 46. l. 10. r. *assenting*, p. 56. l. 9. of the margin r. ὑποτιμᾶσθαι, p. 76. l. 2. r *soon leads them*, p. 109 l. 18. r. *neerer to sapience*, p. 135. l. 6 r *train of his thoughts*, p 135. l. 6. r. *train of his thoughts*, p. 139. l. 20. r. *is it not clearly evinced*, p. 151. l. 3. r. *quæ quoniam crassa sunt*, p. 157. l. 1. r. *conjuncture of*, p. 168. l. 12. r. *descensions*, p. 193. l. 19. r. *relating*, p. 199. l. 4. r. *came thereby*, & l. 6. r *broad kneading-tubb*, p 213. l 15. r. *the ration of even*, & l. 26. r. *the number Three*, p. 235. l. 21. r. *good omens and gratulation*, p. 254. l. 9. r. *Sanctiones*, & l. 13. r. *Deos*, p. 259. l. 17. r. *Epocha Marmorea*, p. 263. l. 6. r. πλυνεῖ τὰ ἱμάτια, p 265. l. 4. r. *præfatus Deum* p. 266. l. 9. r. *Signification* and *Efficacy*, p. 280. l. 12. r. *umbrage of irreverence*. p 290. l. 18. r. *volitantq; hæc littora circum*, p. 296. l. ult. r. *Elpenor*.

As for the more venial Errors committed in either omission or misplacing of Interpunctions *and other signs of* Pauses; *having found them to be neither very numerous, nor much injurious to the Authors Sense, I leave them to the candid Correction of the competent Reader.*

SOCRATES HIS APOLOGY.

The ARGUMENT

Out of *SERRANUS.*

SOCRATES *being accuſed of Impiety by* Melitus, Anitus, *and* Lycon, *before the People of* Athens, *by this Oration defends his Cauſe: And he ſo pleads, that he not only evinceth this their accuſation to be falſe and malitious; but alſo clearly ſheweth, that on the contrary, he deſerved well of the Republick, and was*

 therefore

therefore worthy not of punishment, but reward. He moreover declares, that it was a Duty *divinely imposed upon him, to reprove and convince Men; more particularly such, who being puffed up with a vain Opinion of their own Wisdom, were highly conceited of themselves. The infection of which ambitious folly he affirms to be diffus'd amongst Men of all Orders: But that alone is true Wisdom, when men acknowledg their* Ignorance, *(that is, as he in most proper words defines, that Humane wisdom is of small value, or none at all;) and firmly hold, that God alone is wise. Hereupon he declares, that himself had been judged by the Oracle* wiser *than all other men, for no other reason but this, That he differently from the custom of all others, had no esteem of himself, and thought he knew nothing certainly,* but that he knew nothing. *Then he makes the Author of that his Office or Duty of reprehending and informing Men, to be* God: *by whose certain command he avows he did whatsoever he had done in that kind. And this Command of* God *he calls* [τὸ Δαιμόνιον, τὴν Φωνὴν, τὸ σημεῖον,] *a* Spiritual Intelligence, *a* Voice, *a* Sign: *By those words, in way of excellency, designing not any power of Humane Wit, but a certain Divine and extraordinary signification; and (as we commonly*

ly call it) Inſpiration, *whereby he was ſecretly admoniſhed, what he ought to do, and what not. He calls it* Dæmonium, *a ſpiritual Intelligence; Becauſe he conceived that Power to come, not from Man, but from God: and otherwiſe terms the ſame,* Vocem & Signum, *in reſpect of that private admonition, which he affirms hath been given to him by a perſpicuous Voice, by manifeſt and true Dreams, and by other ways of Intimation. Thus much we briefly and plainly (according to what we could collect from the words of* Plato) *obſerve concerning the* Dæmonium *of* Socrates; *That we might not be obliged to amuſe our ſelves with the Myſterious Comments of various Interpreters. By the* auſpice *therefore, and ſuggeſtions of this his Divine Dictator,* Socrates *avers, that even from his Childhood he had ordered and governed his whole life, and made it his grand buſineſs to convince of Ignorance, Men inflated with the ambitious confidence of Science. From this contagious Fountain he derives that torrent of hatred with which very many of his Fellow-Citizens now ſought to overwhelm him; And from thence he deduces his preſent accuſation. Nevertheleſs, he profeſſes to be immovably fixed in this reſolution, always to obey the Counſel of God, nor ever to leave any part of that his principal duty*

unperformed, though it ſhould be conjoyn'd with manifeſt danger of his life : The loſs whereof he feared not, nor any thing elſe, except this, leſt he ſhould be found not to have conformed himſelf to the Dictamen *of God. Reſting upon this reſolve, he denies that he would by Prayers and Intreaties (as was the manner of the* Athenians*) beg favour and pardon from his Judges : But commending the iſſue of his Cauſe to God, and to the will of his Judges, would conſtantly perſevere in his own determinate courſe. Therefore when it was left to his own option, whether he would go into exile, or die; he choſe rather to die : teſtifying, that even in Death it ſelf, he ſhould not fail of certain Felicity; being fully perſwaded that God took care of him and his contenments. This was the Condemnation of* Socrates; *from whence* Plato *endeavours to demonſtrate, that he was undeſervedly accuſed of Impiety. Thus then* Socrates *ſuffered Death, for that he refuted the falſe Doctrines of Men concerning Religion : Though it be not to be doubted, but that he was ignorant of the true Religion taught by the ſacred word of God. Yet among* Ethnics *there was this clear teſtimony extant of an* Ethnic Philoſopher, *to take from them all excuſe of Ignorance : Since beſides that natural knowledge, which God hath engraven*

graven upon the minds of all men, there appeared in a moſt populous City, and the nobleſt School of Learning, this eminent witneſs, endowed with this peculiar Gift, that he would rowze up men, ſleeping profoundly in vain opinion of themſelves, and ſhew them their ignorance, wherein they were ſhamefully involved: the knowledge of this matter alſo being at length diſſeminated not only through all Greece, *but through the whole world, by this writing of* Plato. *This therefore is the* Theme, *and this the* Oeconomy *or Method of this* Oration.

THE ORATION.

HOw your minds, *Athenians*, are affected and inclined by the harangue of my Accuſers, I know not: but I my ſelf am ſo ſenſibly touched with it, that I have almoſt forgot my ſelf. So fitly and advantagiouſly for the gaining of belief and perſwaſion have they ſpoken: tho (to comprehend all

His *Exordium*; wherein he weakneth the credit of his Accuſers, by charging them with manifold falſhoods.

in one word) they have ſpoken nothing of truth. But among many falſhoods they alleaged, I chiefly admire this one, that they have admoniſhed you, diligently to beware leſt you be ſeduced by me; as if I were ſingularly powerfull in the faculty of ſpeaking: and that they have not bluſht to urge that, wherein they will ſoon be found guilty of palpable lying, when firſt I ſhall be found unfit to ſpeak to you: this ſeems to me the moſt impudent of all. Unleſs perhaps their meaning be, that *he is powerfull in the art of ſpeaking, who ſpeaks truely.* For if this be their ſenſe, I profeſs my ſelf to be an Orator, but not according to their opinion. But they (as I ſaid) have delivered nothing of truth; from me on the contrary you ſhall receive nothing of falſhood. And yet I ſwear by *Jove*, you ſhall not from me hear a formal Oration compoſed of the elegances of words, and Ornaments of ſentences, (as theirs was,) but plain truths expreſſed in unſtudied language and vulgar phraſes. But the things I am going to ſpeak, I believe to be equitable and juſt: nor let any among you expect other from me. For it is not fit that I ſhould at theſe years, come

He renounces all eloquence but *truth*: to engage the benevolence and attention of the Judges.

to

to you, like a boy, with fiction and Romances.

This one thing I earneſtly beg and require of you, that if you, O *Athenians*, hear me making my defence in the ſame way of ſpeech, and manner of reaſoning I have uſed both in the *Forum*, and at the Tables of the Bankers, (in which, and other places moſt of you have ſeen me) you neither wonder thereat, nor raiſe a tumult thereupon. For the truth of the matter is, this is the firſt time I appear at your Tribunal, being now more than 60 years of age: ſo that I may well be a ſtranger in this way of pleading cauſes. Allow me therefore the ſame favour as if I really were a ſtranger; ſeeing I ſhall uſe both the ſame words, and the ſame form of ſpeech, wherein I have been educated. This alſo I beg of you (and it ſeems moſt equitable you ſhould grant it to me) that you conſider not the manner of my pleading, whether it be rude or convenient: but diligently examine, and with all poſſible attention of mind perpend, whether the matter or ſubſtance of it be juſt or unjuſt. For

προκατάληψις, or *Pre-occupation*, where in he excuſeth his plain and familiar way of pleading, by his being inconverſant in *Forenſian* controverſies, and by his cuſtom, which is equivalent to Law: as alſo by this, that a Judge ought to conſider, not the elegancy, but truth of a defence.

this is the virtue of a Judge; as the virtue of an Orator is, to deliver truths.

The *Partition* of his plea, according to the diverſity of his accuſations.

Firſt then, O ye *Athenians*, I am obliged to anſwer to thoſe lyes, that are in the firſt place objected to me; and ſo to my firſt Accuſers: then to my laſt accuſations, and my laſt Adverſaries. For many have accuſed me to you, and long ſince in the ſpace of many years; yet have they never delivered a word of truth in all their charges: and theſe indeed I more fear, than I do *Anitus* and his fellows, though they likewiſe preſs me with the weight of their enmity and malicious combination. Yet the *others* truly are more preſſing and more powerful, who have even from your tender age, O men, perſwaded you, that the accuſations are true, which they objected againſt me falſly; namely, that there is one *Socrates*, a wiſe man forſooth, and one who ſearcheth into the nature of ſublime things, and enquireth into all things under the earth; who can by his Sophiſtical way of ſpeaking, make a bad ſpeech paſs current with the hearers for a good one. Theſe men, O *Athenians*, having ſpread abroad this rumor concerning me, theſe (I ſay) are vehement and prevalent

lent accuſers. For they who give ear to theſe ſcandals, preſently entertain a belief, that ſuch perſons as they repreſent me to be, converſant and curious in the ſtudy of Natural Cauſes, hold that there are no Gods. Beſides this, the number of my accuſers of this ſort is great; and their accuſations are of a long date, inſinuated and ingraffed into your minds, in that age which is credulous and eaſie to admit any perſwaſions, when moſt of you were boys, or rather little children: ſo that they accuſed me behind my back, and while I had no compurgator, no advocate to vindicate me; and (what is extremely unjuſt, and unreaſonable) I was not permitted either to know, or to produce the names of my accuſers. Only there was a confuſed whiſper, a darkſom muttering in the general, that it was a certain Comical Poet. And they who by envy and calumny traduce me to you, and breed in your minds an odium againſt me; have ſo ſtrongly poſſeſſed themſelves with the crimes objected to me, that they draw others alſo into the ſame perſwaſion: but thoſe no where appear in the light. For I can by no means obtain, that any one of them ſhould be brought hither to confront me, that I might have the liberty and opportunity

portunity to confute him: but am forced, while I make my defence againſt them, and endeavour to convince them of forgery; to combate as it were in the dark, no man appearing in the Liſts to anſwer me. Know this therefore, and conſider with your ſelves, that I have two ſorts of accuſers: ſome who have but even now accuſed me; others again who have been long verſed in this clandeſtine practiſe, of whom I ſpeak: and think that I am obliged to make anſwer to thoſe in the firſt place. Let it be ſo then, that I muſt form a defence for my ſelf, and do my utmoſt devoir, in this ſhort time allowed me, to remove and extirpate that ſiniſter opinion, which hath for a long time remained deeply rooted in your minds to my prejudice. This I would wiſh might be effected, to your and my own benefit: for in this my defence, I ſhould deſire to effect ſomewhat more. But that I conceive to be weighty and difficult: nor am I ignorant what will be the event of my Trial. Yet let the iſſue be ſuch, as may be gratefull to God; I muſt obey the Law, and anſwer.

Fetching then the firſt riſe of my wrongs from their Original, let us ſee in good earneſt what is that accuſation, from whence this

this Indictment drawn againſt me, hath proceeded; whereupon *Melitus* relying thus chargeth me. Let it be ſo. What did my adverſaries charge me with? for their [ἀντωμοσία, *i. e.*] their Libel of accuſation ratified on both ſides by mutual oath, is to be throughly read.

The *State*, and ſeveral *heads* of his *firſt* accuſation.

SOCRATES, *Contrary to right and equity, doth more curiouſly inveſtigate thoſe things that are under the Earth and in Heaven: and makes a bad ſpeech, by delivering it, good: and teacheth others alſo the ſame.*

This forſooth is the Libel of the Action, and form of the Indictment. The like unto which you may ſee in a Comedy of *Ariſtophanes*, * where is brought in the perſon of one *Socrates*, who pretends to walk in the air, and playes the Droll in a Farce of many other extravagances. Wherein I am, *Athenians*, neither little nor much skilled. Which I ſpeak not out of deſign to condemn that Art, or any man converſant therein; that I be not by *Melitus* involved in that crime, and made to undergo his puniſhment. But true it is, *Athenians*, I had never any converſe with things of this kind; whereof I am

* ἐν νεφελαῖς.

He diſavows that *ſublime ſcience* imputed to him.

am able to produce many witneſſes: and I would intreat you, that you inform each other, and enquire among your ſelves, who have ever heard me diſcourſing of any ſuch matters; and there are many preſent, who have frequently heard me in free and familiar conferences. Declare therefore openly, whether any of you have ever heard me ſpeaking little or much of theſe things: and from thence you ſhall underſtand, that the like credit is due to other fictions that very many ſcatter abroad concerning me. But certainly of theſe nothing is true.

And denieth that he ever either uſurped the Authority of a public *Teacher*, or exacted *reward* for his private inſtruction of youth.

Enquire alſo, whether you have heard from any man, that I ever endeavoured to teach men, and exact mony: neither is this true. Foraſmuch as I ever held it a thing highly meritorious and honorable for a man to teach and inſtruct others in Learning and Virtue, as *Gorgias* the *Leontine*, and *Prodicus*, *Ceus*, and *Hippias* the *Elean* have done. For each of theſe are able, to what Cities ſoever they travel, to perſwade young men, (and yet it was lawfull for them frankly to converſe with whomſoever they liked beſt of their own Citizens,) that quitting the converſe of all others,

others, they would intirely give up themſelves to their inſtructions, and moreover give them mony, in acknowledgment of the benefit received from their diſcipline, and to requite the favour. There is here preſent alſo another certain man, a *Parian*, and wiſe, whoſe reſidence in this City was grateful to me. For I by chance lighted upon a certain perſon, who gave more mony to *Sophiſts*, than all others; namely *Gallias* the Son of *Hipponichus*; and of him I asked this queſtion. Thou haſt two Sons, *Gallias*. If thoſe thy two Sons were Calves or Colts, doubtleſs we ſhould have ſome one ſet to be their *Tutor*, and a reward given to him, to teach them, each according to his particular Genius and capacity; (for he ſhould be skilful in Horſmanſhip, or in Agriculture) whereas now tho they be men, thou yet takeſt no care to provide them a Teacher and Governor. Who is there knowing and expert in this art of Humanity and Civility? I ſuppoſe, that being a Father of Sons, thou haſt conſidered of this matter. Is there (ſaid I) any man fit for this charge, or not? and for how much doth he teach? *Evenus* (anſwers he) the *Parian*, O *Socrates*; and his demand is five Attic *Minæ*. And I preſently commended *Evenus*, as a happy

happy man, if he were really endowed with this moſt uſefull art, and taught ſo ſtudiouſly and dextrouſly. Truely I ſhould glory, and boaſt my ſelf, were I knowing in theſe things: but I profeſs my ſelf, *Athenians*, altogether unacquainted with them. Here perhaps ſome one of you may *object*; but, *Socrates*, what is the matter then, from whence theſe criminations have been produced againſt thee? For unleſs thou didſt often do ſomething very remarkable, ſingular and very different from the cuſtom of others; ſo great a rumor would not have flown abroad concerning thee. For why ſhould this ignominy have faln upon thee, if thou hadſt done nothing ſtrange and unvulgar? Tell therefore what it is, leſt we, not underſtanding the matter, give a raſh judgement of thee. Who urges this, may ſeem to have reaſon for it. And I therefore will endeavour to lay before you what it is, that hath procured to me both a name and blame. Hear ye then, and tho to ſome of you I may ſeem to jeſt and droll; yet be moſt confident of this, that I will declare to you the whole truth. For I *Athenians*, have upon no other ground, but

He derives the popular *hate* oppreſſing him, from his frequent *reprehenſion* of men; as if he thought himſelf *wiſer* than all the reſt of mankind.

but that of ſome certain Wiſdom, acquired this name. But what Wiſedom? that perhaps, which is humane wiſedom. For with that I ſeem really to be endowed. Theſe perchance, whom I lately named, may be enriched with ſome greater wiſedom than that which is incident to man. To this I can oppoſe nothing; for ſuch wiſdom I underſtand not. But whoſoever ſaith this, doth lie, and ſay it on purpoſe to raiſe an odium againſt me by calumny. Nor be ye *Athenians* diſcompoſed, if I ſhall ſeem to declare to you ſomething that is great and remarkable. For I will deliver nothing from my ſelf, but refer to him who is above all exception, who will himſelf communicate the ſame things to you. For of my wiſdom, if I have any, ſuch as it is, I will give you for a witneſs that *Delphic God. Cherephon* ye all well know. He was my familiar companion even from the time when we were boys together; and alſo your Countrey-man: who both fled, and return'd with you: and you cannot but remember of what humour and diſpoſition he was; who vehement, whatſoever he undertok. And indeed when on a time he came to *Delphos*,

He juſtifies his practice of *reprehending* others, by alleging the expreſs command of *God*, whom he ought to obey.

Delphos, he had the boldneſs to conſult the *Oracle* about this matter. Be not (I beſeech you) *Athenians*, moved to a tumult by what I ſhall ſpeak. He inquired of the God, if there were any man wiſer than my ſelf: and *Pythia* anſwered, none was wiſer. The truth hereof, the Brother of that *Cherephon* will atteſt: for he is dead. Now ſeriouſly conſider, I pray, why I recount this to you. For I am coming to explain the cauſe, whence this calumny againſt me firſt aroſe. When I had heard of *Cherephons* adventure, I thus thought in my mind. What doth the God ſay? or what doth he ſignifie by theſe words? For I eſteem not my ſelf to be wiſe neither little nor much. What then can be his meaning, when he affirms that I am the wiſeſt of men? Lye he doth not, for that is to a God impoſſible. And long did I remain in doubt, profoundly conſidering his words: then not without difficulty I converted my ſelf to a certain diſpoſition of this kind. I came to one of thoſe who ſeemed to be wiſe, in hope I might here convince the ſaying of the Oracle, and ſo commonſtrate that he, not I (as the God had ſaid) was the wiſer. When therefore I had together with him examined the matter, (I need not name the man: he is one

of

of those who are imployed in Governing the Common-wealth, and managing Affairs of State) when (I say) I had conferred with him, somewhat of the like nature, *Athenians*, hapned to me. He seemed to me indeed to be accounted wise, both by others, and those many, and by himself chiefly; but was not really so. Then I endevoured to demonstrate to him, that though he thought himself wise, yet he was not so in reality. Hereby I fell into the displeasure and ill-will of him, and of very many others who were present: But retiring thence, I thought with my self, that I was wiser than that man, because neither of us seemed to know any thing Noble or Excellent: only he (thought I to my self) believes he knows something, when he knows nothing; but I, as I know nothing, so I think I know nothing. Herein therefore I took my self to be a little wiser of the two: in that I deceived not my self with an Opinion that I knew that, whereof really I was ignorant. After this I addressed to another, who seemed yet wiser than the first: but found no difference betwixt them, as to wisdom. Whereupon I incurred his hatred also, and that of many of his Admirers. Then I went likewise to others; being sensible of my ill

 succes,

ſucceſs, and grieved ſufficiently therewith, as much fearing leſt I might ſtir up hatred and envy againſt my ſelf: Nevertheleſs I conceived my ſelf under an abſolute neceſſity of highly valuing the voice of God, and turning my ſelf to all parts, by going to all thoſe who thought they knew ſomething, that in the end I might explore the true ſenſe of the Oracle. But I Swear to you *Athenians*, (for I muſt declare the Truth) that while I perſued my ſcrutiny according to the voice of God, I met with the like Fortune; diſcovering, that ſuch who attained to the greateſt name and glory, ſeemed to come vaſtly ſhort of wiſdom: but others, accounted inferior to them, were more diſpoſed to, and better qualified for the acquiſition of it. 'Tis fit and pertinent, that *I* ſhew you my Errors, what great pains *I* took, to render the Faith and Authority of the Oracle Sacred and indubitate with me. After theſe States-men and Grandees, *I* addreſſed my ſelf to *Poets*, and Wri-

κὺν τὴν κύνα; *per Canem*, by the *Dogg-ſtarr*; An Oath uſed by ſome *Grecians*, even Philoſophers. but probably derived from the old *Egyptians*, among whom the Dogg-ſtar, the brighteſt of all fixed ſtars was adored as a Divine *Numen*; as well becauſe the Exundation of their *Nile* began at the riſing of that Star, as becauſe they believed their *Iſis* to have been ſtelliſied into Αςροκύων, this Celeſtial Dogg.

Writers of *Tragedies* and *Dithyrambios*, and others of the same Tribe: as if here *I* should perspicuously, and by Surprise (as they say) discover, that *I* was more unskilful, more ignorant than they. Taking therefore their *Poems* into my hands, and noting those things they seemed to have written with greater subtilty, and higher strains of Wit; *I* diligently asked them, what they could say, that *I* might at the same time learn something from them? *I* blush to tell you the truth, *Athenians*: but do it *I* must, though very briefly: all that were present almost spake more favourably of those *Poems*, than they who had made them. So *I* soon found concerning *Poets*, that they perform what they do, not by the power of Wisdom, but by a certain *impetus* of Nature, and fury of Divine incitement; as *Prophets* fore-tell things by Divine instinct or Enthusiasm, propheſying many Noble and Notable things, but not understanding so much as one word of what they deliver. With the same affection *Poets* appeared to me to be inspired and incited: and *I* discovered likewise, that they, upon the account of their faculty in Poetry, think themselves the wisest of all men, even in other things; whereof notwithstanding they are utterly

ignorant. From theſe therefore I departed, as from the former, and with the ſame reaſon too: thinking my ſelf to excel, as the *Politicians*, ſo likewiſe the *Poets*. At length *I* betook my ſelf to *Artificers* of *Mechanic* Works: conſcious to my ſelf, that in thoſe *I* knew nothing at all, (*I* comprehend all in a word) and well underſtanding, that *I* ſhould find thoſe plain People to have knowledge of many and excellent things. Nor did my opinion deceive me, for they knew things that *I* underſtood not, and were ſo far wiſer than *I*. Yet even the moſt eminent *Artificers* ſeemed involved in the very ſame Fault with the *Poets*; in that they alſo, becauſe they had ſhewn themſelves great Maſters in their Mechanics, would every one be accounted moſt skilful alſo in other even the greateſt matters; and this Fault of theirs wholly darkens the lights of their skill. Wherefore *I* interrogated my ſelf alſo, about the ſenſe of the Oracle, whether *I* had rather be as *I* was; neither wiſe with their wiſdom, nor unskilful with their unskilfulneſs: or be, as they are, comparated or diſpoſed both wayes; and *I* anſwered my ſelf and the Oracle, that it was more commodious and profitable to me, to be as *I* am. From this Diſquiſition, *Athenians*, many

many offences, and those most difficult too, and grievous, have come against me; and thence as many imputations, scandals, and criminations, and calumnies: and so it came to pass, that *I* was named the *wise* man. For they who are in my company, daily suppose me to be singularly knowing in those matters, wherein *I* reprehend and evince other mens errors.

His Explanation of the sense of the *Oracle*.

But it seems, *Athenians*, that *God alone is wise*: and the sense of the Oracle this, that *Humane wisdom is to be very little or nothing esteemed*. And the Oracle expressly nominated *Socrates* for no other reason but this, that by misusing my name, it might propose me as an *example*: as if it would say, this man, O Mortals, is the wisest of ye all, who, as *Socrates*, well knows, that as to wisdom, he is not to be valued at all. Being then of this temper of mind, I to this very day enquire strictly every where, and according to the words of that Divine Oracle, seek both among my Fellow-Citizens, and Strangers, if *I* can find a man worthy to be reputed wise: but when *I* discern any not to be really wise, truly out of Conformity to God, *I* clearly demonstrate him to be not wise. And being wholly Devoted to this

good Work, I have no leisure allowed m
neither to Transact any public affair of m
ment, nor to regulate my own Domest
concerns; but am cast into the streights
profound poverty, by reason of that my
bedience to God. Besid
this, some Youths born
most Wealthy Families, a
having leisure enough, fo
lowing me of their ow
Free-will, are highly d
ighted when they he
men reproved and conv
cted by me; and they all
in imitation of me, do ther
selves often endeavour

Another cause of the vulgar *Odium* cast upon him, viz. that many Noble youths were delighted with his convincing discourses, and imitated him in reproving others, who taking Offence thereat, reflected upon him, as the corruptor of Youth.

refute others: nor is it to be doubted, b
they find a very great multitude of suc
who believe themselves to understand a
know many things, when yet in truth th
know few or none at all. Hereupon the
who are refuted, grow angry, not wi
them, but me: and say, there is one *Soc
tes*, a man of most impure and dangero
manners, who corrupteth young men: a
if any ask them, whether it be by teac
ing or doing any thing unjustifiable, that
corrupt youth: they can alledg nothing
particular, because indeed they know n
where

wherein to inſtance: nevertheleſs that they may not ſeem to be at a loſs, they charge me with thoſe imputations that are laid upon almoſt all Philoſophers, and in every mans mouth, that forſooth *I am exceſſively curious in ſearching into the nature of things both ſublime and under the earth, that I think there are no Gods, and that I can by my Sophiſtical arguments turn an ill Speech into a good one.* They will not (*I* believe) declare the Truth, becauſe they manifeſtly appear to pretend to know things, whereof notwithſtanding they are altogether ignorant. For they who traduce me, being men ambitious and vehement, many in number, and furniſhed with Harangues artificially compoſed to gain belief; they have filled your Ears, both heretofore and now, with a charge deſigned againſt me. Among theſe, *Melitus*, *Anytus*, and *Lycon* have aſſaulted me: *Melitus* on behalf of *Poets*; *Anytus* in the name of *Artificers* and *Politicians*; *Lycon* as Champion of *Orators*, enraged againſt me. *I* ſhould wonder then (as *I* ſaid in the beginning) if *I* ſhould be able in ſo ſhort a time to diſſolve ſuch a charge, which made up of ſo great calumnies, is grown inveterate and hard. Theſe are truths, *Athenians*; ſo that *I* have concealed nothing

from you, nor detracted or evaded any the least point, though *I* well knew *I* should incur their hatred. Which is an Argument that I speak Truths, and that that is my Crimination, and those the causes of it: and whether now or hereafter you inquire into these things, you shall certainly find them to be as I have represented them to you. Thus far then let this be taken for a full answer before you, against the Crimes charged upon me by my *first* Accusers.

Having answered the Articles of his first charge, he now converts to the *Second*; which he Recites.

To *Melitus*, a good man and (as he saith himself) a lover of his City, and to my *last* Adversaries, I will endevour to Answer anon. Mean-while let us resume the Libel of Accusation plotted against me and ratified by an Oath mutually given and taken by all of the Combination (for some Accusers there are, distinct from the *former*) which speaks thus.

Socrates, *contrary to Right and Equity doth corrupt Youth; the Gods which the City judgeth to be Gods, he thinks to be no Gods; and introduceth new Powers Divine.* This is my Accusation; the Heads whereof let us examine singly.

He

He ſaith *firſt*, that *I do contrary to Right and Equity, in that I corrupt Youth:* and I affirm that *Miletus* himſelf doth contrary to Right and Equity, in that he Jeſteth in a ſerious matter: while he brings another into peril of loſing his life, pretending himſelf to be highly ſolicitous, and to labour exceedingly about theſe matters, which have never been any part of his care [perhaps never (unleſs upon this occaſion) in his thoughts:] and that this is ſo, I will trie to demonſtrate to you. Come hither, O *Melitus*, and tell me, doſt thou take care of nothing elſe, but that young men may become virtuous to the higheſt degree? Very well. Now tell theſe, who may make theſe yong men better: for this thou muſt needs know, ſince thou haſt ſo long and deeply conſidered the matter. For me thou haſt (as thou ſaiſt) taken already corrupting them: and upon that account now violently bringeſt me, by a ſtudied and formal Accuſation, to be judged by theſe. Tell us then, who may inſtruct and improve youth in Virtue? inform us, and ſhew theſe men who it is.

The *firſt* Article thereof; which he diſſolves: demonſtrating it to be objected to him by *Miletus* meerly out of malice, not of reſpect to the virtuous Education of Youth, which *Melitus* neither underſtood, nor ſtudied.

Thou

Thou ſeeſt, *Melitus*, thou art ſilent, and haſt not a word to reply: Nor doth it ſeem to misbecome thee; and ſo is a juſt Argument thou never troubledſt thy Head with this care: yet tell me, in good earneſt, who may make theſe better? *The Laws.* Of that I enquire not: but what man, who firſt hath known alſo this very thing, namely the Laws. *Theſe Judges, Socrates.* How ſayeſt thou *Melitus?* can theſe teach young men, and refine them? *yes.* Can all theſe, or ſome of them do that work, and others not? *All.* Thou ſayeſt well, by *Juno*; and doſt commemorate good ſtore of thoſe who are able to help. But what? can theſe *Auditors* alſo reform men? *They can.* And the *Senators* too? The *Senators* alſo. Well then, *Melitus*; we muſt now ſee whether they who make Speeches to the people, corrupt young men, or reform them. *And theſe too.* It ſeems then, *Athenians*, that all render young men good and honeſt, except my ſelf, who alone debauch them. Saiſt thou ſo? I again and again affirm it. Thou imprinteſt upon me a brand of great infelicity indeed: but anſwer me, haſt thou the ſame Opinion of Horſes alſo? do all men make them better, one only excepted, who corrupts them? or the contrary to this, is there

there any one who can do it: or few skilful in Horſemanſhip, but on the contrary many, who while they dreſs, manage and uſe Horſes, wholly ſpoil them? is it not ſo of both Horſes, and all other Animals? Certainly it is, whether thou and *Anytus* affirm or deny it. Since young men would attain to a certain very high felicity, if there were only one to corrupt them, and all beſides would improve them, But thou, *Melitus* haſt ſufficiently demonſtrated, that thou takeſt no care of young men: and clearly ſheweſt thy negligence, that thou haſt never laboured in theſe matters, whereof thou accuſeſt me. Furthermore *Melitus*, reſolve us this queſtion alſo by *Jove*; whether it is better to dwell among good and ſober Citizens, or among evil and debauch? Anſwer me, prithee; for I ask nothing difficult. Do not evil men always bring ſome Evil upon thoſe who live neer them: and on the contrary, good Neighbors bring good? moſt certainly. Is there any who had rather receive damage from thoſe with whom he converſeth, than beneſit? Anſwer,

The falſitie of the ſame Article evinced alſo by this; that if *Socrates* had corrupted Youth, *Melitus* ought, according to the preſcript of the Law, firſt to have privatly admoniſhed him, before he had accuſed him thereof to the Magiſtrates: but this he had never done: *Ergo.*

Anſwer, prithee; for the Law commands thee to Anſwer: Is any willing to ſuffer Detriment? By no means. Go too then; ſeeing thou haſt hurried me into Judgement, as a corrupter of youth, and Patron of Vice; do I this willingly, or unwillingly? Willingly, as I conceive. What then, *Melitus*? art thou ſo much Wiſer than I? thou a young man, doſt thou? ſo far excel me an old one, as to underſtand, that evil men bring evil upon thoſe who chiefly converſe with them; but good men bring good? and am I ſo great a Fool, as not to underſtand this, that if I debauch any Familiar, I ſhall be in danger of ſuffering ſome Evil from him: and ſo ſhall be willing to pull this ſo great Evil upon my ſelf, as thou ſaiſt? Herein, *Melitus*, I believe thee not, nor (I think) doth any man elſe. Wherefore either I do not corrupt youth, or I do it againſt my will: ſo that thou lyeſt in both. If I corrupt *unwillingly*, the Law forbids all ſuch to be brought hither into Judgment, who have offended unwillingly; but commands they be privatly both inſtructed and admoniſhed. For manifeſt it is, that upon inſtruction, I ſhould ceaſe to do what I did againſt my will: but thou haſt avoided and declined to converſe with me, and to admoniſh me;

and

and inſtead of that, forceſt me to this place of Judgement, whither the Law requires only ſuch incorrigible Offenders to be brought, who need rather Coercion then admonition. But *Athenians*, this is evident, what I ſaid before, that *Melitus* never had any the leaſt care of this matter.

A ſoft and ſmooth *Tranſition* to the *Second* Article; viz. that *Socrates* held there were no *Gods*, and introduced *others* than thoſe the *Athenians* worſhipped; and a demonſtration thereof to be *abſurd*, and *repugnant* to it ſelf.

Yet tell us, *Melitus*, how thou canſt prove that I corrupt Youth: is it from the form of the indictment thou haſt drawn againſt me; as if I thought thoſe not to be Gods, whom the City holds to be Gods; and introduced new Divinities, and by teaching this, corrupt Youth? *all this* I *ſtrongly averr.* By thoſe very Gods then, whereof we now ſpeak, explain thy ſelf more clearly to me, and to theſe here preſent, for I cannot underſtand, whether thou meaneſt, that I teach there are no Gods, (and I hold there are ſome Gods, nor am I truly without God, nor do I in that offend) or that I hold not thoſe to be Gods, that the City believes to be ſuch, but ſome others. is this that whereof thou accuſeſt me, that

that I hold there are *others*? or this, that
hold there are *none*.

Prithee, *Melitus*, why ſaiſt thou this? d
I hold neither the Sun, no
Moon to be Gods, as o
ther men think them t
be? *Not by Jove*, Judge
for the Sun he affirms to b
a Stone, *and the* Moo
Earth. Thou thinkeſt tho
accuſeſt *Anaxagoras*, m
Melitus; and ſo contemne
theſe here, and ſuppoſe
them unlearned, and igno
rant that the Books of *A*
naxagoras Clazomenius ar
full of ſuch matters. Nov
would Young men learn
from me theſe Doctrines, which they migh
ſometimes pick up from the Muſic-room o
the Play-houſe, for not much more than
dragm? I allow thee to laugh at *Socrates*
if he feigned theſe Opinions to be his
when they are wholly abſurd and fooliſh
But tell me, by *Jove*, *Melitus*, ; thinkeſt thou
that I hold there is no God? I *think ſo*
Thou ſpeakeſt things incredible, *Melitus*
ſuch as neither thy ſelf doſt, nor canſt be
lieve. This man, *Athenians*, ſhews him
ſel

Tis worthy to be obſerved, that here *Socrates* doth not plainly deny the *Sun* and *Moon* and other Deities of the *Ethnics* to be *Gods*; for that had made him guilty; but wiſely Eludes the danger, by Tranſferring that Doctrin upon *Anaxagoras*; and by reducing his accuſer to the point of proving, that he held there was no *God*, which is *impoſſible*.

ſelf injurious and petulant; and to have brought this accuſation meerly for Reproach, and from impotency of Youthful Malepartneſs, and diſtemper of Brain. He ſeems to have propoſed a kind of Riddle, or darkſom ſaying, out of deſign to tempt me; whether forſooth that Wiſe man *Socrates* (ſaith he) will perceive that I jeſt, and contradict my ſelf: or I can deceive both him and thoſe who hear me? For, this man appears to ſpeak things repugnant each to other, in his very Libel of Accuſation: as if he ſaid, *Socrates* offends in that he thinks there are no Gods. This truly is the part of a mocker.

Conſider with me, how he ſeems to ſpeak this contradiction; and do thou *Melitus*, anſwer us: and ye remember (as I beſought you before) not to be diſordered to a Tumult, if I ſpeak to you after my uſual manner. Is there among Mortals any one man, *Melitus*, who thinking there are Humane things, can at the ſame time not think there are Men? Let him anſwer, *Athenians*; and let there be no diſturbance. Is there any man, *Melitus*, who holding there

Another *anſwer* from the *Hypotheſis* of his Adverſaries. They Object, he pretended to *Divine inſpiration*; and yet charge him with denying *Divine powers*; which is a manifeſt *contradiction*.

there is ſuch a thing as Horſemanſhip, can hold there are no Horſes? can he think there are Miniſtries of Pipers, and Modes and Tunes, but no Pipers? certainly there is no man ſo void of all ſenſe and reaſon. If thou refuſeſt to anſwer, I will anſwer for thee and others. But anſwer me this further; is there any who confeſſeth there are things *Divine*, and can yet deny the being of Gods? *No man.* How ſlow thou art? thou haſt hardly afforded an anſwer, though forced thereunto by theſe: But doſt thou ſay, that I hold and teach there are *Dæmonia* [*i.* certain Divine Powers] whether New or Old? if then, as thou confeſſeſt, I hold there are Divine Powers, and I Swear the ſame in the Bill of my Anſwer, 'tis of undeniable neceſſity, that I hold alſo there are *Dæmones*, *i. e. Gods.* Is not this neceſſary? 'Tis ſo, for I take thy ſilence for Confeſſion.

An amplification of the ſame Argument from hence, that all *Relatives* imply the Exiſtence each of other.

But theſe *Dæmones*, do We conceive them to be Gods, or the Sons of Gods. Doſt thou affirm, or deny this? I *affirm it.* If then I hold there are *Dæmones*, as thou affirmeſt, if ſome Gods be *Dæmones*; this is the very thing, wherein I affirm thou doſt Jeſt in obſcure Words: when thou ſaiſt, I think

think not that there are Gods, and on the contrary think there are Gods: seeing thou granteſt, that I think there are *Dæmones*.

And if theſe *Dæmones* be the Sons of Gods, Baſtards begotten upon either *Nymphs*, or ſome others, ſuch as are vulgarly talked of; what man can hold them to be the Sons of Gods, and yet hold that the Gods themſelves are not? for it would be equally abſurd, as if a man ſhould affirm there are Sons of Horſes, or of Aſſes, Mules; but deny Horſes & Aſſes themſelves to be in *rerum natura*. But *Melitus*, thou haſt formed this Accuſation againſt me, either that thou mighteſt Experiment my skill in Reaſoning, or certainly becauſe thou hadſt nothing to object to me as a true crime. Couldſt thou perſwade any man who hath but a ſpark of ſenſe and underſtanding, that the ſame man can hold there are [δαιμόνια, & θεῖα] Divine things, and yet at the ſame time deny there are either *Dæmones*, or Gods, or Heroes? this cannot be poſſible. And ſo, *Athenians*, it is not neceſſary for me further to demonſtrate, that I am not in the leaſt point guilty of the charge contrived by *Melitus* againſt me: ſeeing theſe particulars ſeem abundantly cleared and proved.

Having refuted *Melitus* in all parts of his Indictment, so that he need not doubt of Absolution from impartial *Judges*: he yet shews his danger from the prejudice and inveterate hatred of the *people*, always insense to good men.

Now ye may take it for an evident Truth, that (as I said afore) among the multitude also there was raised up very great hatred against me: and that is it which if any thing do, will take away my life; not *Melitus*, nor *Anitus*, but the very Crimination and Odium of the people; which hath destroyed many other good men, and will likewise destroy many in times to come; for there is nothing of incommodity, if this plague ended in me. But some one may here ask, Art not thou ashamed, *Socrates*, to undertake this so great an Enterprise, which may bring thee into present danger of Death? and I think I may return him this just Answer.

That a virtuous and valiant man is not, even by death it self, deterred from doing his duty; which he confirms by *Examples*.

Thou art grossly mistaken whoever thou art, if thou thinkest that a brave and valiant man makes any difference betwixt, or is at all concerned in life or death, where any, though but little Utility may from thence result: and that he doth not, when he undertakes any Enterprise, thoroughly consider this, whether he therein

in performs Things juſt or unjuſt, whether he doth the work of a Good or Ill man. For according to that thy reaſon, all the *Heroes*, or *Half-Gods* who dyed at *Troy*, were wicked and profligate; as well others, as the Son of *Thetis*, who that he might ſuffer nothing of diſhonor, ſo far contemned death, that after his Mother, the Goddeſs her ſelf, oppoſing his deſire of killing *Hector*, had aſſured him that if he to Revenge the ſlaughter of his Friend and Kinſman *Patroclus*, ſhould kill *Hector*, he ſhould himſelf be ſlain; in theſe very words (if I be not miſtaken.)

Hector once killed, thou too ſhalt ſurely die.

He nevertheleſs perſiſted in his Reſolution, deſpiſing death and danger; he rather feared, leſt Surviving, he ſhould be held diſhoneſt and unfaithful, if he vindicated not the injuries of his Friends; and thereupon inſtantly retorts. *Let me dye puniſhing an injurious man, leſt here expoſed to the Laughter and ſcorn of the Greeks, I ſit on Ship-board an unprofitable Burthen of the Earth.* Think'ſt thou that he was concerned in death, or any other danger. Thus it is, *Athenians*: in what place ſoever any man is ſet, either by his own Judgment that it will be beſt,

for moſt commodious for him, or by command of the Magiſtrate, he is oblieged therein conſtantly to perſiſt, whatever danger threatens him; nor is he to conſider any other thing ſo much as this, how he may avoid *Diſhonor*. Truly *Athenians*, I ſhould involve my ſelf in a very great Wickedneſs, if having hitherto, even to the Hazard of my Life, conſtantly maintained my ſtation in that place, n which they whom you had conſtituted my Generals, have ſet me, whether in *Potidæa*, or in *Amphipolis*, or in *Delium*: I ſhould now at length when God hath ordered and conſtituted me in that degree [as I have hitherto conceived, and with full perſwaſion of mind entertained that Judgment] that it behoves me to ſpend my life in Philoſophizing; and ſo to ſearch and throughly examine both my ſelf and others: commit a very hainous ſin, if for fear of death, or any other terror, I ſhould abandon my ſtation, and deſert my office. And then certainly any man might drag me to judgment without injuſtice, for that I, from fear of death, diſobeying the command of the Oracle, held

He argueth *a minori ad majus*, if the Authority of a mortal General, be ſo great, as to oblige all under his Command, to maintain their ſtations with invincible conſtancy, what ought we to think, of the authority of *God*.

held there are no Gods; and for that I thought my ſelf to be wiſe, when I am not ſo. For *to fear Death*, O ye men, is nothing elſe but for a man *to think himſelf wiſe, who is far from being ſo*, for he thinks he knows what he doth not know. For no mortal knows, whether Death be not mans greateſt good: and yet they fear death, as if they certainly knew it to be of all Evils the greateſt. And who ſees not, that it is an infamous and ſhameful ignorance, to think ones ſelf to know that, whereof he is utterly ignorant? But I, *Athenians*, herein very much differ from many men: and if I durſt affirm my ſelf wiſer than any other in any one thing, it ſhould be in this, that I underſtand nothing concerning the ſtate and condition of thoſe *below*; nor think I know it. This one thing I certainly know; that to do injury to any man, or to rebel againſt our Superiors, whether God or Men, is ſinful and ſhameful. But as for thoſe things, which I know not whether they be good or evil; certainly I never will either fear or avoid them, rather than thoſe which I certainly know to be evil. If therefore repudiating the

Since it would be a crime equivalent to *Atheiſm* or *impiety*, for him to relinquiſh his office of *reproving* men; he declares his firm reſolution to perſiſt in the execution thereof, in contempt of all danger, yea of death it ſelf.

Counsel of *Anytus*, who saith, that either I ought not to have been brought to this judgment at all; or that since I am come hither, you are in prudence obliged to adjudg me to capital punishment: and subjoyns this reason, that if I escape condemnation, it will come to pass, that your Sons eagerly, and with zeal pursuing the Lessons I teach them, will all be wholly corrupted: if (I say) ye should acquit and dismiss me, and say to me, *Socrates*, at this time we give no credit at all to *Anytus*, but acquit and discharge thee; yet on this condition, that henceforth thou never again meddle with this Disquisition, that is, never more Philosophize; and if thou art found to do it, thou shalt certainly be punished with death: if (as I said) ye would acquit me upon these conditions; I should tell ye, that indeed I acknowledg and thank ye for your good will and favour, but choose rather to obey God than you, and that while I live, and am able to do it, I will never cease to Philosophize, and to teach and exhort every one of you whom I shall meet, and after my manner to inculcate thus. " And thou, who also art a Ci-

προσωποποιία, *sive* (*ut* Ciceroni *vocatur*) *Conformatio, qua* Socrates *sibi personam, quæ non adest, adesse confingit.*

tizen

" tizen of *Athens*, a City both exceeding
" great, and moſt renowned, as well for
" wiſdom as power; feareſt thou not to
" undertake the menage and conduct of
" an affair of importance, and to acquire
" Honor; that thoſe [advantages] may be
" accumulated upon thee; and yet takeſt
" no care, no conſideration of prudence
" and verity, *i.e.* of thy own mind, to ren-
" der it moſt accompliſht and noble? If any
man ſhould deſire contentiouſly to oppugn
this my admonition, and affirm, that he doth
take care alſo of thoſe [moſt excellent]
things, [prudence and truth:] I would not
preſently diſmiſs him, and go my way; but
would interrogate, and by ſtrict examinati-
on ſift him, and ſo convince him. If I conceiv-
ed him to be unfurniſhed with virtue,
though he ſhould never ſo confidently own
himſelf to be therewith adorned; I would
rebuke him, and ſeverely tell him, that he
hath no eſteem for things of greateſt mo-
ment, but puts too great value upon things
vile and contemptible. And this will I do
to every man, young or old, Citizen or ſtran-
ger, whomſoever I ſhall meet: but more ſtu-
diouſly to Citizens, as you are more neerly
related to me. For ſo (believe me) God
commands me to do. Nor do I think a

After the divine authority of his commiſſion to reform men; he here aſſerts the excellent *utility* of it.

greater good can come to your City, than that I perform this ſervice to God, For, addicting my ſelf intirely to this work, and pretermitting all other affairs, I walk up and down with no other deſign, but to perſwade you, young and old, to eſteem neither bodies, nor riches, nor any thing elſe, before, nor ſo much as your *mind*, that it be with all poſſible ſpeed refined to the laſt degree of goodneſs. And I give this reaſon: that Virtue hath not its being from riches; but from Virtue flow both riches, and all other goods, as well privatly as publickly to men. Now if I corrupt youth by ſaying theſe things, let them be hurtful: but if any one avouches, that I ſay other things beſides theſe, he ſaith nothing. In fine, I ſhall anſwer to theſe things, do ye, *Athenians*, believe *Anytus*, or not; diſcharge me, or not; do according to your pleaſure: I will never do any thing but this, though I were to ſuffer many deaths. Be not diſturbed, *Athenians*, but continue the calm attention I begged of ye; leſt you excite a tumult by reaſon of what I ſhall ſpeak: but hear me patiently. Which if ye ſhall do, ye will (I think) receive from thence

no

no little emolument. Other things beſides I ſhall ſpeak, that perhaps will move ye to æxclame: but pray, forbear to do ſo. For be well aſſured, that if ye ſhall put me to death, me, ſuch a man as I deſcribe myſelf to be: ye will bring greater loſs to your City, to your ſelves, than to me: for neither ſhall *Melitus*, nor *Anytus* hurt me in the leaſt, nor could they. Since I think it *impoſſible, that a good man ſhould be violated by a wicked man.* He will murder me perhaps, or expel, or diſgrace me; and he, and ſome others will account thoſe to be great evils: but I think them not to be ſuch. Nay I rather hold, that to do the actions that he doth, is a great evil indeed: for he attempts to inflict puniſhment unjuſtly upon an innocent man. Now therefore *Athenians*, I am ſo far from making a Defenſe for my ſelf (as ſome may expect) that I will ſpeak rather for your ſakes; leſt by giving ſentence againſt me, ye hainouſly ſin againſt the *gift of God that is in me*: for if ye kill me, ye ſhall not eaſily find ſuch another, one who (that I may ſpeak truly and candidly, though bluntly and ridiculouſly) being by God appointed to the

μείζαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν. *Quæ verba ipſemet Sanctus Apoſtolus* Paulus *alicubi emphatice recinit.*

the care and overſight of this your City, am conſtituted ſupervisor thereof, and Moderator; that I might ſit upon it, as upon a Horſe great and generous indeed, but by reaſon of his huge bulk, dull and ſlow, and to be excited by ſharp pricks. Exactly ſo God ſeems to me, to have placed me over the City, that I may incite ye, and perſwade ye, end reprove every Mothers Son of ye, ceaſing not daily to ſit by [and admoniſh] every one in every place. Such another [*monitor*] *Athenians*, will not eaſily come to ye: and therefore (if ye believe me, ſpare me. Though ye perhaps, filled with indignation, as men rouzed up from profound ſleep, and following the Counſel of *Anytus*, rejecting mine, ſhall without remorſe put me to death: yet be moſt confident, you ſhall ſpend the remainder of your life in drowſineſs, unleſs God, taking care of ye, ſhall ſend ſome other [to excite ye.] And that I am ſuch a man, by the ſpecial favour and bounty of God given to the City, ye may collect from hence. It ſeems not con-

A farther proof of the Divine authority of his *Office*, from his neglect of all his private and Domeſtick affairs, only that he might execute that with diligence, for the Public good.

ſenta-

ſentaneous to Humane reaſon, that I, caſting away all care of my own private affairs, have ſo tempered my ſelf, as to endure ſo many years together in that contempt of my domeſtic concernments; and wholly apply my ſelf to the adminiſtration of yours, by catching hold of, and going unto every one, and as a Father, or elder Brother, inculcating to ye, that ye ſhould ſtudiouſly addict your ſelves to Virtue. If from theſe adviſes of mine I received any emolument, or any reward, to my own private uſes, and gave them to that end; that would ſeem to rely upon ſome probable reaſon; but ye ſee, that my very Adverſaries themſelves, who have impudently forged ſo many lies againſt me, could not yet to their higheſt improbity adjoyn that ſhameleſs boldneſs, either to accuſe me, or oppoſe any witneſs to me, as if I had exacted or asked a reward from any one at any time. And of this truth, I might bring my poverty as a competent, and (I think) a convincing witneſs.

Now it may perhaps ſeem abſurd, that I running to and fro to ſeveral men, and with extreme diligence buſying my ſelf, ſhould give counſel to each one apart; but not dare to addreſs my ſelf in public to the peo-

people, to give the same advises to the City.

The reason why he had not addressed his Counsels to the *City* in general, but only to particular men, *viz.* that he was forbidden to meddle with the public, by his *Dæmonium*; (*vide Apulium de Socratis Dæmonio.*)

The cause of this, is what most of ye have heard from me, oftentimes, in various places. I have *something Divine*, and a *Dæmonium*, a certain *Voice:* at which *Melitus* indeed in his accusation railed expressly. This began with me from a Boy, namely a certain voice, which when it hath been perceptible, alwaies recals me from that thing I was going to do; but never impells me to undertake any thing; this is that which forbids me to interest my self in matters of the State, or of public concernment to the City. And indeed it seems with admirable prudence to oppose me [therein.] For *Athenians*, if in times past I had taken upon me the administration of *Civil* affairs, truly I had long since perished; so that I could not have been any way useful either to you, or to my self. Be not inflamed with indignation against me speaking the truth;

That he might decline the danger impendent over all *good* men, who interest themselves in the administration of State affairs; and so the longer perform his duty, in *reprehending* men.

" truth; for there is no man, who if he ſhall " ingeniouſly and boldly oppoſe either " you, or any other people, and hinder the " doing of many acts of injuſtice and impie- " ty in a City, can ever be preſerved in ſafe- " ty: and whoever ſincerely contends for " the maintenance of Juſtice, muſt be obli- " ged, if he deſire to live any the leaſt time " in peace and ſafety, to lead a private life, " without intereſſing himſelf in the admini- " ſtration of public buſineſſes. Hereof I will give you very ſtrong arguments, not words, but (what ye more value) realities and matters of fact. Hear therefore what hapned to me, that ye may underſtand, that I have in no reſpect yeilded to any in the defence of what is juſt, for fear of death; no not when I ſeemed to incur preſent danger of deſtruction, by refuſing to yield. I will tell ye things Offenſive, and pertinent to this way of pleading cauſes in Court, yet true. For, I, *Athenians*, never bore Office in the Commonwealth, yet attained to the dignity of *Senator*; and our Tribe *Antiochis* obtained the Lieutenancy of the Supream power, when ye

He atteſteth his conſtant adherence to *Equity* and *Juſtice*, even when he thereby incurred preſent danger of death; and that by many *inſtances* yet freſh in the memory of ſome of his *Judges*.

ye cenſured ten Military Officers to be condemned to death, for not burying the ſlain in a Naval fight, and this againſt Law, as ye after judged. Then I being one of the *Council* of *Athens* oppoſed you, that ye might not give a judgment contrary to Law; and made a decree contrary to yours, the Orators then ready to call me to the Bar, and appoint a day for my Trial, ye alſo ſenting, and by acclamations approving their Indictment: yet I choſe rather to be in danger with Law and Juſtice, than aſſent to your unjuſt votes, notwithſtanding the terror of impriſonment or death. And theſe things fell out at that time, when the City was governed by equal *Democracy:* but when it afterward fell under the domination of a *Few*, the *thirty Tyrants* ſent me the fifth man to *Tholus*, that we ſhould bring from *Salomine*, *Leontes*, *Salaminius*, to be put to death, as they commanded many others alſo, to the end they might derive the envy of their [own] many crimes upon the heads of many others. Then I not by words, but actions, demonſtrated, that the fear of death (that I may ſpeak a little roughly and clowniſhly) touched me not: and that my grand care and concernment was, that I might commit nothing unjuſt and impious. Nor truly did

did the command and government of those Tyrants, however violent and cruel, so terrifie me, as to make me do any unjust act. But after we departed from *Tholus*, four [of the Embassadors] went on to *Salamine*, and brought away *Leontes*; and I went home: and perhaps I should for this cause have been put to death, had not that Tyranny been soon after subverted and destroyed: and of these traverses I have many witnesses. Now whether do ye think, that I could have continued safe so many years together, if I had imployed my self in matters belonging to the State: and so deporting my self, as became a good man, had vindicated and maintained just causes, and thereunto seriously and studiously devoted all my devoirs? It had been impossible, *Athenians*; nor any men else. But truly through the whole course of my life, both publickly if I acted any thing, and privatly, I still have kept to the same rule, never to yeild to any man, neither to other, nor to any one of these, whom my accusers individuously call my *Disciples*, in any thing contrary to right and equity. Nor have I ever been *Preceptor* to any man: but if any were desirous to hear my discourses, whether he were young or old, I never denied him this; nor do I dispute

diſpute to get money, or if mony be wanting, leſs: but with equal freedom offer my ſelf to be interrogated, to the rich and to the poor, and whoſoever pleaſes, hears my anſwers. If by theſe my anſwers and conferences, any man hath become either ſober, and of good and honeſt converſation, or debaucht and vitious; tis not juſt, that I ſhould bear the blame thereof; ſeeing I neither taught, nor promiſed to teach any man. And if any ſhall ſay, he hath learned, or heard from me in private, any thing, that all might not with equal freedom hear: be ye moſt aſſured, he ſpeaks moſt untruly. But the reaſon why ſome are delighted with frequent and long converſation, ye have heard *Athenians*. 'Tis wholly this, as I declared; that thoſe who are admitted to my conferences, are much pleaſed to hear ſuch who think themſelves to be wiſe, but are not ſo, examined and refuted; for this is not unpleaſant. And that I ſhould thus confute ſuch, I affirm to be a duty impoſed upon me by *God*, both by *Vaticinations*, and by *Dreams*, and all other waies, whereby *Oracles* are wont to deliver commands. Theſe things, *Athenians*, are both true, and ſuch as may be eaſily proved. For if I now of late corrupt ſome young men, and have long ſince

ſince corrupted others; it would be probable, that ſome of thoſe who have arrived at years of more maturity, and the borders of old age, when they come to underſtand me to have been to them author and adviſer of ſome certain evil, would now riſe up againſt me, and accuſe me, and require me to be delivered up to puniſhment: and if they would not, yet it were fit that ſome of their Kinſmen, Fathers, or Brothers, or others, whether by Affinity or Alliance nearly related to them, ſhould in caſe their Kinſmen had ſuffered any thing of detriment from me, remember the injury, and demand puniſhment to be inflicted upon me; but here are many whom I ſee. Firſt this *Crito* here, my equal in years, and my Country-man, the Father of this *Critobulus*: then *Lyſanias* the *Sphettenſian*, the Father of this *Æſchines*: and *Antiphon* the *Cephiſenſian*, Father of *Epigenes*. Theſe others then, whoſe Brethren lived with me in this way of converſation familiarly, *Nicoſtratus* Son of *Zotidas*, Brother of *Theodotus* (but *Theodotus* is dead, ſo that he cannot now ask his Brother to impeach me) and this

He appeals to the teſtimony of ſome *preſent*, who had often heard his *moral* diſcourſes, whether he had ever endevoured to *corrupt* their minds, or not.

Paralus, Son of *Demodicus*, whoſe Brother is *Theages*; and *Adimantus* of *Ariſton*, whoſe Brother here is *Plato*; and *Æantidorus*, whoſe Brother is *Apollodorus*, and many others I could ſhew, of whom it was fit ſome one at leaſt ſhould have been named as witneſs by *Melitus* in his accuſation; and if he forgot to do it then, let him produce any one of them now, I will give him leave freely; let him declare whether he hath any matter of this kind. But ye ſhall find the contrary, *Athenians*; namely that all theſe are ready to help and vindicate me, who (ſay *Melitus* and *Anytus*) corrupt and wrong their Kinſmen. Truly, if thoſe whom I have corrupted and infected, ſhould endevour to aſſiſt and vindicate me, that would carry a plauſible face of reaſon: but if thoſe who have felt no contagion of my corruptions, antient men, and by conſanguinity neerly related to thoſe whom I have corrupted, ſtand for and defend me; they can ſeem to be impelled to that defenſe, by no other reaſon but what is right and juſt; that is, becauſe they are conſcious that *Melitus* lyeth, and I ſpeak truth. Let therefore what I have hitherto ſaid, *Athenians*, and other the like reaſons be ſufficient for my defenſe.

But

He professeth not to court the *favour*, nor to excite the *commiseration* of his Judges, by the usual arts of pusillanimous men, when standing at the Barr to receive their sentence.

But now some one may be offended at me, if he call to mind, that he being brought into less danger than this of mine is, petitioned and courted the Judges with many tears, and brought his children hither, to excite pity and commiseration to the height, and brought also to the same purpose many of his Kindred and Friends; but observes me to do no such thing, tho brought into extreme peril of my life: and considering this with himself, become the more inraged and more embittered against me, and so in anger give his vote or sentence for my condemnation. If any of you be thus affected, I will not address to him with prayers and supplications, to mitigate his displeasure; yet think I may with equity and fair reason speak thus to him. I also, O thou very good man, have some Kinsmen; for (as *Homer* saith) *I am not born from an Oak, nor of a Stone, but from men.* I then have Kinsmen too, *Athenians*, and three Sons; one a young Lad; two little Boyes; yet I have brought neither of them hither, to begg of ye for their sakes to be favorable to me, and absolve me. What then? will I do none

of thoſe [ſubmiſſive] things? Not of pertinacious arrogancy, *Athenians*, or in contempt of you (& whether I have courage and conſtancy to ſuffer death, or not, I ſhall elſewhere declare) but to aſſert both my own and your honor and reputation, and ſo that alſo of the whole City. It ſeems to me indecent and diſhoneſt, that I ſhould do any of thoſe [ungenerous] things; I who am of this age, and have acquired (whether deſervedly or not) ſo great a name [for wiſdom.] This then I moſt firmly reſolve upon, to do my devoir that *Socrates* may differ from other men. Were thoſe who among you ſeem to excel, whether in ſapience, or in fortitude, or in any other virtue whatſoever, ſuch as ye would have me to be, [afraid of death;] certainly no ſmall diſgrace would be thereby fixed upon your City. Some ſuch I have beheld, when they ſtood here expecting the ſentence of death to paſs upon them: who though they thought themſelves brave fellows, yet brought into thoſe ſtreights, committed things diſhonorable, even to admiration, as thinking they ſhould ſuffer ſome grievous miſery if they dyed; as if (forſooth

Yet not out of obſtinate arrogancy, nor of contempt of his Judges; but only to conſerve his own and their *honor* and *dignity*.

ſooth) they ſhould be immortal, if ye put them not to death. Theſe ſeem to me to bring a ſhamefnl mark of ignominy and reproach upon your City: foraſmuch as any ſtranger will hence take occaſion of thinking baſely of us, namely that among the *Athenians*, even thoſe who as more excellent in virtue, are preferred to places of higheſt dignity and power in the State, nothing differ from [timorous] Women. Theſe things, *Athenians*, 'tis not fit ye ſhould do your ſelves, who have acquired honor and renown, and are highly eſteemed [both at home and abroad:] nor ought ye to permit them to be done by us; but rather to make it appear by effect, that ye will rather condemn him who ſhall introduce thoſe Theatrical fopperies, and devices to raiſe commiſeration, into your judgments, and ſo expoſe your City to ſcorn and deriſion; than him who calmly expects the event of your judgment. Now beſides this care we ought to have of the Honor of our City, there is this alſo adjoyned, that to me it ſeems not equal and juſt, that we ſhould with ſupplications court the Judg, and by the force and efficacy of thoſe prayers, decline

And becauſe 'tis inconſiſtent with the *duty* and *oath* of a Judge, to admit of ſupplications for mercy.

the rigor of his ſentence, and ſo be abſolved: I think, he is only to be rightly informed, and by certain arguments perſwaded. For the Judge ſits not here, to confer grace and favour, and to ſhew indulgence; but to judge righteouſly. To this he is bound by ſolemn Oath, that according to the beſt of his underſtanding, he ſhall not by grace and favour pervert right, but judge according to the preſcript and form of the Laws. 'Tis not therefore fit, that either ye ſhould accuſtom your ſelves, or we be accuſtomed to perjury: for neither could do it without violation of piety and religion. Do not then, *Athenians*, require this from me, that I ſhould in your preſence perform things which I take to be neither honeſt, nor juſt, nor pious; and the rather becauſe I ſtand here accuſed by this *Melitus* of impiety; for ſhould I by begging and intreating endeavour to induce ye to abſolve me, and by [fawning] words as it were compell ye ſo ſtrictly bound by Oath; truly I ſhould convince you to be of opinion, that there are no Gods; and while I defend my ſelf from that falſe accuſation, effectually accuſe my ſelf to be guilty thereof, as if I thought there are no Gods. Whereas truly I am far from being of that [abſurd] opinion; for I hold

Atheni-

Athenians, more certainly than any of my accusers, that there are Gods: and to you, and to God I freely leave the issue of my judgment, that he may determine of me as may be both for my good, and yours.

A new Speech after his Condemnation.

He comforts himself, both with his *prevision* of the event of his judgement, and with the *paucity* of Votes condemning him.

That I may with the less regret and disquiet of mind bear this my disaster, namely that I am by your Votes condemned; very many things concur to afford me help and consolation; among the rest this chiefly, that this hath not hapned to me otherwise than I believed and expected; but the number of Votes given on both sides, I more admire. For, I thought I should have been condemned, not by so small, but a much greater excess of *Balls*: now it appears, that if only thirty Balls had been otherwise cast, I should have been absolved. From the accusation of *Melitus* therefore (if I be not mistaken) I am free and clear: nor only that, but this likewise is evident to all, that if *Anytus* and *Lycon* had not risen up with a new supplement to accuse me, he had been fined in the sum of a thousand

dragms, for that he had not on his ſide ſo much as a fifth part of the Votes. He then hath my life for a Mulct. Let it be ſo. And with what puniſhment ſhall I on the other ſide think it equal to be mulct'd my ſelf, *Athenians*? 'tis clear, with that whereof I am worthy. What then? what have I deſerved to ſuffer, or pay, becauſe in my whole life, I have not by idle ſilence concealed what I knew; but contemned the purſuit of thoſe things that others with all poſſible contention of mind covet and hunt after, riches and great eſtates, military commands, public aſſemblies, and other dignities and ſodalities confirmed by oaths, factions alſo and parties which are frequently made in the City: conceiving my ſelf deſtined to nobler ſtudies, than that flying to the helps and defenſes of thoſe [uncertain] things, I ſhould from hence draw the hopes of conſerving my ſelf: in fine, I applied not my

By the *Athenian* law a man condemned to capital puniſhment, might choſe either *exile*, or *perpetual impriſonment*, or a *pecuniary mulct*; which was called ὑπομᾶσθαι, a *ſubſtitution*, or *commutation* of puniſhment. This *Socrates* refuſeth, and reſolves rather to *die*; as *Xenophon* alſo recordeth of him. Yet briefly recounting his own merits, he affirms himſelf to deſerve from the *Athenians*, not puniſhment, but ſome ample reward anſwerable to his age and office; in particular a *penſion* for his life from the State.

my ſelf to the attainment of ſuch things, which if I had attained, I ſhould have reaped from them nothing of utility either to my ſelf, or to you; but made it my chief buſineſs, and conſtant labour, by addreſſing to every one, to oblige all, by the greateſt and nobleſt of benefits; namely by perſwading every man of you to make it his firſt care to become virtuous and prudent to the laſt degree; nor to take greater care about affairs belonging to the City, than the City it ſelf; and that by the ſame reaſon, care was to be taken of other matters in the ſame manner. What therefore is it, that I, being ſuch a man, have deſerved to ſuffer? Some great good certainly, *Athenians*, if ye eſtimate things according to the dignity, verity, and nature of them, and return a juſt reward. And in truth there is due to me ſuch a good, as may be ſuitable and convenient to my perſon. And what is convenient to a man poor and benefic, who gives himſelf wholly up to admoniſhing and urging you on to virtue, and therefore hath need to be exempted from other buſineſſes, that he may freely and without diſtractions attend that good work? Nothing doubtleſs is more convenient, *Athenians*, than that he be nouriſhed

in

* The public Granary or Storehouse of Corn in *Athens*.

in the * *Prytaneum*: and this certainly with greater reason, than if any of ye had in the Olympic games brought home Victory either from the Horse-race, or Chariots, whether of two or four Horses apiece. For he can but make ye to appear happy; but I, to be really so: and he wants not a relief of aliments or food, but I do. If then, as equity and justice require, a due reward be to be defined and assignd to me; this truly will be my reward, to be fed at the charge of the State in the *Prytaneum*.

For this his freedom of claiming a maintenance from the City, he gives this reason; that he cannot assent to an act of *injustice*, though done against *himself*.

While I say this, perhaps I seem to speak as vainly, as I was thought to speak arrogantly and obstinately afore, when I declared against that way of moving Judges to commiseration by prayers and supplications. But this, *Athenians*, is not so: but rather thus. My constant perswasion and resolve is, not to do injury willingly and knowingly to any man living; but I prevail not upon ye to believe this my profession, for the time we speak together, is but short. When if ye had among ye a Law, such as is in force among other Nations, concerning giving sentence of death

death, that the ſpace of not only one, but very many daies, ſhould intercede betwixt the hearing of the cauſe, and pronouncing of Judgment in cauſes capital: doubtleſs ye would approve of my reaſons and plea: but now in ſo ſhort a time 'tis not poſſible to waſh off the accuſations of ſo great crimes.

Reaſons why he chooſeth neither *exile*, nor *impriſonment*, nor *fine*; but *death*.

Now being fixed in this reſolution, not to do injury to any, I am very far from doing it to my ſelf; that is, from pronouncing my ſelf guilty of this evil, and aſſigning to my ſelf ſome other puniſhment in lieu thereof. What? ſhall I, as if I feared to ſuffer the puniſhment to which *Melitus* adjudgeth me, (which I profeſs not to know whether it be good or evil) chooſe inſtead thereof that which I certainly know to be evil, & adjudg and condemn my ſelf to ſuffer it? *Impriſonment*? To what end ſhould I live in priſon, perpetually in ſlavery to the will and command of the *Eleven*? A *pecuniary mulct*? and remain in priſon until I have paid it? But, as I even now told ye, I have not mony wherewith to pay a fine. Shall I ſuffer *Exile*? for to this puniſhment ye will perhaps addict me. Certainly I were much in love with life, *Athenians*, were I ſo inconſiderate, as not

to

to be able to ſee, that if ye my Fellow-Citizens cannot endure the way of my converſation and diſcourſes, but think them ſo offenſive and hateful to ye, that now ye ſeek to be freed from them; others will leſs patiently endure them. I am far from this, *Athenians*. Wiſely ſhould I order my life indeed, if at this age departing from my City, and wandring to and fro in baniſhment through various Countries, I ſhould prolong a miſerable life. So certainly the caſe ſtands; whereſoever I ſhall come, young men will hear me diſcourſing, as here they do. If I repel them, they will on the other ſide expel me, and bring their Elders to do ſo too: if I not repel them, their Parents and Kindred will for their ſakes expel me. Some man will ſay perhaps, what? *Socrates*; *being expulſed the City, canſt thou not live ſilent and quiet?* What I ſhall ſay, is of that nature, as hardly to be inſinuated into the belief of ſome of ye; for if I tell ye, that for me to be ſilent, is *to reſiſt God*, and therefore it is not poſſible I ſhould live in quiet; ye will not believe me, as if diſſembling the matter in jeſt. But if I ſay this alſo; that it is the ſupreme happineſs of man-kind, daily to diſcourſe of virtue, and of thoſe other [excellent] things, concerning which ye

hear

hear me diſputing, and examining both my ſelf and others, (for without ſuch ſcrutiny and examination, life is not life) ye wil not give credit to me; and yet theſe are moſt certain truths, *Athenians*; though ſuch as cannot eaſily be wrought into your belief. And with the ſame difficulty truly am I perſwaded to pronounce my ſelf worthy of any puniſhment. For if I had monies by me, I would condemn my ſelf in ſuch a fine, as I ſhould be able to pay (for that I ſhould account no detriment to me) but I have no mony: unleſs ye ſhould proportion my fine to my ability; perhaps I ſhould make a ſhift to pay down a *mina* * of ſilver; and therefore I fine my ſelf at that rate. *Plato* here, *Athenians*, and *Crito*, and *Critobulus*, and *Apollodorus* bid me offer the price of thirty *minæ*; and promiſe to be ſureties for the paiment thereof. This ſum therefore I propoſe for my redemption, and they will be aſſiduous and competent ſureties for the paiment of it.

The *Mina Attica* of ſilver, conteined 25 *ſicles*; and the *ſicle* conteined half an ounce; ſo that 12 ounces & half make a *mina*: a ſum equal to 25 *ſtaters*, or *Belgic Florens*, each of 20 *ſtuſers*.

But now, *Athenians*, ye ſhall ere-long ſuffer ignominy and reproach, brought upon your City by thoſe who deſire to defame it;

He freely reproaches the *Athenians* with their *ingratitude*, and *inhumanity* towards him.

it; namely that ye have murdered *Socrates*, a wiſe man. For tho I be far from a wiſe man, yet they who ſeek to caſt this diſgrace upon ye, will ſay I am one. Would ye have expected but a little time, I ſhould have prevented this your infamy, by dying of my ſelf by the courſe of nature; for ye ſee my age, how far it is from [poſſibility of long] life, how nearly approaching to death. Theſe things I ſay, not to all of ye, but to thoſe only who have by their Suffrages doomed me to death: and to thoſe I again and again proclaim the ſame. Ye think perhaps, *Athenians*, that I have loſt my cauſe for want of words, by which I might have inclined you to approve of my defenſe, had I reſolved to leave nothing in this matter unalledged, that I might eſcape puniſhment; but 'tis not ſo. I have loſt my cauſe indeed for want, not of words, but of boldneſs and impudence, and that I was unwilling to ſpeak things that would have been moſt grateful and pleaſant to your ears: in particular, that ye might hear me wailing, and howling, and doing and ſpeaking what I think highly unworthy of me; ſuch

And rejoyceth in the Juſtice of his *cauſe*, and of his *defenſe*.

ſuch as ye are accuſtomed to hear from others. But I even then thought, I was obliged to do nothing indecent and diſhoneſt, in order to my evaſion from danger: nor doth it now repent me, that I made my defenſe in that manner. Nay I had rather die, having made my defenſe in this manner, than live by making it in that, [abjectly and poorly.] For [neither in Judgement, nor in War, ought any man to endeavour to avoid death by any way or means whatſoever; for in many Battels this is clearly evident, that death may be eaſily avoided, if a man, throwing away his arms, caſt himſelf a ſuppliant at the feet of the victorious and purſuing enemy, and begg his life. There are alſo very many other arts and ſhifts of declining danger in all occurrents, and of avoiding of death; if a man will adventure to ſay and do any thing, [however indecent and diſhonorable.] To avoid death, is not difficult, *Athenians*: but 'tis very difficult indeed, to avoid improbity, which runs on ſwifter than death. And now truly I, old and ſlow, am catcht by one that is ſlower [by *death:*] but my accuſers, who are vehement and fierce, are overtaken by that which is ſwifter, by *improbity.*

An honorable death is to be preferred to a diſhonorable life.

probity. And now I go away, by your command to ſuffer the penalty of death: but theſe men are by truth it ſelf condemned in the mulct of improbity and injuſtice. I ſtand to the puniſhment appointed for me: and they ſtand to theirs. And theſe things ought ſo to be; and they have, in my opinion, ſucceeded conveniently and opportunely.

Converting his Speech to thoſe who had condemned him, he predicts the evils to come upon them; for their putting an innocent man to death. Concerning the event of which prediction, read *Diogen. Laertius*, in *vita Socratis*.

Now ye who have *condemned* me, I deſire to fore-tel you, as by Oracle, the calamities that ſhall come upon ye: for I am now arrived at that [critical] time, wherein men are moſt able in the faculty of Divining things to come; namely when they are dying. I ſay then, O ye men, whoſoever ſhall put me to death, that ſoon after my death, puniſhments ſhall overtake ye, much more grievous than the death ye inflict upon me: for thereby ye now deſign to free your ſelves from the labour of giving an account of your life: but the event ſhall be altogether contrary to your expectation, as I affirm. There ſhall riſe up to reprove ye, many, whom hitherto I have repreſſed,

repreſſed, nor have ye felt them: and they ſhall ſo much the more ſeverely rebuke ye, by how much the younger ye are; and ye ſhall be vehemently offended even to indignation. For if ye think, by killing men, to reſtrain and keep under thoſe, who are minded to upbraid and convince ye, that ye take a wrong courſe to prevent that trouble; and to reproach ye for your diſhoneſt life: ye are groſly miſtaken. For that way of freeing your ſelves, is neither ſufficiently efficacious, nor honeſt: but the beſt, moſt honorable, and eaſieſt way is this; not to hinder others, but to render your ſelves virtuous to the higheſt degree. Having then thus propheſied to thoſe who have condemned me, I leave them.

To his *Friends*, he avows his confidence of happineſs in his death, and the preſignification thereof by his *Demonium*.

But to ye who have *abſolved* me, I ſhal gladly ſpeak of what hath juſt now happened; while the Magiſtrates ſtay here imployed in other affairs, and I have a ſhort reſpit, before I depart to the place where I muſt die; and for ſo ſhort a time do ye, *Athenians*, expect me; for nothing hinders but we may ſpeak together, while we have the liberty. To you who are my Friends, I will declare, what is the

ſignification of this my diſaſter. For, *Judges*, (and in calling ye *Judges*, I do ye but right) there hath hapned to me an accident well worthy admiration. That preſaging and prophetic *Voice* of my *Dæmonium*, frequent to me at ſeveral times of my life paſt, was wont to check and countermand me, even in things of the leaſt moment, if I were about to enterpriſe any affair imprudently: but now theſe Occurrents, which ye ſee, have hapned unto me, which any one might imagine to be evils in extremity: and yet that *ſign of God* hath not contradicted me, neither in the morning when I came forth, nor when I aſcended into the Pulpit [or pleading chair] nor in my ſpeech, whatſoever I was delivering. In other ſpeeches, it did often interrupt me: but now in this action, it no waies oppoſed me in any thing I ſaid or did. And what do I conceive to be the reaſon of this? I will explain it to ye. This event [of my condemnation] is very happy to me. We are not juſt Eſtimators of things, whoever of us think death to be an evil. Hereof, this hath been to me a great argument; for doubtleſs that uſual *ſign* would have reſiſted me, if I had gone about any thing but what was truly good. Thus we may with certain judgment determine

determine of the matter. A ſtrong hope poſſeſſes me, 'tis happy for me, that I am ſent to death; for one of theſe two is abſolutely neceſſary; *Either death utterly deprives us of all ſenſe*, or by death *we paſs from hence to another place.* Wherefore, whether all ſenſe be extinguiſhed, and death be like that ſleep, which ſometimes brings moſt calm quiet, without the [deluding] phantaſms of Dreams; good Gods, what advantage it is to die! for I think, if any man were obliged to take particular notice of, and ſet apart that night, in which he ſlept ſo profoundly and quietly, as not to be ſenſible of any the leaſt diſturbance from dreams; and then comparing it with all other nights, yea and daies too, of his whole life paſt, would obſerve, which of all thoſe nights or daies he had paſſed more ſweetly and pleaſantly; I am of opinion, that not only a man of private and humble condition, but even the greateſt

That to *good* men, there can be nothing of evil in death; he proves by this *Dilemma.* Either all ſenſe is extinguiſhed by death; or mens Souls remain after death. If there be no ſenſe, there muſt be eternal quiet; if the Soul ſurvive, then there muſt be a ſtate of extreme felicity to the Souls of *good* men, in the ſociety of the *Bleſſed.* Hence *Seneca* ſeems to have borrowed that two edged argument againſt fear of death: *Mors nos aut conſumit, aut emittit; emiſſis meliora reſtant, onere detracto; conſumptis nihil reſtat.* Epiſt. 24.

greateſt of Kings, would find ſuch nights to be eaſily numerable, in cómpariſon of other whether daies or nights. If then death be but like ſuch a ſound and undiſturbed ſleep, I call it *gain* or advantage: for all time ſeems to be nothing more than one night. But if it be true (as [wiſe] men have affirmed and taught) that *death* is a *paſſing* hence into thoſe places or regions, which the deceaſed inhabit: 'tis more happy for thee, when thou ſhalt have eſcaped from thoſe who will have themſelves to be accounted Judges, to come to thoſe who are rightly called Judges, and who are ſaid there to ſit in judgment, *Minos*, and *Radamanthus*, and *Æacus*, and *Triptolemus*, and all other *Demigods*, who lived juſtly and with faith. Is ſuch a change, ſuch a migration as this, to be valued at nothing? Then to converſe with *Orpheus*, and *Muſæus*, and *Heſiod* and *Homer*; who of us would not prefer ſuch a ſtate of life to that of this? For my part, I would die, if it were poſſible, many times over, to find the ſatisfactions I ſpeak of. How much ſhall I be delighted, when I ſhall meet with *Palamedes*, with *Ajax* the Son of *Telamon*, and others circumvented by judgment of unjuſt men, and compare their caſes with my own? This, I think, will not be unpleaſant

ſant: but this will be moſt pleaſant, there alſo to find one who examines and tries every one who is wiſe; and who thinks himſelf wiſe, but is not ſo: how much rather, Judges, will a man find out him, who brought a numerous Army againſt *Troy*, or *Ulyſſes*, or *Syſiphus*, or very many others both men and Women? with whom freely to talk and converſe, to compare opinions, and make inquiries, is a thing of vaſt and infinite wiſdom. And yet they who are there, are not put to death for ſo doing; and are in many other reſpects far happier than theſe our Citizens, and for ever after immortal: if at leaſt thoſe things that are ſaid [of the ſtate of the Soul after death] be true.

But it becomes you alſo, O ye Judges, to conceive noble hopes of death, and to be fully perſwaded in your minds of the verity of this, that *nothing of evill can ever come to a good man, neither living nor dead*: and *that his concerns are never neglected by the Gods*. Nor

This he ſaith, not from doubt, but from the ſuppoſition of the people with whom he had then to do. For, as to his own perſwaſion, he held nothing ſo firm and certain, as the *immortality* of mens *minds* or *ſouls*. With the ſame caution *Seneca* alſo ſaith; *& fortaſſe (ſi modo ſapienti vera fama eſt, recipitq; nos locus aliquis) quem putamus periſſe, premiſſus eſt.* Epiſt. 63.

have theſe things happened to me by *chance*; but certain and evident it is to me, that to die, and to be freed from buſineſſes, is better and more conducible to me. And for this reaſon, that *Divine ſign* hath not at all averted me: Nor am I angry either with my Judges who condemned me, or with my Accuſers; though they condemned and accuſed me not with deſign to render my condition more happy and tranquill; but thinking thereby to bring ſome great incommodity or calamity upon me; wherein I have juſt cauſe to complain of them. But this only I begg of them, that if my *Sons*, when they are grown up, be troubleſome to them in the ſame matters wherein I have diſquieted and offended them, they would ſeverely puniſh them: chiefly if they ſeem to take more care either of riches, or the like [tranſitory] thing, than of virtues they ſeem to be ſomething, when they are nothing; I would have ye reprehend and convince them, as I have reprehended you: if they neglect things neceſſary, to be ſolicitous about things unneceſſary, and pretend to be what they are not; ſharply reprove

In fine he recommends to his Judges the tuition of his *Sons*; with this requeſt, that they might be inſtructed rather to ſeek after *virtue*, than to accumulate riches.

prove them. Which if ye ſhall do, both I and my Sons ſhal obtain from you a juſt and lawful benefit. But 'tis now time to depart; I to my death, ye to life; and whether of the two is better, I think is known only to God.

The End of Socrates *his Apology.*

AXIOMS MORAL.

Collected out of *Socrates* his Apology.

1. A *Judge* is to conſider, not the Elegancy, but *Truth* of what is ſaid before him.

2. The good *Education* of Youth, is of very great Importance to the Common-wealth.

3. *Humane* wiſdom is not to be much valued. becauſe *God* alone is truly wiſe; and among men, he only deſerves to be reputed wiſe, who conſcious of his own ignorance, profeſ-

seth to know nothing certainly, but that he knows nothing.

4. The *Station* and Office that God hath assigned to us in this Life, we are to defend and maintain, tho we thereby incur the greatest incommodities and dangers: and we ought to have no consideration either of death, or any other terror, when *Shame* and *Dishonour* is to be avoided. Nor are those things to be feared, which we do not certainly know to be Evil: but only those which we do certainly know to be Evil, namely not to obey the Commands of God, and to do unjustly.

5. To be conversant in Affairs of *State*, * is full of danger.

6. It is both indecent and unjust, for *Judges*

* A precept delivered also by *Epicurus*, οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι, *non ad rem publicam accessurum Sapientem*, and inculcated even by *Cicero* himself; *Omnia sua causa facere sapientes; Reip. capessere hominem non oportere*, &c. *Orat. pro Sext.*

to

to be moved and seduced by the Charms of Eloquence or Tears: for they ought to be [ἀπροσωπόλημπτοι & ἀπαθεῖς] no respecters of persons, and without passion: and so to give judgment, not from their own *affections*, but from the *merit* of the *Cause*, and according to *Law*.

7. An honorable Death is alwaies to be preferred to a dishonorable Life.

8. Since *God* takes care of human Affairs, and chiefly of Good men: no *Evil* can come to *Good* men, neither living nor dead.

9. We are not to be immoderately *angry* with our *Enemies*, nor to hate them, although guilty of Crimes against us, and certainly to suffer the punishments reserved for them.

A DIALOGUE

Concerning the

Immortality of Mans Rational Soul.

AND

Admirable Constancy of *SOCRATES* at his Death.

The ARGUMENT

Out of *SERRANUS.*

PLATO *here introdnceth* Phedo, *recounting to* Echecrates, *the Philosophical Discourses delivered by* Socrates, *the very day wherein he suffered death by a draught of poyson: wherein he shewed both his invincible magnanimity in embracing death with perfect tranquility of mind; and his most certain perswasion of the immortality of the Rational Soul. By this eminent Example then, and from the mouth of that true* Hero *at that time encountring that Gyant*

of

of Terrors, death (when the judgment and ſayings of men much inferior to Socrates, *in point of wiſdom, are commonly reputed Oraculous)* Plato *proves the Humane Soul to be immortal, and declares his opinion concerning the ſtate and condition thereof, after its ſeparation from the body.*

The Theſis *therefore, or capital* deſign *of this* Dialogue, *ſeems to be two-fold:* firſt *to evince, that death* ought to be contemned; *and then that the* Soul *is, by the prerogative of its nature* exempt from the power of death. *And from the latter, as the more noble and auguſt part, the whole Dialogue borrows its* Title [περὶ ψυχῆς] de Animo, *of the* Soul.

The Contents *thereof are partly* moral; *in that it teaches the contempt of death, and conſtant adherence to virtue; partly* Metaphyſical, *or* Theological; *for that it treats of the excellency of the Soul, and of God. To theſe are added alſo* Ornamental *parts*, viz. *a decent* Introduction, *and accurate* Narration *of the remarkable manner and circumſtances of* Socrates *his death.*

Of theſe ſo various parts, the Oeconomy *or Order is conciſely this. Some Philoſophers, Friends to* Socrates, *viſiting him in the priſon, the laſt day of his life, and talking familiarly*

liarly together: the clue of their conference soon leads them to this useful question; Whether a wise man ought to fear death? *Of this*, Socrates *first disputing with less cogent Reasons, and transiently determining that other doubt*, Whether it be lawful for a man to kill himself? *opportunely, and after his grave way of arguing, resumes & proceeds in the former enquiry about despising death. Concerning which the summe of his reasoning is this. Since the principal duty of a Philosopher is, daily* to meditate upon Death, *i.e. to withdraw and divide his Mind or Soul from his body, and the exorbitant desires thereof, (and death is defined to be only a separation of the Soul from the Body) and that after this frail and mortal life is at an end, there remains a full and solid felicity to be enjoyed by those who have here truly and sincerly embraced the study of Wisdom: there is no reason why he should fear death, but good cause rather why he should wish and long for it: because being thereby freed and secured from all importune and insatiable lusts of the body, wherewith the Soul is here intangled and fettered; he should instantly pass to a second and better life, and therein attain to a full and perfect knowledg of Wisdom. Which he now remonstrates, he most assuredly expected to enjoy immediatly after his*

his death, and ſo, his body being diſſolved, to become conſummately happy: So from the conſequence of this concluſion, there naturally ariſeth a new *diſpute, about the Souls ſurviving the Body. For, if the Soul exiſt not after death, all diſſertation concerning future felicity or infelicity, muſt be vain and abſurd.*

Of this moſt important conference about the immortality of the Soul, there are three *parts:* One *poſitively aſſerts the Soul to be eſſentially immortal: the* Second *refutes the contrary opinions: the* Third *teaches the uſe and advantages of the belief of the Souls immortality.*

The FIRST part then of this excellent Doctrine of Plato (*and of* Socrates *too, from whom he ſeems to have learned it*) *concerning the Souls immortality, is* Apodictical *or* Demonſtrative. *And yet he ſo prudently and circumſpectly manages his forces, as to begin the combat with a Forlorn of lighter Reaſons; and then bring up as it were a phalanx of ſtronger and more preſſing arguments, to aſſure the Victory: which indeed is his proper and peculiar method of convincing. His* lighter *Reaſons he advances, partly from the Doctrine of the* Pythagoreans, *of the tranſmigration of Souls into new bodies, which they called*

led [μετεμψύχωσιν] Transanimation, *and* [μετεμσωμάτωσιν] Transcorporation: *partly from his private conceipt, that knowledge is but* memory, *and to* learn *only to* remember. *From these opinions (I say) conjoyn'd into one complex argument, he concludes,* first *that the Soul was existent by it self, before it came to be guest or inmate to the body; and then* that *the same will exist also apart, when separated from that its Lodging or Inne, and is therefore immortal. His more* solid *and Nervous arguments, by which he more accurately and convincingly demonstrates the Souls eternal substistence, are drawn from the very essence of the Soul it self,* viz. *that being* simple *or void of composition, it must by necessary consequence be also* indissoluble *or incapable of destruction. For, presuming it to be made after the* Exemplar *or Image of* God, *who is* Simple, Pure, Immutable, Invisible: *he thence infers, that the Soul is* [συγγενῆ καὶ ὁμογενῆ] *congenial and homogenial to God,* i. e. *likewise uncompound, invisible, immortal: in fine, that it is* (suo tamen modo) *of the same nature with the* Supream Being, *which he calls* τὸ ὄν, αὐτὸ τ' αγαθὸν, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, *that is* God. *Hence he concludes, that though the Soul, while obliged to sojourn in the Body, be necessitated to use the ministry and service of its various Organs; and*

so

ſo be neerly affected with the paſſions and other alterations incident thereunto, by reaſon of the cloſe conjunction betwixt them: yet notwithſtanding, upon the diſſolution of that ligue or conjunction, it doth inſtantly fly away, and return to that its primary and cognate Idea, God: *in the mean time ſtill conſerving its own ſimple, incorruptible nature. And this is the ſubſtance of the* firſt *part of this ſublime diſpute.*

The SECOND *is a* Refutation *of Opinions impugning the immortality of the Soul: which are chiefly two;* One, *that affirms the Soul to be an* Harmony, *that is originally compoſed, and reſulting from the conformation and ſyſtem of the corporeal ſenſes: and therefore as it hath its beginning from, ſo it muſt alſo periſh together with the body.* Another, *which allows the Soul to be indeed more laſting than the Body, and ſo to ſurvive it; yet will not have it to be indiſſoluble, but to decay by degrees, and at length utterly to periſh, from its own natural weakneſs. This* laſt *Error* Plato, *in the perſon of* Socrates, *ſolidly refutes; further alledging, that the Immortality of the Soul is clearly manifeſt even from the true notion of* Cauſes, i. e. *of a* Primary *cauſe, namely* God; *and of* Second *or proxim cauſes, by right reaſon duly inveſtigated. Where he*

he opportunely evinceth it to be highly unreasonable, so to acquiesce in the re-search of second causes, as to relinquish the first and principal: and then proceeds to teach, that there are two kindes of Causes; one, principal, or Supreme, *and in truth cause of all Causes, which gave both being and efficacy to all others; Others,* Secondary, *which are not truly* [ἄιτιαι] *Causes, but only* [ξυναίτιαι] Adjuvants, *impowred, disposed, and regulated by the* first, *all such as God hath made subordinate to himself, to the end that the virtue and energy of his power might extend even to us. From the Reasons therefore of these different Causes,* Plato *infers the Soul to be immortal. Whence by a genuine transition, he proceeds to the*

THIRD part of the Disputation or Conference, which concerns the state *or condition of the Soul, after this shaddow of life is vanished, or (as he saith)* apud inferos; *thereby understanding* [δεύτερον βίον] *a* second *Life, whereof he treats more amply* in Timæo; *in this arguing thus. Seeing that in this tumultuous Life, there every day arise infinite disorders in Humane affairs, and events apparently inconsistent with Equity and Justice; so that good and pious men suffer various afflictions and oppressions; and on the contrary, unrighteous and impious men flourish in delights*

lights and prosperity: reason requires, that after this scene of Inequality is withdrawn, after this Life (the use whereof is in common to all men, both good and evil) is expired, there should succeed another, *wherein is to be made a just distinction of the good from the bad, that so these may be adjudged to condign punishment, and those rewarded with felicity, according to their deserts. And hence he collects, that there are but two paths wherein all Mortals walk:* One *leading to eternal* happiness, *the* other *to endless* misery. *Thus much this our wise* Ethnic *plainly discerned by the meer light of nature, by right reason: more he could not perceive without rayes of light supernatural. We are not therefore to arraign him of ignorance, but rather to applaud his singular modesty, in that in the close of his discourse about rewards and punishments after death, he adventures upon no conjectural descriptions of the places, qualities, degrees, &c. of either: but leaving all such to* Poets, *ingeniously professeth, he thought it not to be the part of a man endowed with sound Judgment, to affirm any thing concerning those inscrutable secrets, and reserves of Divine Justice. Only he held it necessary, that the minds of men be deeply imbued with established and certain perswasions of rewards and punishments to come: that*

ſo they may be inflamed with love of Virtue, which he defines to be the true and only way to future felicity; and reclaimed from Vice, the high way to future infelicity. And this he declares to be the uſe *and* advantage *of his Doctrine of the Souls immortality: namely, that we may be induced to learn, and aſſiduouſly follow the way that leads to that happy life; and carefully avoid that of miſery. The* former *he defines to be true and ſolid knowledg of* Wiſdom: *the Nobleſt part whereof is this, that Divorcing and Alienating our mind from all commerce with corporeal affections, and ſenſual pleaſures; we fix it intirely upon the contemplation of* God, *and hold it perpetually exerciſed in that Divine Meditation.*

This being the great duty of man, and moſt ſatisfactory imployment of a Reaſonable Soul; he opportunely admoniſheth every one, to make it alſo his principal care and ſtudy, to be diligently converſant therein: alwaies animating himſelf with this nobleſt of hopes, that after the ſhort and anxious race of this life is finiſhed, he ſhall infallibly attain unto that immortal Happineſs, of which he hath now diſcourſed. And to fringe this his long Web of Speculations Philoſophical, with a grateful reflection upon the Heroic Virtues of his martyr'd Maſter, Socrates;

Socrates; *after a conciſe* Hiſtorical Narration *of the manner and circumſtances of his Death; he concludes with this glorious Character of him; that notwithſtanding he had been Oppreſſed and Condemned by the envy and inhumanity of the* Athenians, *he was in truth the* Wiſeſt, and moſt Virtuous of all Man-kind.

PHEDON.

Perſons of the Dialogue;

Echecrates, *Phedon*, *Apollodorus*, *Socrates*, *Cebes*, *Simmias*, *Crito*, Executioner.

The *Proem*, wherein *Plato*, obſerving the *Decorum* proper to *Dialogues*, and by natural conſequence of the diſcourſe, leading the mind to his grand argument here diſcuſſed. firſt recounts the *circumſtances* that are pertinent thereunto, *viz.* when *Socrates* was put to death, *who* were then preſent, and upon what *occaſion* this Diſpute concerning the *Soul* aroſe..

Echecrat. Were you, *Phedon*, preſent with *Socrates*, that very day wherein he drank the poyſon in the Priſon? or have you heard it from ſome other?

Phe. I was then preſent, *Echecrates*.

Ech. And what ſaid that [brave] man before his death? what end made he? for that I would willingly hear. But yet none of the *Phliaſians* hath of late gone to *Athens*, nor any ſtranger come

come from thence to us, who could relate any thing of certainty concerning theſe matters; only they report him to be dead by a draught of poyſon; but nothing more.

Phe. Have ye not heard what men ſaid of his Judgement, how that was ordered and managed?

Ech. That we have indeed heard; for a certain man gave us a narration thereof: But this ſeemed wonderfully ſtrange to us, that his arraignment and condemnation being paſt a good while ſince, he ſhould be reported to ſuffer death after ſo long a reſpit. What was the reaſon of this, *Phedo?*

Phe. A certain accident intervened, *Echecrates*; it hapned, that the very next day after Judgment had been given upon him, the ſtern of the ſacred ſhip, which the *Athenians* annually ſend to *Delos*, was with uſual pomp and ſolemnity Crown'd.

Ech. What Ship is that?

Phe. That wherein (as the *Athenians* ſay) *Theſeus* long ago brought thoſe fourteen young men into *Crete*, and ſaved both them and himſelf: and they then made a Vow (as the tradition goes) that if they returned in ſafety, they would yearly celebrate a Feaſt, and offer Sacrifice to *Apollo* in *Delos*, in me-

mory of their preſervation, which they call θεωρίαν, the Sacrifice of *Inſpection*, and every year Solemnize, by ſending that ſhip thither. Now when they have begun the celebration of this Feaſt of *Inſpection*, 'tis by law provided, that the City be in the mean time expiated, and no man put to death by public decree, until the Ship hath been at *Delos*, and is returned home again: in which Voyage ſometimes long time is ſpent, eſpecially when they meet with contrary Winds. The beginning of this Inſpection is, when the Prieſt of *Apollo* crowns the ſtern of the ſhip: and this fell out to be performed upon the very day wherein (as I ſaid) Judgment was given upon *Socrates*. Which is the reaſon why ſo long a time intervened betwixt his condemnation and death; he being all that while kept in priſon.

Ech. But what of his death, *Phedon*? what were his ſpeeches and actions? were any of his Kindred and Friends with him? did the Magiſtrates permit them to be preſent, or died he alone, deprived of their company?

Phe. They did permit them: and there were with him ſome, yea many of his Friends.

Ech. Well then, I pray, do your devoir to

to recount us the whole matter fully and plainly; if at leaſt your leiſure will permit.

Phe. I have leiſure, and will endeavour to give ye the beſt account I can, of all paſſages. For to remember *Socrates*, and to ſpeak my ſelf, or hear another ſpeak of him, is the moſt delightful entertainment in the world.

Ech. And you ſhall find us alſo, *Phedon*, in the ſame manner affected and diſpoſed to hear you. Wherefore go on, and do your beſt to relate the whole itory.

Phe. Truly being then preſent, I was affected in a very ſtrange manner: For *commiſeration* moved me not at all, as being preſent at the death of a man nearly Related to me: For to me he ſeemed happy, *Echecrates*, both by his deportment, and by his ſerene conformity, and alſo by his diſcourſes: ſo undauntedly and bravely he ſubmitted to death, that it then came into my mind that he deſcended not to the ſhades below, without ſome Divine power, and therefore would when he came thither, live in happineſs, if ever any man elſe did. I did not then much *pitty* him, as became one that was ſpectator of ſo ſad and doleful a Tragedy: nor was I on the other ſide ſenſible of that plea-

ſure, wherewith we were wont to be affected, when we were ſeriouſly imployed in Philoſophical conferences, though at that very time alſo we were earneſtly occupied in ſuch: but was variouſly agitated by a diſagreeable and contrary paſſion. A certain unuſual pleaſure mixt with grief, ſurpriſed me, thinking he was ſo ſoon to die. And all we who were preſent, felt the ſame confuſion of oppoſite affections, now ſmiling, now weeping, eſpecially *Apollodorus*: you know the man, and his manners.

Eſch. I know him well.

Phe. In this manner was he then diſpoſed: but truly I and others were perturbed.

Elch. Who were there, *Phedon?*

Phe. Of our Citizens, there were this *Apollodorus*, and *Critobulus*, and his Father *Crito*: *Hermogenes* alſo, and *Epigenes*, and *Æſchines*, and *Antiſthenes*, with *Cteſippus* the Pæanian, and *Menexenus*, and ſome other of the Natives: but *Plato*, I think, was ſick.

Ech. Were there any *ſtrangers* with him?

Phe. There were. *Simmias* the *Theban*, and *Cebes*, and *Phædonides*: and *Euclid*, and *Terpſion*, Megarenſians.

Ech. What? was not *Ariſtippus* there, and *Cleombrotus?*

Phe.

Phe. No; 'twas ſaid, they were in *Ægina.*

Ech. Was any other there?

Phe. Thoſe whom I have named, were all.

Ech. Well, what diſcourſes paſſed among them?

Phe. I will endeavour to recount to ye all that paſſed from firſt to laſt. In the daies precedent, I and ſome others were wont to viſit *Socrates* frequently: meeting together early in the morning, in the Judgment Hall, where his cauſe had been tried, for it ſtood next to the priſon. There we daily expected, until the priſon doors were opened; paſſing the time in walking and talking together the while, for 'twas pretty late before the priſon was opened. When the doors were unlocked, we went in to *Socrates*, and many times paſſed the whole day with him. On the day of his Suffering, we came to viſit him ſearlier than we uſed: for the day before, when we retired from the priſon in the evening, we had heard, that the ſacred ſhip was arrived from *Delos*: and thereupon agreed among our ſelves to come to *Socrates* ſooner than our cuſtom was, and indeed we did ſo: but the Door-keeper, who formerly uſed to obey

us,

us, came forth, and bid us have patience a while, nor to enter till he called us. For now (ſaith he) the Eleven Officers are taking off *Socrates* his Fetters, having commanded that he Die this day. So after a ſhort ſtay, he returned, and gave us admittance: Being entred, we found *Socrates* unfettered, and *Xantippe* (whom you know) holding an Infant in her arms, and ſitting by *Socrates*. Having ſeen, and ſaluted us, and ſaid ſome ſuch things as Women uſe to ſpeak [out of civility] now *Socrates*, ſaith ſhe, this is the laſt time your Friends ſhall ſpeak to you, and you to them: and he turning his eyes upon *Crito*, I deſire *Crito*, ſaid he, that one of you would lead away this Woman into ſome other place. Her therefore weeping and lamenting, the Servants of *Crito* led away. But *Socrates* ſitting upon a little Bed, with one legg reſting upon his other thigh, rubbed his legg, ſaying the while; how abſurd dos that ſeem, which men call pleaſant! and how wonderfully ſtrange is the nature of whats unpleaſant, ſo as to be perceived contra-

Socrates, upon occaſion of the pleaſure he felt in his leggs, ſoon after his Fetters had been taken off, reflects upon the affinity betwixt *pleaſure* and *pain*, and their viciſſitude; intimating, that the condition of human life is ſuch, as to be led in a round of pleaſure and pain *alternately* ſucceeding

ry

ry to what's pleaſant! ſo that nature would not have a man affected with both at once; but if any man purſue, and take one of them, he is compelled for the moſt part to take the other alſo; as if they were both fitly contained in one head; and I believe that *Æſop*, if he had taken notice of the thing, would have compoſed a Fable of it, namely, that God, when he attempted to reconcile theſe two Enemies, *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, making War each againſt other, but could not effect it, bound their heads together, ſo that where either comes, the other alſo muſt follow, as ſeemed to me even now; for while my Fetters were upon my leggs, I had pain there, and the pain vaniſhing away upon the remove of my Fetters, pleaſure ſeems immediatly to ſucceed it. And you have opportunely put me in mind of this, anſwered *Cebes*, by *Jove*, *Socrates*; for a good while ſince many have asked me, and *Evenus* lately, concerning the Poems you have of late made, particularly the Fables of *Æſop*, you have turned into Verſes, and a Hymn to *Apollo*: for what reaſon you compoſed thoſe Poems, ſince you came into this place, when you never before addicted your ſelf to Poetry. If therefore you will have me give an anſwer to *Evenus*, when he ſhall

ſhall again interrogate me (as I am confident he will) tell me, I pray, what anſwer I ſhall make to him. Tell him, replies *Socrates*, the truth, *Cebes*: that I have done this, not out of deſign to emulate him and his Writings, (for that I know would be extreamly difficult) but to make trial, what might be the ſenſe of ſome Dreams, and to know if they injoyn'd me this kind of *Muſic*. For very often heretofore in my life, the ſame Dream occurred to me; when appearing to me ſometimes in this, ſometimes in that figure or repreſentation, it ſtill inculcated to me the ſame thing: alwaies ſaying, ſtudy *Muſic Socrates*, and practiſe it. And I thought what I did in the paſt time of my life, to be the very thing that my Dream commanded, and by reiterated Injunctions urged: and as they who by repeated ſhouts incite men running a race, ſo I thought my Dream did the ſame to me, by frequent admonitions inculca-

Another occaſional reflection touching ſome *poetical Eſſaies* made by *Socrates*, during the time of his impriſonment; whereof he gives this reaſon, that having been by Dreams frequently admoniſhed, to learn *Muſic*; and being doubtful, whether the *muſic* of *philoſophy*, to which he had alwaies ſtudiouſly addicted himſelf, or that of *poetry* were thereby meant, he thought it his duty, before his departure, to compoſe Verſes, leſt he might offend, by omitting to fulfil that Divine command in this ſenſe alſo.

inculcating its command, that I ſhould apply my ſelf to *Muſic*; for as much as Philoſophy is the nobleſt and moſt excellent *Muſic*. While I did this, and ſentence of death had now been pronounced againſt me, and the Feaſt of *Apollo* forbad me to die: I thought fit by no means to diſobey the injunction of my Dream, even though I interpreted it to concern the *vulgar* Muſic: but to do according to the preſcript thereof. For I thought it ſafer, not to depart from hence, before I had in that manner alſo, to ſome degree performed my Vow; obeying my Dream, by making Verſes. The firſt Poem I made therefore, was to that God whoſe Feaſt this was. * After that devout care of God, conceiving it decent for a Poet, if he ought to be reputed worthy of that name, to compoſe Fables, not Orations; and being my ſelf unskilful in the art of inventing Fables: I therefore made an Eſſay upon the Fables of *Æſop*, which I had by me, and knew, of thoſe that firſt came to hand.

* The beginning of this *Hymn*. *Diogen. Laertius* recites, in *vita Socrat.*

This, *Cebes*, I would have you report to *Evenus*: and wiſh him health, bidding

The occaſion of the following diſpute, deduced naturally

him

him, if he be wise, to follow me; for I go hence, as I think, this very day, the *Athenians* so commanding. Here *Simmias* interrupts him, saying, what advice is that, *Socrates*, you give to *Evenus?* I have had conversation with him a long time; but as much as I can fore-see, he will not be very forward to follow your counsel in this particular. What, saith *Socrates*, is not *Evenus* a Philosopher? He seems to be one, replies *Simmias*: and therefore saith *Socrates*, he & whoever else embraceth the study of Philosophy, as he ought, will not decline death, and yet will not think himself obliged to lay violent hands upon himself; for this they say, is no waies lawful. And saying this, he let down his leggs from the little Bed to the ground, and sitting in that posture, pursued the remainder of his discourse. *Cebes* asked him then, what say you, *Socrates?* that it is a crime for a man to lay violent hands upon himself; and yet that

from the clue of the conference. Let *Evenus* follow me (saith *Socrates*) in death; for being he is a *philosopher*, he ought neither to kill himself, nor to fear death. Hence are started two Questions; Whether Self-murder be a crime? and how a *philosopher* stands obliged not to fear death? Now this *Evenus* was a *Sophist*, fond of the pleasures of this life, and an adversary to the Doctrine of *Socrates*; and therefore fit to be answered by him thus *ironically*, after the usual manner of *Socrates*.

that a Philoſopher is willing to follow him who dies? To whom *Socrates*; what, *Cebes?* have ye, you and *Simmias*, heard nothing concerning theſe matters, after ſo familiar converſation with *Philolaus?* Nothing, *Socrates*, I aſſure you. What I have heard, it will not be ungrateful to me to recount, ſeeing nothing ſeems more agreeable to him who is ready to ſet forth towards ſome place, than to meditate upon, and ſpeak of what concerns either his Journey, or the condition he expects to be in at the end of it, ſuch as we are able to conceive beforehand: and of what Subject can we more uſefully diſcourſe, until the ſetting of the Sun? Now as for what they ſay, that it is criminal to kill ones ſelf; that indeed I have long ſince heard, not only from *Philolaus* (as you asked me) when he lived among us, but from ſome others alſo, that it is a nefarious act: but why it ſhould be ſuch, I have underſtood nothing of certainty from any. But be of good courage [replies *Socrates*] perhaps you ſhall hear the reaſon by and by. Mean while

The *firſt* queſtion, *whether ſelf-murder be criminal*, or not; argued *Socratically*, that is *pro* and *con*; and then determinedby theſe two fundamental reaſons; *God takes care of us*; and *we are his by right of poſſeſſion*; therefore tis double impiety to lay violent hands upon our ſelves.

this

this perchance may ſeem ſtrange, that this among other things ſhould be univerſally true, without exception; that no calamity can befal a man ſo great and intollerable, as that it may be better for him to die, than to live: and to men in ſuch a caſe, is it inconvenient to affirm, that it is impiety in them, rather to confer this benefit upon themſelves, than to expect it from the hand of another? And *Cebes* gently ſmiling, be it known to *Jove*, ſaid he in his own Dialect, * you have ſaid well. So it ſeems, ſaith *Socrates*, to be inconſiſtent with reaſon. That darkſom and abſtruſe ſpeech which is carried about concerning this matter, *viz.* that we men are placed in a certain ſtation and guard, from which we ought not upon any pretext whatever to free our ſelves, nor to abandon our charge, ſeems to me to be truly great, and ſuch as cannot eaſily be underſtood and comprehended: and yet notwithſtanding I conceive it to be very truly ſaid, *Cebes*, that both God takes care of us, and that we are his poſſeſſion. Do not you conceive ſo too, *Cebes?* I do indeed, ſaith *Cebes*. But, ſaith he, if any one of your ſlaves ſhould kill himſelf, without your command, would you be angry with him, and

* ἴττω Ζεὺς, pro ἴστω Ζεὺς.

and if it were in your power, revenge it? I would, saith *Socrates*: and therefore this also seems grounded upon no less reason; that no man ought to be author of his own death, before God hath brought some absolute necessity upon him, such as he hath now imposed upon us.

This also seems consentanious, saith *Cebes*. But in good truth, what you said even now, that Philosophers are easily inclined to die, seems next to absurd: if what we have here said, be said consentaneously, namely, that God takes care of us, and we belong to him, as a Free-hold and certain possession. For to affirm, that even the wisest of men are not displeased and troubled in the least, when they depart from this procuration and trust which the best Lords and Guardians of things, the Gods, committed unto them; seems in no measure agreeable to reason. For that Wise

Coming here to the *second* Query, viz. *Whether a Philosopher ought to desire death?* First, he shews reasons for the *Negative*, viz. that the *Gods* are both *Despots*, or *Lords* of men, and gracious or *good* Lords to good men; *ergo*, good men ought not to desire death; it being evident and confest, that all are to desire to continue in the fruition of good things; and he assuming that we remain with the Gods, so long as we remain in this life. Wherein lieth concealed a *paralogism*; for in truth, while we live here, we are as it were pilgrims from God, as *Socrates* will in due place remonstrate.

man thinks not, that if he ſhould be at his own liberty and diſpoſe, he can provide better for himſelf than God doth: but a fool will think, that he is to fly from his Lord; nor will he think he ought to fly from a good thing, but conſtantly to continue therein; and ſo he flies away, without any fore-going knowledg of reaſon. But a prudent and circumſpect man will rather deſire to continue ſtill in that which is more advantageous and profitable to him; which certainly, *Socrates*, ſeems plainly repugnant to thoſe things that have been by us juſt now explicated; and yet it appears to be more like truth, that wiſe men when they die, ought to be troubled; and fools to rejoyce. This *Socrates* hearing, ſeemed to me to be highly pleaſed with that ſubtile diſquiſition of *Cebes*; and turning his eyes upon us, *Cebes*, ſaith he, alwaies hunts after ſome [amuſing] reaſons; nor will he preſently give aſſent to what is ſaid by any man. But I alſo, ſaith *Simmias*, am in this point of the ſame opinion with *Cebes*. For when Wiſe men deſire death, what elſe do they propoſe to themſelves, than to fly from Lords better than themſelves, and to be freed from them? And *Cebes* ſeems to me to aim his diſcourſe at you, who can ſo eaſily

ſily relinquiſh both us, and the Gods, (as your ſelf confeſſes) the beſt Lords. Ye have reaſon, ſaith *Socrates*; for I think ye require me to make my defenſe before ye, as in the Judgment-hall. We do ſo, ſaith *Simmias*. Well then, ſaith he, I will endeavour to defend my ſelf with more convenient and more probable Arguments before ye, than before my Judges. For I * ſaith he, *Simmias* and *Cebes*, if I did not think I ſhould come, firſt to other Gods wiſe and good, and then to men deceaſed, better than thoſe who are here: truly I ſhould do very ill, not to be offended and troubled at my death: but now (believe me) I am confident I ſhall come to good men. This (I confeſs) I will not poſitively affirm: but if I affirm any thing for certain, it ſhall be this, that I ſhall come to Gods, the beſt Lords. And this is the true reaſon why I am not at all diſcompoſed or troubled, but ſuſtain my ſelf with a ſtrong hope, that

* *Socrates* going to prove, that *death* is not only not to be feared, but alſo wiſhed by a Philoſopher; layeth down the fundamentals of his future probation, applying the matter to himſelf; namely, that he was ſuſtained by a ſtedfaſt hope, that after death, he ſhould go, not from the Gods, but to them: becauſe there remains ſomething after death, and it will be well with good men. Which are the two Heads of the ſubſequent diſputation, *viz.* that our Souls are *immortal*, and that *felicity* is reſerv'd for good Souls after death.

ſomething remains in reſerve for the dead after death; and as they long ago ſaid, that it will be much better with good men, than with wicked. What then, ſaith *Simmias?* ſince relying upon this cogitation, you have a mind to depart, will you not communicate to us the cauſe of it? for that ſeems to be a good common to us alſo, and if you ſhall convince us of the truth of what you ſay, that will be alſo your full defenſe. I will endeavour it, ſaith *Socrates*: but firſt let us ſee what *Crito* here would have. What elſe ſhould I deſire to ſay to you, *Socrates*, anſwered *Crito*, but this, that a good while ſince, the man who is to give the poyſon to you, bad us advertiſe you, that you ought to ſpeak very ſparingly; becauſe much ſpeaking puts men into a heat, and therefore ought not to precede the poyſon: for tha from thence it may come to paſs, that the draught of poyſon muſt be repeated twice or thrice. Wiſh him good health, ſaith *Socrates*; let him take care only of what belongs to his own duty [and provide enough] as if he were to give the doſe twice, and if need be, thrice. This I knew before, anſwers *Crito*; but the Fellow hath been troubleſom to me a good while: ſuffer him ſaith he. But I will render an account to

ye

ye, my Judges, by what right I became poſſeſſed of that my opinion, that *he who truly and ſeriouſly addicts himſelf to* Philoſophy, *or the love of wiſdom, doth die with undaunted courage, and ſtedfaſt reſolution, furniſhed with that noble hope, that immediatly after his death, he ſhall certainly attain unto the greateſt Goods,* [*or ſupreme felicity.*] How this is, *Simmias* and *Cebes*, I will endeavour to explain to ye.

First argument; the great duty and buſineſs of a Philoſopher, is continually to *meditate* upon death; therefore he ought not to *dread* it when it comes.

They who have rightly embraced the ſtudy of Philoſophy, ſeem to excel in this one thing; that living in obſcurity and retirement from vulgar converſation, they intirely and with all poſſible contentation of mind, devote themſelves to the meditation of death. If this be true, it will be abſurd, to addict our ſtudy and devoirs to the conſideration of this one thing, all our life long; and at laſt when death it ſelf comes, to be offended and preturbed at it, after ſo long and familiar a converſe therewith in our thoughts. * Here

* The popular *ſcoff* againſt Philoſophers, that they have death alwaies in their thoughts, becauſe they are conſcious to themſelves, they *deſerve* to die, in reſpect of their nefarious lives; urged to *Socrates*.

Simmias ſmiling, *Socrates* ſaith he, by *Jove* you have forced me to ſmile, who was nothing inclined to ſuch gayety of humor; for the vulgar if they had heard this, would (I believe) be of opinion, that it is extremely ſuitable to Philoſophers: and the greateſt part of our men would conſequently aſſent, that all Philoſophers ought in good earneſt to die; and that themſelves are not ignorant they very well deſerve to die. * This (replies *Socrates*) they might ſay, *Simmias*; and truly too; this one thing excepted, that they *themſelves are not ignorant* how far thoſe who are truly Philoſophers, both meditate upon death, and are worthy of it: [for the vulgar are really ignorant thereof, and cannot judge of what they underſtand not.] Wherefore ſecurely pretermitting thoſe vulgar [Scoffers] let us ſeriouſly purſue our diſcourſe.

* Whereunto he gravely replies, that it is no wonder if the ignorant vulgar give a raſh and importune judgement of what they underſtand not.

Do ye think, that death is any thing? *Yes*, anſwers

A *Second*, and indeed an artificial argument drawn from the nature of *death* it ſelf, which he defines to be a *deliverance of the Soul from the Body*; and puts that for the firſt *propoſition* of a Syllogyſm.

Simmias.

Simmias. Do ye think death to be any thing elſe but a freeing of the Soul from the body: and that to die, is this, when the Body being freed from the Soul, remains by it ſelf; and the Soul likewiſe freed from the Body, hath exiſtence apart by it ſelf? or is death any other thing beſides this? *Nothing but that*, anſwers *Simmias.* Conſider then, I beſeech ye, whether your judgment be not the ſame with mine: for thence I conceive light will be derived to the argument now under our conſideration. * Do ye take them to be Philoſophers, who imploy themſelves in purſuit of thoſe pleaſures (as they call them) of the body, as of eating and drinking, and other the like ſenſual delights? *By no means, Socrates*, ſaith *Simmias.* What then? in Venerial pleaſures? *Neither.* Hath a Philoſopher any care or value for other things that appertain to the delicacy and ornament of the body? as of rich cloaths, fine ſhooes, and other gaudy ornaments; doth he deſire to be furniſhed with ſtore of theſe toyes? Whether do ye think he eſteems, or contemns thoſe things, unleſs ſo far as there may be great neceſſity of uſing them? *My opini-*

* *Aſſumption*; but the main care of a Philoſopher is, to alienate and divorce his Soul from his Body, and the cupidities thereof.

on is, a true Philoſopher contemns them all. Then your opinion is, that the whole ſtudy, care and labour of ſuch a Philoſopher is, not in pampering and adorning his body, but in with-drawing (as much as he can) his thoughts from his body, and converting them intirely upon his mind. *I confeſs* it. Doth it not then evidently follow from thence, that the Office of a Philoſopher doth chiefly appear in this, that he renders his Mind free and abſolute from community of his body? *It doth ſo.* But yet, *Simmias*, moſt men think, that he who takes no pleaſure from thoſe [ſenſual] things, deſerves not the uſe of this life, but comes nearer to death, being inſenſible and careleſs of thoſe delights that belong to the body. *You are in the right.* * What then? when wiſdom it ſelf is to be acquired, will the body prove an impediment, if a man take it along as a companion in that diſquiſition? for example, the ſight it ſelf, or hearing, have they any truth in men? or do Poets ſpeak truth, when they ſay, that we neither ſee nor hear any thing clearly and intirely? and

The *firſt* circumſtance of his probation, from the effects of the corporeal *ſenſes*; that they being not ſufficiently *pure* and *perfect*, cauſe the *Soul*, by contagion and ſympathy, to be dull and pore-blind in the diſquiſition and diſcernment of *truth*.

and if theſe ſenſes of the body be not perfect, or ſufficiently quick and perſpicuous; certainly the others, which are all weaker and duller than the ſight and hearing, muſt needs be leſs perfect and ſincere. Do you not think ſo? *I do*, ſaith he. When then doth the Soul attain truth? for when it endeavours to diſcern any thing clearly and diſtinctly, by the help of the body; 'tis apparent, that then it is ſeduced and circumvented by the body it ſelf. *You are in the right.* Doth not the Soul, by reaſoning, or ſome other way of diſcerning, comprehend this perſpicuouſly? *Certainly it doth.* And then it reaſoneth beſt, when no ſenſe of the body offends it, whether hearing, or ſeeing, or pain, or pleaſure; but it converſeth intirely & undiſturbdly with it ſelf alone, contemning and repudiating the body, and (as much as lies in its power) retiring from all community and commerce therewith, with certain premeditation and counſel deſires things, and purſues them. *No doubt on't.* Doth not therefore the Soul of a Philoſopher even in this alſo highly contemn the body, and retreat from it: and by its ſelf inquire into the nature of things, ſatisfied only with its own converſation? *So it ſeems.* Now this Operation, or work of the

Another proof, from the proper and peculiar *operation* of the *Soul*; wherein withdrawing it self from commerce with the Senses, it is exercised in pure and abstracted *Reasoning*.

the *Soul*, shall we say 'tis just, or not? *Just, without doubt.* Is it fair and good? *Why not?* But have you ever beheld with your eyes any thing of those? *None*, saith he. Have you with any other of your corporal senses attained to these things, (I speak of all, as of magnitude, health, strength; and in a word, the like, which are of such a nature, as they have all a real being) is their most true and certain nature considered, and fully discovered by the body? Or is it thus, that he who is most fitly and exquisitely comparated or disposed to comprehend by cogitation, the nature of that very thing, in the disquisition whereof he is versed; shall come neareſt to the knowledge and understanding of the nature thereof? *No doubt of it.* He then will perform this most purely and clearly, who by that edge of his Wit, by that accuteness of Spirit, pierceth into every thing, neither making use of his sight while he thinks, nor drawing any other sense into counsel together with his reasoning: but imploying only his pure and simple faculty of reasoning, endeavours thereby to investigate and discover the naked

ked and true nature of the things themſelves: free and ſeparated from his ears, and eyes; and in a word, from his whole body; as that which may perturb the Soul it ſelf, and hinder it from acquiring to it ſelf verity and wiſdom, when it is imployed in converſation and commerce therewith. Will this man, think you, if any other doth, attain to underſtand the true nature of things? *you ſpeak truth, Socrates*, over and over, ſaith *Simmias*: Is it not then conſequently neceſſary, that to thoſe who are truly Philoſophers, there be a conſtant and eſtabliſhed Opinion, that they may confer among themſelves about theſe things? there ſeems to be a plain way as it were paved to our hands, which leads us with reaſon to the conſideration of things; but while we carry about this body, and our Soul is immerſed in ſo dark and incommodious a ſink of evil, we ſhall never attain to what we deſire. This we affirm to be truth. For this body creates to us an infinity of buſineſſes, troubles, and diſquiets, meerly for the nouriſhment and neceſſary ſupplies of it. Beſides, if diſeaſes chance to invade us, they likewiſe hinder us from the inveſtigation of various things: and that fills us with loves, deſires, fears, various imaginations and Chimera's, and

and many fooliſh whimſies; ſo that it is a very true ſaying, that *the body will never permit us to be wiſe.* For nothing but the body raiſeth wars, ſeditions, combats, and the like miſchiefs, by its inordinate luſts: and we are forced to provide monies for maintenance of the body, being ſlaves and drudges to the neceſſary ſervices of it. Now while we are thus imployed in theſe meaner Offices, we have no leiſure to apply our ſelves to the ſtudy and ſearch of wiſdom. And what is the greateſt of all incommodities, if we do by chance get any thing of leiſure and vacancy from the cares of the body, and addreſs our minds to the ſerious conſideration of any thing; preſently the body intrudes, and while we are buſied in that inquiry, raiſeth commotions and tumult, and ſo diſturbs and confounds the mind, that it cannot poſſibly diſcern truth. But we have already demonſtrated, that if we deſire to perceive any thing purely and clearly, we muſt withdraw from the body, and imploy only our mind, which alone is

The former aſſumption repeated, and illuſtrated by a *Dilemma.* Whence flows a certain *concluſion*; ſince the grand deſign of a Philoſopher is, to diſcern truth, his duty is to ſeparate his Soul from his Body; and ſo as it were to anticipate death in this life.

capa-

capable to diſcern the nature and properties of Objects, in the contemplation thereof: for then at length, as appears, we ſhall attain to the fruition of what we deſire, and with love and diligence ſeek after, namely *wiſdom*; when we have paſſed through the [refinement] of death, as our precedent diſcourſe intimates: but not whilſt we remain in this life. For if it be impoſſible for us to perceive any thing pure and intire, in conjunction with the body, one of theſe two [propoſitions] muſt of neceſſity follow: *either we ſhall never attain to ſapience; or not until we have paſſed out of this life.* For then will the Soul be intirely divorced and ſeparate from the Body, but not before. While we live here, we approach indeed never to ſapience, if we have as little commerce and converſation with the body, and be as little infected with the luſts thereof, as the condition and neceſſities of our frail nature will permit: but preſerve our ſelves pure from the contagion of the ſame, until God himſelf ſhall diſcharge and free us wholly from it. And being once thus delivered, and pure from the madneſs and ſeducements of the body; as is reaſonable to believe, we ſhall both be aſſociated to the like pure beings, and by our ſelves know all

all purity and integrity; which perhaps is *truth* it ſelf. For *it is not poſſible for him who is himſelf impure, to touch what is pure.* Theſe things, *Simmias*, I conceive it neceſſary for all, who are poſſeſſed with a right deſire of underſtanding things, both to hold, and to diſcourſe of among themſelves. Are not you alſo of the ſame opinion? Altogether, *Socrates.* If then theſe be true proceeds *Socrates*; there is truly great hope, that who ſhall arrive at the place whither I am now going, will there, if any where, abundantly attain to the enjoyment of that, for which we have in the whole courſe of our life paſt, been ſeeking with extreme labour and ſtudy. This peregrination therefore now appointed to me, is finiſhed with good hope; and ſo it will to any other, who ſhall have once perſwaded himſelf, to prepare his mind, by rendring it pure and clean. *No doubt of it,* ſaith *Simmias.* Is therefore what we ſaid even now, to be held a purification and purging of the Mind; *viz.* as much as is poſſible, to divorce it from the Body, and

The ſecond *concluſion* from the premiſes, *viz.* if we then only live well, *i. e.* exerciſe our faculty of reaſoning, when we abdicate our ſenſes: it neceſſarily follows, that we ſhall then be happy, and perceive truth plainly, when we ſhall be wholly ſeparated from the body, *i. e.* after *death.*

to

to accuſtom it to be by it ſelf congregated and retired from the ſame, and to dwell as it were by it ſelf: both in this, and in the future life, ſingle by it ſelf, and freed as from the chains of the body? *Yea certainly*, ſaith *Simmias*; Is death then rightly called a ſolution and ſeparation of the Soul from the Body? *It is ſo*, ſaith he. And do they only, who ſtudy Philoſophy rightly, moſt endeavour to divorce their Souls from their Bodies, as we have ſaid? is not this the conſtant meditation of Philoſophers? *It ſeems to be ſo.* What therefore we ſaid in the beginning, would it not be ridiculous, if a man who hath all his life long made it his conſtant ſtudy, and principal care, to anticipate death by rendring his life as nearly like to it, as is poſſible; ſhould yet when death really comes, be afraid of, and troubled at it? *Why not?* In truth then, ſaith he, they who Philoſophize ſeriouſly and rightly, meditate moſt upon death, and to them of all men living, death is leaſt formidable; which is evident from this argument.

A *third* concluſion. Since the principal deſign of a Philoſopher, is to attain unto truth; and that he cannot attain unto it, until after death: it is inconſiſtent for him to fear death. So the whole queſtion is determined, that to a *wiſe* man, *death* is not only not *formidable*, but alſo *deſirable*.

For

Funera non metuit ſapiens ſuprema; nec illi,
Qui contemplando toties ſuper aſtra levavit
Carnoſo abſtractam penitus de carcere mentem,
Corporis atq; Animi faciens divortia tanta;
Quanta homini licuit, mors formidanda venire
Aut ignota poteſt. Nam mors divortia tantum
Plena hæc, quæ ſapiens toties optaſſe videtur,
Et toties tentaſſe, facit, Superoſq; petenti
Libertatem animæ clauſtris concedit apertis.

Majus noſter, in Supplemento, *Lucani*, lib. 4.

For if at all times they contemn and vilifie the Body, and ſtrive to have their Soul apart by it ſelf; and when the hour of their real and final ſeparation comes, fear and be diſquieted: what could be more alien or remote from reaſon, unleſs they willingly and freely come thither, where there is hope they ſhall, at their arrival, obtain whatever they in this life deſired? and they deſired Wiſdom, and to be delivered from all commerce of the body, with which they are offended. Have many been willing, out of ardent affection to their Friends, Wives, and Children deceaſed, to deſcend to the ſhades below, led by this hope, that there they ſhould ſee, and converſe with thoſe whom they loved: and ſhall he who is really in love with Wiſdom, and hath conceived a ſtrong and certain hope, that he ſhall no where

where obtain and enjoy it, but in the other world, as is decent and conſentaneous; when he is at the inſtant of death, be vexed and grieved, and not rather voluntarily and freely meet and embrace it? for ſo we are to hold, that a genuine Philoſopher will conceive; that he ſhall never meet with true wiſdom, but only *apud inferos*, among the dead. Which if true, how inconſiſtent with reaſon were it, for ſuch a man to fear death? *Highly inconſiſtent*, ſaith he, by *Jove*. 'Tis then a fit argument, that he whom you ſhal ſee dying with reluctancy and fear, is not [φιλόσοφος, *ſed* φιλοσώμαΤος,] a lover of *Wiſdom*, but a lover of his *Body*; not a lover of *verity*, but of *Riches*, and the *pleaſures* of this life. *It is juſt ſo as you ſay.* To thoſe therefore who are in this manner diſpoſed and inclined, is not that [Virtue] which is named *Fortitude*, moſt agreeable and proper? *It is*, ſaith he. Is not *Temperance*, which many define to be this, not to be diſquieted or afflicted with luſts, but to deſpiſe them, and to regulate ones life by moderation: does not this properly and peculiarly

A new *Theorem*, reſulting from the precedents; that thoſe who neglecting the ſtudy of *phyloſophy*, purſue not truth, as *politicians* and the vulgar, have not true *Virtue*, but only the ſhadow and reſemblance of it.

ly belong to thoſe who both contemn the Body, and continually exerciſe themſelves in the ſtudy of Philoſophy? *Of neceſſity.* For, ſaith he, if you conſider the Fortitude and Temperance of other men, you will diſcover them to be nothing but an importune and abſurd oſtentation of Virtue. *How ſo, Socrates?* You know ſaith he, that all other men account death to be one of the greateſt Evils. *They do ſo indeed*, replies he. Do then men of courage and fortitude endure death bravely, for fear of greater Evils? *They do*, anſwers he. Then are all, except Philoſophers, ſaid to be *Valiant* only from *fear*; though it be truly ſomewhat abſurd [and a kind of contradiction] to call any man valiant upon the account of fear and cowardiſe. *I grant it to be ſo.* What? as for thoſe of the vulgar who are reputed to be *Temperate*, are not they ſo out of ſome intemperance? Tho we have declared that to be impoſſible: yet the like affection falls upon them, in that their ſenſeleſs and fooliſh temperance; for while they fear to be deprived of ſome pleaſures, and ſtill coveting them, abſtain from others; they are carried away by thoſe they covet, without reſtraint. Now they call it Intemperance, to be governed by the tyranny

ny of pleaſures: and 'tis their caſe, to be overcome by ſome pleaſures, whilſt they conquer others. So that what we ſaid even now of vulgar Fortitude, holds true alſo of theſe men, that they are Temperate from ſome Intemperance.

That the firmament of true Virtue, is wiſdom; without which the *politic* virtues are vizards and diſguizes. So that to *Plato*, true *Virtue*, is wiſdom; Wiſdom *truth*; and Truth, *Expurgation*.

But, my *Simmias*, this is not the right way to Virtue, to exchange pleaſures for pleaſures, pains for pains, one fear for another, greater for leſs, as we do money. That is at laſt the true money, for which all things elſe are to be exchanged; *Wiſdom*, for the ſake whereof, and for which alone, all things are to be ſold and bought: that fortitude, and temperance, and (in *ſumme*) every true and genuine Virtue may exiſt with wiſdom; while pleaſures, and fears, and all of the ſame Tribe come and go. But if they be ſeparated from prudence, and exchanged one for another by turns; ſuch Virtue will not amount to the ſhadow of Virtue, but be meerly ſervile and baſe; it will have nothing of true, nothing of ſound and ſolid in it. Now *Truth* it ſelf is the expurgation and refinement of all theſe: not temperance, nor juſtice, nor fortitude, no nor

Wiſdom it ſelf can be the expurgation. And indeed thoſe who firſt ordain'd our Ceremonies, ſeem not to have been ſilly and vile men: but to have prudently deſigned that wrapt up in the veyls of words, when they ſaid, that he who ſhould deſcend to thoſe *below*, not being initiated, and expiated according to the uſe of Sacrifices; ſhould be rowl'd in mudd: but he who deſcended to the ſhades, being firſt ritely expiated, and admitted to the Sacrifices, ſhould have his habitation with the Gods. For in the Ceremonies themſelves (as they ſay) you may ſee * many that bear Lances covered with leaves, but few *Bacchuſes*. * Theſe are, in my opinion, no other but they who ſtudy Philo-

Hence that of *Virgil.* (*Æneid lib* 6, *ea. prima piacula ſunto, Sic demum lucos ſtygios, regna invia vivis aſpicies, &c.* Concerning which Expiation, derived from the antient *Egyptians*, conſult *Servius Honoratus* upon the place.

* Ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοὶ, Βάκχοι δὲ γε παῦροι. *Multos Thyrſigeros, paucos eſt cernere Bacchos*, an old Greek adage.

* The importance of all the precedent Arguments, accommodated by *Socrates* to his own juſtification, for that rejecting the counſel and aid of his Friends, who ſtrove to perſwade him to avoid death, (as *Plato* hath left upon Record, in a precedent Dialogue, intitled *Crito*) he ſtill remained fixed in his judgement, that he ſought rather to embrace it.

ſophy

ſophy rightly. From which inſtitute I for my part have never in my whole life departed: but have with all poſſible contention of mind laboured to be one of them. But if we have done our devoirs rightly, and profited any thing in that ſtudy, when we come thither, we ſhall certainly underſtand, if God be ſo pleaſed, a little after, as I think. Theſe then *Simmias* and *Cebes*, are the reaſons I bring for my defenſe, that I leave you and theſe Lords who are here, not only upon juſt motives, but without trouble or regret: being fully perſwaded within my ſelf, that I ſhall there find as good Lords and Friends as here. The things I have ſaid, are indeed of that [abſtruſe] nature, that they may be by very many eſteemed incredible: but if I ſhall appear to you to have made now a more pertinent & decent defenſe, to engage your aſſent, than I did before thoſe *Athenians* who were my Judges; 'tis very well.

When *Socrates* had ſaid this, *Cebes* taking up the diſcourſe; ſome things, ſaith

A new diſputation of the *Immortality* of the *Soul*; but the *baſis* of the former. For if the Soul ſurvive not the body, all diſpute concerning future felicity or infelicity, muſt be vain and idle.

ſaith he, ſeem indeed to be excellently well ſaid by you: but what you have delivered concerning mans *Mind* or *Soul*, ſeems wholly abhorrent from Humane belief: nay they believe rather, * that the Soul, ſo ſoon as it goes out of the Body, doth no longer exiſt; but in the very day wherein a man dies, utterly periſh; more plainly, that departing from the Body, as a breath or ſmoke, it is diſperſed, and flies away, nothing of it afterwards remaining. Now if it continued intire, and had a being apart by it ſelf, delivered and freed from the evils you recounted; then I confeſs, there would be a noble hope [beyond death] if the things you have ſaid, *Socrates*, be true. But this wants no little probation of Arguments to prevail upon belief: * namely that the Soul exiſteth after a man is dead; and what faculty it hath of perceiving and underſtan-

* To make way for this diſpute, firſt is propoſed the *contrary* opinion of thoſe who held, that *the Soul dies with the Body*; but ſo propoſed, that in the words of this opinion lie concealed the ſeeds as it were of more ſolid Arguments. For things *compounded* are ſaid to be *diſſipated*. He therefore being about to demonſtrate the *Soul* to be a thing, not compound, but moſt *ſimple*; makes it moſt evident, that a *Soul* is uncapable of deſtruction by *diſſipation*; as will appear from the diſpute it ſelf.

* The *ſtate* of the Queſtion, Whether after the diſſolution of the Body, the *Soul* be likewiſe diſſolved, and hath no longer a *being*.

derſtanding. You are in the right, *Cebes*, replies *Socrates*. But what do we? Will you that we diſcourſe further of this matter, whether it be reaſonable, or not? I would gladly hear, ſaith *Cebes*, your opinion concerning theſe [abſtruſe] things. Nor do I think, ſaith *Socrates* again, there is any man living, though he be a Comedian, when he ſhall hear me diſputing about them, will ſay, I trifle and ſpeak of things impertinent and undecent. If you pleaſe therefore, that this matter be fully debated among us; let us conſider it in this manner, namely whether the Souls of men deceaſed, be in the *infernal* habitations, or not. * For this is a very antient Tradition, which we here commemorate, that the Souls of the dead go from hence thither, and return from thence hither, and are made of the dead. Now if it be ſo, that the living are made out of the dead; our Souls truly can be no where but there: for if they were not, men could not be made again of them. And this would be a ſtrong Argument, that the thing is ſo, in caſe

* The *firſt* reaſon, drawn from the *Pythagorean* opinion, of the *tranſmigration* of ſouls. For if ſouls go from bodies into another life, and return thence hither to animate other bodies; it follows both that they do and will exiſt hereafter; becauſe they are ſuppoſed to paſs through many bodies.

caſe it were manifeſt, that the living are not otherwiſe animated than by the Souls of the dead. But if this be not evident and certain, other reaſons are to be ſought for, that may be more convincing. *They are ſo*, ſaith *Cebes*. * Do not then, ſaith he, conſider this in men only, if you would eaſily underſtand it; but in Animals and Plants alſo; in ſumme, in all that have being by Generation: that we may enquire whether they be all produced from no other original than as contraries from contraries, (whatſoever have their contraries) as Beautiful or Honorable is contrary to ugly, or ſhameful, juſt to unjuſt, and infinite others in the ſame manner. Let us ſee therefore if it be neceſſary that any contrary can have no being in nature, unleſs from its contrary: for example, that when a greater thing is made, it be neceſſary it ſhould be made of a leſs firſt, and then greater. *Let us examine this.* If a leſs thing be made out of that which was greater before, will it afterward be made leſs? *Yes*, ſaith he. And of a ſtronger, a weaker; or a ſlower a ſwifter?

* *Proof* of this *Pythagorean Hypotheſis*; that this circulation is peformed, not only in the bodies of men, ſo that the *living* are made out of the *dead*; but in all other creatures; namely that *contraries* are *made* out of their *contraries*, as he teacheth by various *examples*.

It will ſo. What? if any thing worſe be made, is it out of a better? if any thing more juſt, is it out of what is more unjuſt? *Why not?* This then is clear, ſaith he, that all things are thus made, contraries out of contraries. *'Tis ſo.* What more? Is there any medium betwixt two contraries; ſo that where there are two contraries, there muſt be alſo two generations or originals of being produced, firſt from one to the other, and then from that to this again? for betwixt a leſs thing and a greater, there is augmentation and diminution, of which one we call to increaſe, the other to decreaſe. *Right.* Therefore to ſeparate, and compound; to grow cold, and to grow hot, and all in the ſame manner; though we uſe not names ſometimes, yet in reality it is neceſſary, that ſome things be made out of others, and that there be a mutual generation and beginning of ſome to others. *I grant it*, ſaith he. Is any thing contrary to life, as ſleep is contrary to waking? *Yes.* What? *Death*, ſaith he. Are theſe then made mutually each out of other, ſeeing they are contraries, and their generations made by ſome thing intermediate betwixt two contraries? *Why not?* One therefore of the two pairs I juſt now mentioned to you, I will explain, and their generations:

rations: do you ſhew me the other. To ſleep, and to awake: for out of ſleep comes waking, and out of waking, ſleep. The origins or generations of theſe are, of ſleep, to be in a deep ſleep, of waking, to be raiſed up from ſleep. Is this ſufficiently explained, or not? *Sufficiently.* * Do you then tell me with equal plainess, of life and death: whether is life contrary to death? *It is ſo.* And are ſome things generated out of others. *They are.* What then is made out of one living? *A dead one*, ſaith he; and what out of a dead? *A living*, I muſt confeſs. Of the dead therefore, *Cebes*, are made the living. *Clearly ſo*, ſaith he. Are then our Souls in the *Manſions below*? *It ſeems ſo.* Of the two generations or orgins therefore, which we have demonſtrated to be in theſe things, is not *one* at leaſt perſpicuous? For to *die*, is manifeſt to all: is it not? *yes*, ſaith he. * What then ſhall we do? ſhall we compoſe ſome other contrary to this, or will this nature rather be maimed and imperfect? or ſhall we determine,

* That death is contrary to life, and life to death; whence is collected, that the dead are out of the living, and the living out of the dead; and therefore the ſouls thus paſſing from body to body, ſtill are in Being; for otherwiſe they could not tranſmigrate.

* The ſame *concluſion* farther explicated, thus; tho this *new life* appear not to us, yet ſince no

termine, that ſome other generation is to be rendred contrary to death? *yes*, ſaith he. What ſhall that be? *Even to revive* [that is a new life. If then there be a new life, will that be a certain generation out of the dead to the living? *Doubtleſs.* That therefore ſhall be confeſſed and eſtabliſhed betwixt us, that the living have exiſtence out of the dead, no leſs than the dead out of the living. Which being ſo, is a convenient argument, that it is plainly neceſſary, the Souls of the dead be ſomewhere, from whence they may again exiſt. This indeed, *Socrates*, ſeems to me to be proved from [Propoſitions] granted and given. Obſerve this alſo, *Cebes*, that we have not confeſſed that without good cauſe. * For unleſs thoſe things that are made, were compoſed ſome of others by turns; ſo as they come round again as in a circle; but there were only a generation in a right line from one to its oppo-

man can doubt of *death*, which is known to all; from the nature of *contraries*, that cannot be underſtood one without the other, it is neceſſary that [ἀναβίωσις] or *reviving*, or [παλιγγενεσία] *ſecond generation* to life, be.

* Another Argument, *ab incommodo*; if contraries were not thus produced out of contraries, all Generations would inevitably ceaſe; which being abſurd, he thence collects and evinces, that out of the living, are made the dead, and out of the dead the living. Which is the *firſt* concluſion.

ſite

ſite, not reflecting again to the firſt, nor making a return or regreſs: aſſure your ſelf, it would come to paſs, that at length all things would have the ſame figure, be in the ſame manner affected, and conſequently would ceaſe to be made. *How's that?* ſaith he. 'Tis not difficult, anſwers *Socrates*, to comprehend what I ſay. For Example; if this very thing, *to ſleep* (if I may ſo ſpeak) that is ſleep, were exiſtent; but to *awake*, were not, on the reverſe, compoſed of the man ſleeping: we were obliged to conclude, that all would at length repreſent the Fable of *Endymion*, and appear no where: becauſe the ſame would happen to all, that hapned to that *Endymion*, namely to *ſleep*. And if all things were mixed and compounded into one, without diſcretion or diſtinction; then that of the *Anaxagoreans* would come to paſs, all things would be at once. In the ſame manner, my *Cebes*, if all things that now participate of life, ſhould die, and then remain dead in that figure, nor revive again; is it not clearly neceſſary, that at length all muſt die, and nothing be left alive? for if the living have exiſtence out of others, and the living ſhould die; how could it be poſſible but all would be conſumed by death? *By no meanes, Socrates,*

crates, quoth he; for all you ſay, appears to me to be true. 'Tis even ſo, *Cebes*, ſaith he. Nor do we ſeem to confeſs things, as being impoſed upon, and circumvented by error: but this is really demonſtrated by us, *that there is a return and reſtauration of a certain new life; that the living are made out of the dead; that the Souls of the dead exiſt; and that good Souls are in a better condition, and wicked ones in a worſe.*

A ſecond Reaſon to prove the Immortality of the Soul, drawn from that Hypotheſis, that *to learn*, is only *to remember*. For if in this body, the Soul *remember* the things it knew before it came into it, it hath had a *Being* before it was married to the ſame.

Here *Cebes* anſwering, *Socrates*, ſaith he, what you now ſaid, ariſeth from the reaſon of that opinion which you frequently have in your mouth (if at leaſt it be true) *that to learn, is only to remember.* And from this opinion indeed it ſeems to be neceſſarily concluded, that we ſome time heretofore learned, what we now recal into our memory. But this could not be, unleſs our Soul were in being, before it came into this human form. So by this reaſon alſo, the Soul ſeems to be a thing *immortal.* But *Cebes*, ſaith *Simmias* taking up the Diſcourſe; pray, recal to our memory thoſe your demonſtrations: for I do not well remember

member them at preſent. The thing may be demonſtrated by one, and that a remarkable Reaſon; * namely, becauſe men being asked, they deliver the whole matter as it is: but this certainly they could not do, if there were not Science and right reaſon in them. Again if a man bring a matter to Geometrical Figures, or Diagrams, or the like evidences: this moſt manifeſtly proves and demonſtrates the ſame to be true. But if by this way, ſaith *Socrates*, that be not proved to you; conſider well, whether when you by this reaſon ſeriouſly examine the matter, it ſeem to you ſo clear, as that you ought to aſſent thereunto. Do you not believe, how that which is called to *learn*, is really nothing but *to remember?* I do not indeed refuſe to believe it: but deſire to have recalled into my memory, that of which we began to diſcourſe: and from thoſe reaſons *Cebes* hath endevoured to alledge, I almoſt remember and believe it already. Nevertheleſs I would now gladly hear,

* A proof of that *Platonic Hypotheſis*, that *ſcience* is *Reminiſcenſe*, from the *effects* themſelves; *viz.* that men being asked rightly, anſwer fitly of things otherwiſe (than by reminiſcenſe) unknown to them, yea and of ſuch as are indeed obſcure and abſtruſe, as in *Mathematics*. This *Plato* more copiouſly explicates in his Dialogue called *Menon*: here touching it only *en paſſant*.

hear, by what way you are provided to demonſtrate it. *By this*, ſaith he. Upon this we are already agreed, that if a man record and recal to his memory any thing whatſoever, he muſt have known it before. *True*, ſaith he. * Do we then confeſs this alſo, that when there is knowledge by this way, that knowledge is reminiſcence? I ſay, by this way [by this example] as if a man had perceived a thing either by ſight, or by hearing, or any other ſenſe, he hath not only known that thing, but thought upon ſome other thing alſo, whereof that very knowledg is not, but of another: might we not ſay, that he hath remembred the thing, the underſtanding and knowledg whereof he hath perceived? *How ſay you this?* Let this be an example; is not the knowledge of a Man, one; and the knowledge of a Harp, another? *Why not?* Know you not that it is uſual to Lovers, when they behold either the Harp, or Garment, or any other thing, which their Paramours or Miſtreſſes are wont to uſe; to know that Harp, and to have in their mind the image of the Youth

* A further proof of the ſame *ſuppoſition*, whereof this is the ſumme: that from the *parity* or *imparity* of the thing we have known, we come to underſtand other things, while we mark what is *like*, what *unlike*; which he aſſerts by many *Examples*.

Youth whose the Harp is? Now this [their *Knowledg*] is *Remembrance*: as a man having seen *Simmias*, often remembers *Cebes*; and there are found infinite other examples of the same kind. *There are so*, saith *Simmias*, by *Jove*. And is not that, saith he, *Remembrance?* and most of all, when the same hapneth to us in those things, which when we have not lately seen them, through length of time, and discontinuance of use, we have forgot? *yes*, saith he. Doth it not happen, that if one see the Picture of a Horse, or Harp, he presently remembers a Man: and if he see the picture of *Simmias*, he instantly remembers *Cebes? It doth.* And if he see *Simmias* his picture, doth he not remember *Simmias* himself? *It doth so happen*, saith he. * Doth it not then come to pass, that in all these instances Remembrance is exercised; partly from things alike, partly from things unlike? It doth. * But now, when a man remembers

* Whence it follows, that *Reminiscense* is from the *parity* or *disparity* of things *compared* among themselves.

* Another *supposition*, that from this Reminiscence we do not only perceive wherein the *resemblance* consisteth, but also what is *wanting* to make the resemblance perfect, with respect to the thing already known. Which also he remonstrates by *Examples*.

a thing,

a thing upon ſight of the like, ought he not to be ſo qualified or diſpoſed, as to underſtand whether there be any defect of reſemblance in what he ſo remembers? *Of neceſſity*, ſaith he. Conſider then, ſaith he, if theſe things be ſo. Do we ſay, that there is any thing *Equal?* not wood to wood, nor ſtone to ſtone, nor any thing of that kind: but beſides all theſe, ſome other thing, *viz. Equality* it ſelf? ſhall we hold, there is any ſuch thing in nature, or not? *yes*, by *Jove*, ſaith *Simmias*; but exceedingly admirable. Do we know what that thing, *Equal*, is? *We do*, ſaith he. Whence ſhall we derive the knowledge of it? ſhall we not from thoſe things we juſt now mentioned, when we behold woods or ſtones, or any other the like Bodies equal; from theſe (I ſay) ſhall we not in our thoughts comprehend that, which is quite another thing, different from them? or doth it not ſeem to you to be quite another thing? Now conſider this alſo. Do not thoſe very equal woods, and equal ſtones, which are the ſame ſtill, ſeem to you ſometimes to be equal, ſometimes unequal. *They do ſo.* What? Do they ſometimes ſeem to you equal or unequal: or the very Equality it ſelf ſeem Inequality? *Not at all, Socrates.* Are not then, ſaith he, E-

quals, and Equality the ſame thing. *Not*, as I conceive, *Socrates*. But ſaith he, * tho the Equals be different from the Equality, yet you have both underſtood and perceived the knowledge thereof. *You ſpeak moſt truly*, ſaith he. Is it not the ſame thing, whether the object underſtood be like or unlike to that which occaſioned the thoughts of it? *It is*. That truly makes no difference, for having ſeen one thing, and from that very ſight conceiving in your mind another, whether like or unlike: neceſſary it is, ſaith he, that [*Conception*] be *Remembrance*. *Very well*. What then, ſaith he? are we to hold the ſame concerning thoſe things of which we newly ſpake, woods, ſtones, and the like? Do the Equals ſeem to be ſo among themſelves, as *the Equal* it ſelf is? or doth ſomething ſeem to be wanting therein ſo as they are not ſuch as that equal is, or nothing? *Much is wanting*. Do we not admit this alſo, as certain and perſpicuous; when

* Another *Suppoſition*, to the ſupport whereof the reſt are applied, *viz.* that we come to know things *Equal* and *Unequal*, by a certain *Divine* power (which *Plato* here calls [τὸ ἴσον] the *Equal*) from the reaſon of the compariſon made, underſtanding this ſimply, that in our Soul is a *Divine* virtue or faculty, by which the operations of both *Memory* and *Science*, and other the like, are perform̃ed.

when a man having beheld ſomething, comprehends the ſame in his mind, and will have it (for example, what I now look upon) to be exactly ſuch as ſome other thing: but yet it fails, *i. e.* it cannot be ſuch, but comes ſhort of the other to which he likened it: is it not of abſolute neceſſity, that he who ſo reaſoneth, hath before ſeen that, to which he ſaid the other is like, but yet there is wanting therein ſomewhat to complete the ſimilitude or reſemblance? *It is neceſſary.* What? are we in the ſame manner affected, in the conſideration both of the things that ſeem equal, and of the equality it ſelf? *Altogether.* Neceſſary it is therefore, that we have firſt ſeen that *Equal*, before that time wherein having firſt beheld the Equals, we comprehend them in our mind, and conceive, that all things affect to be ſuch as that Equal, but cannot reach to a full and perfect ſimilitude or reſemblance thereof. *So it is.* * But let us grant this alſo; that no man could comprehend in his mind that *Equal*

* From theſe ſuppoſitions given and granted, he infers (toward the explication of the queſtion under debate) that the Soul underſtands both *like* and *unlike* things, wherein the *parity* or *diſparity* conſiſteth; which is *Science*, and from *Remembrance*; as being from compariſon of *par* and *impar*.

* And that although our Soul doth in this life, act

by meanes of the corporeal *Senses*, and so is obliged to make use of them as her instruments; yet that very faculty of *perceiving* by them, is to be deducted from a higher and nobler principle, namely that *Divine* power essential to the Soul, which he calls [τὸ ἴσον] the *Equal*, so that by that name he seems to intimate *God* himself, to the end he might conclude, that the *Soul* also is *Divine*.

it self, from any other [intimation:] and that it is not possible, that any should comprehend it, otherwise than from the sight, or touch, or some other of the Senses. For I hold the same of all: the case being one and the same in all, *Socrates*; as to what concerns the explication of this Discourse. But from the information of the *Senses* themselves we are to understand that all things that are subject to their preception, continually affect, and desire to be referred unto that which is *Equal*, and to yield thereunto; as being in themselves less perfect. Shall we grant this? *Yes.* * For before we began to see, or hear, or have any faculty of Sense, 'twas necessary for us to be endowed with knowledge of that *Equal*, what it was: if we would refer to that *Equal*, the E-

* The *Reason* of that assertion. Unless that Divine power were in us, whereby we perceive; certainly we could discern nothing by the help of our Senses. Divine then is that Faculty whereby the *Soul* understands by benefit of the senses, remembers, and reasons; yea and hath a knowledge even of God himself, of Good, Beautiful, Holy, Just.

quals

quals that occur to our ſenſes; as if all things were by a certain potent inſtinct inclined to aſpire to be ſuch as that is, tho they be much, yea infinitely inferior thereunto. This, *Socrates*, is evidently neceſſary from the things mentioned by us before. When we were newly born, did we not See and Hear; had we not all our Senſes? *We had.* It muſt be therefore, that before that, we were endowed with knowledge of the *Equal*. *Certainly.* Before we were born therefore (it ſeems) 'tis neceſſary we ſhould have the knowledge thereof. *It ſeems ſo.* * If we were endowed therewith, before we had exiſtence; did we not underſtand even before we were Born? and when firſt we were born, did we not know, not only *Equal*, and *Greater*, and *Leſs*, but all other the like [Reſpects?] for the deſign of

* *Concluſion*; ſeeing that from the example of things moſt known to us, it hath been proved, that we know that which by comparing *like* and *unlike*, or *equal* and *unequal*, we remember; and ſeeing that the ſoul doth even now it is in the body, know ſo *great* things; it follows of neceſſity, that the ſoul long before knew the ſame things, which it now, by the miniſtry of the ſenſes, knows and underſtands, as it were by certain degrees. Yet that knowledge is to be attributed, not to the miniſtry of the ſenſes, but to that efficacious *ſeed* of Reaſon and Science which is inherent in the Soul it ſelf; and only excited by the ſuggeſtions of the *ſenſes*.

our diſcourſe is no more concerning the *Equal*, than concerning the *Beautiful*, the *Good*, *Juſt*, and *Holy*; in ſumme, concerning all, by which both in our interrogations, when we interrogate our ſelves, and in our anſwers, when we anſwer, we ſign and ſeal the *Being* of a thing: ſo that of neceſſity, we were endowed with the knowledge of all theſe things, before we were born. *It is of neceſſity.* Now if there had never been induced upon us an *Oblivion* of theſe Knowledges perceived, we muſt certainly have ſtill been skilful in them, and through our whole life alwaies endowed with Science. For, *to know*, is conſtantly to retain the knowledge of that thing we have perceived, and never to loſe it. Do we not call *Oblivion*, a *loſs* of Knowledge? *We do, Socrates.* What if being endowed with that Knowledge, before we were born; we have loſt it, ſince we were born: and afterwards being converſant in thoſe things by the help and ſervice of our Senſes, retrive thoſe Sciences we had before: do not we then call to *Learn*, to *recover* our own Science? and if we call it, to *Remember*; do we call it rightly, or not? *Rightly.* For by experience it hath been demonſtrated to be poſſible, that he who hath perceived a thing by

ſenſe

ſenſe, *i.e.* ſeen, or heard, or by any other ſenſe perceived it, may in his mind comprehend ſome other thing different from that which he had forgot, namely that to which the other, like or unlike, ſhould ſucceed [in the brain of his thoughts.] Wherefore of the two, one (as we have ſaid) is a neceſſary conſequent; for either we were born knowing theſe things, and all know them through the whole courſe of our life; or certainly thoſe whom we call Learners, do nothing elſe but Remember: and ſo, to Learn, will be only to remember. And without all doubt, *Socrates*, this is even ſo. Whether of the two will you chooſe, *Simmias?* That we are born knowing; or that we afterward recal to mind the things we knew before. *I know not at preſent, Socrates, which to chooſe.* What? in this example have you not judgment to chooſe, & to determine certainly of it? A prudent and knowing man, cannot he give a reaſon of the things he knows? *He can, Socrates.* Do you think that all are able to give an account of thoſe whereof we juſt now treated? *I wiſh they could*, ſaith *Simmias*; but fear leſt to morrow no man may be left alive able to do it. Do not all, think you, know theſe things, *Simmias* ſaith he? *No.*

Therefore they remember thoſe they have ſometimes known. *Certainly.* And when did our Minds receive their knowledge? Not from the time we were born men. *No doubtleſs.* Before therefore. *So it ſeems.* Our Souls then were, before they put on the ſhape of man; and they obtained the power of underſtanding, while they yet had exiſtence apart by themſelves. Unleſs perhaps, *Socrates*, we receive theſe Sciences at the time of our birth: for that time yet remains. When then do we loſe them? for we have them not when we are newly born, as was before agreed upon betwixt us. Do we loſe them at the ſame time when we receive them? or can you aſſign any other time? *No.* But I perceived not that I ſay nothing. Then, *Simmias*, the thing is clearly ſo. *

If at leaſt there be thoſe things which we have alwaies in our mouths, *Beautiful*,

How the *ſoul* is ſaid to have formerly *known* the things which being in the body, it recalls to memory. Where we may obſerve, that according to this *Socratic Hypotheſis*, the *ſoul* is created long before the body is formed, and as a Gheſt *infuſed* into it, by *God*. Which is his *firſt* poſition.

A ſecond *poſition*, that our ſoul is *Divine*, not by deciſion from *Divinity* it ſelf, nor by iſſuing, or propagation, or generation of ſubſtance, or any other groſs manner of production from Divinity; yet divine; ſo that the Divine energy of perceiving and knowing, is eſſential to it, which diſtinguiſhes it from all other Animals.

tiful, and *Good*, and every ſuch eſſence; and we thereunto refer all things that come from our Senſes: for that by inveſtigating our own Eſſence, we find to be, namely exiſtent, and we compare theſe things to the exemplar thereof; So it is neceſſary, that as theſe alſo are, ſo our Soul too be, before we were Born, and came into the light of this life. If theſe were not, truly this diſcourſe would ſeem to be made in vain: but they are ſo, and there is an equal neceſſity, both that they be, and that our Souls were exiſtent, before we were Born. If thoſe be not, neither are theſe. *Truly, *Socrates*, ſaith *Simmias*, abſolute neceſſity ſeems to urge theſe things beyond all diſpute: and reaſon ſeems excellently to conduct us to this concluſion, that as well our Soul, as that Eſſence whereof we ſpeak, have been exiſtent, before we were born. For

* *Concluſion*; that this created and divine Soul hath had *præ-exiſtence* with *God*, then knowing more things, than ſince it came a Pilgrim into the darkſom lodging of the body. So that this Doctrine about *Remembrance*, may be reduced to this one *Syllogiſm*. That is learned which is perceived from remembrance of the *like*: the Soul, before it came into the Body, could not but know many things, by that Divine power wherewith it was endowed; therefore what it learneth in the body, it underſtandeth from remembrance of the *like*; and ſo *Learning* is nothing but *Reminiſcenſe*; which was the thing to be *demonſtrated*.

I hold nothing ſo certain and evident, as that all theſe are, and chiefly both Beautiful and Good, and the reſt of which you now treated: and I am abundantly convinced of their verity. What? and is *Cebes* ſo too? for he alſo ought to be perſwaded. I conceive, ſaith *Simmias*, the whole matter hath been ſufficiently proved to him too, tho he be a man of moſt hard and moſt ſlow belief, beyond all others; yet I think, it hath been clearly enough demonſtrated to him, that our Souls were pre-exiſtent to our Nativity. But whether they alſo *ſurvive* our death, and continue their *Being* after the diſſolution of our Bodies; this I think hath not been yet demonſtrated: and that vulgar opinion, which *Cebes* mentioned, yet remains unrefuted; namely that ſo ſoon as a man is dead, his Mind or Soul is diſperſed, and deſtroyed, ſo that it can no longer exiſt. For what ſhould hinder, but it may derive its origin and creation from ſome other principle, and have Being long before it enter into a human body: but when it departs, and is freed again from the body, then it both die, and be utterly aboliſhed? You ſay well; *Simmias*, quoth *Cebes*: for only the half of what was required, ſeems to be demonſtrated, *viz.* that our Souls were,

were, before we were born. There remains to be remonſtrated the *other* part, that the demonſtration may be full and perfect; namely that after our death, our Souls will be, no leſs than they were before our birth. This part of the Demonſtration, *Simmias* and *Cebes*, ſaith *Socrates*, is now finiſhed; and if ye pleaſe to conjoyn and compoſe this reaſon, with that upon which we all agreed before, namely, *that whatever lives, hath its exiſtence out of the dead.* For if the Soul be pre-exiſtent, neceſſary it is, that when it comes to life, and is truly in Being, it derive that exiſtence only from death. How therefore is not clearly evinced, that it doth exiſt ſo ſoon as a man is deceaſed: ſeeing it is neceſſary that it exiſt again? This alſo then is already demonſtrated, as is apparent.

The ſecond part of the former *Theſis*, of the *immortality* of Souls; where *Socrates*, after lighter arguments, comes to allege more ſolid and cogent Reaſons, to evince, that the Soul being perfectly *ſimple*, or void of all compoſition, is therfore naturally incapable of *diſſolution* or *diſſipation*; as *Cebes* had objected.

And yet notwithſtanding both you and *Simmias* ſeem willing to be again exerciſed more accuratly in this argument, and to be aſtoniſhed with that childiſh fear, leſt the wind blow out and diſſipate the Soul going out

out of the Body; and the more, if a man die, not in a close room secured from winds, but in an open place where winds blow strongly. And when *Cebes* had smiled; endeavour not, *Socrates*, saith he, to incourage us, as if we were astonisht with fear; but endeavour rather to demonstrate the thing to us, as free from all fear. Yet perhaps there is here among us some Boy, who is afraid at the mention of this. Let us therefore do our devoir to perswade him not to dread death, as a Goblin. 'Tis fit, saith *Socrates*, to mitigate and animate him daily with Verses, * till he be perfectly restored. But where, saith he, shall we find a man skilful enough in the Art of Inchanting: since you say, you desire to leave us? *Greece* is wide, *Cebes*, saith he; and in it are good and skilful men, and many Barbarous Nations, which are all to be surveyed, that there may be found out a man powerful in that Art of Charming; neither money nor labour ought to be spared: for

* Alluding to the Magic of *Inbcantation*, first used by the *Egyptians*, and from them derived tothe *Grecians* by *Orpheus*, who thereby having cured his Wife *Eurydice* of the venemous bite of a Serpent, was thereupon feigned to have reduced her from Hell. Of the antiquity of this kind of *Magic*, and the traduction of it, consult Sir *John Maylham in Chronic. Canon. pag.* 142.

for ye can expend your money in nothing that's more neceſſary. And now he is to be ſought after among your ſelves: for perhaps ye will not eaſily find any man more able than your ſelves to perform it. This ſhall be done, ſaith *Cebes*; but in the mean time let us, if you pleaſe, return to our argument, from which we have digreſſed. With all my heart; why not? You ſay well quoth he. * Ought we not then, ſaith *Socrates*, to ask of our ſelves, and with the beſt of our underſtanding to enquire, to what thing this affection [of *Diſſipation*] may be convenient and incident; and for what we ought to fear, leſt it ſuffer *Diſſipation*, and by what reaſon, and in what part thereof: then to conſider diligently whether that thing be a Soul, or not: and in fine, matters being thus ſtated, either to hope comfortably of the Soul, or to fear for it, accordingly? *You ſay well*, quoth he. * Is it agreeable to a thing which is either actually mixt, or compounded, or by nature ſo conſtituted, as to be capable of mixture or com-

* The beginning of the grand diſpute about the Souls immortality; the fundament whereof is this *propoſition*; that the ſoul is moſt *pure* and *ſimple*, and therefore *indiſſoluble*.

* *Firſt* poſition; whatſoever is *compoſed*, is obnoxious to *diſſolution*.

compoſition: is it agreeable, I ſay, to ſuch a thing, in as much as it is compounded, to be diſſolved? But if there be ſuch a thing, of whoſe nature it is, to be wholly ſimple or uncompounded, is it convenient to this thing, to ſuffer no diſſolution? *It ſeems to me to be ſo*, ſaith *Cebes*. * Thoſe things therefore, which are alwaies in one manner, and equally comparated, 'tis highly conſentaneous, that they be ſimple or void of compoſition: but thoſe that are ſometimes in one manner, ſometimes in another affected, that is ſubject to alterations; 'tis conſentaneous, that they be compounded. *I think ſo.* Let us then return to thoſe we noted in our precedent diſcourſe. That very Eſſence, which by the force of queſtions and anſwers we have defined to be *really exiſtent* [namely *God*] is that equally the ſame at all times [without alteration] or not? namely the *Equal* it ſelf, the *Beautiful*, the *Single*, (that is,

* *Second* Poſition; Things that are alwaies the ſame (that is *Eternal*) are void of Compoſition; things not alwaies the ſame, (that is, *moral*) are compounded.

Third Poſition; *God* who gives *Being* to all creatures, and is not only Good, but *Goodneſs* it ſelf; not only wiſe, but *wiſdom* it ſelf, &c.) is neither *compounded*, nor ſubject to any *mutation*, but [μονοειδὲς] *uniform*, knowing no [τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα] ſhadow of change.

is,

is, what really exiſteth) doth it never receive any the leaſt alteration? *That Eſſence,* ſaith *Cebes, muſt of neceſſity be ever the ſame, without alteration.* What ſhall we determine of many Beautifuls, as men, or horſes, or garments, or others however the like, equal and beautiful, or all that are comprehended under the ſignification of the ſame name: are theſe alwaies the ſame, or is any thing contrary to them, nor they to themſelves, nor among themſelves, that I may ſo ſpeak, are they alwaies the ſame? *Theſe truly,* ſaith *Cebes, are never exactly the ſame.* Theſe therefore you may perceive either by your touch, or ſight, or any other ſenſe: but thoſe that are alwaies the ſame, you cannot by any other way, but by reaſoning of your Mind, comprehend; for they are *inviſible*, and fall not under the power of ſenſe. *You ſpeak truly*, ſaith he, *in every point.* * Will you therefore, that we make two Kinds of things; one, *viſible*; the other, *inviſible? Let us lay down theſe two Kinds* [for a foundation] ſaith he. Let us alſo put the inviſible to be that which is alwaies the ſame: the viſible, that

* *Fourth* poſition; there are two kinds of things or (as he ſpeaks) δυο ειδη των ὀντων, two forms of *Beings*. Thoſe that are alwaies the ſame, which are *inviſible*: and thoſe that are mutable, which are viſible.

which

which is never perfectly the same. *And that too*, saith he. Now, saith he, do we consist of any other things but *Body* and *Soul*? *Of no other*, saith he. * To which of the two Kinds shall we decree the Body to be more like, and more allied? 'Tis evident to every man, saith he, that the body is more of Kin to the *Visible*. But the *Soul*, is that visible or invisible? *Invisible*, to men, saith he, certainly. But those things that fall under sense, and those that do not; did we not refer them to the nature of men, or are they to be referred to any other nature, think you? *To Human nature.* And what is to be concluded of the Soul, that it is visible, or that it is invisible? *Invisible.* This therefore is to be fixt, that *the Soul can by no meanes be perceived by the sight. Right.* Therefore the *Soul* is more like to that *Invisible* Kind, than the Body is: and the *Body* more like to the *Visible*. *Of necessity, Socrates.* * We said a

* *Application* of all these four positions to the present argument. There are in Man, two distinct things. One, *visible*, not alwaies the same, but obnoxious to various *mutations*, and so *compound* and *mortal*: the other, *invisible*, alwaies the same, and so *incompound* and *immortal*, namely the *Soul*; whence it is evinced, that the Soul is [ἀναπαλύτω] *indissoluble*, and consequently *immortal*.

* Impediments of the *Soul* from its so close *conjunction* with the *body*.

while

while since this also, that the Soul, when it useth the service of the Body to consider any thing, either by seeing, or hearing, or any other sense (for, to consider a thing by the body, is to consider it by sense) is then drawn by the body to those things that are never the same; and that it errs, and is amused, and giddy, as a Drunkard is giddy by a vertigo in his brain. *Altogether so.* But when the Soul doth contemplate by it self, it aspires to what is pure, to what alwaies existeth and is immortal, to what is ever the same: and as being of Kin thereunto, is alwaies conversant therewith, after it is of its self and by it self, and hath power, and ceaseth from error, and is wholly in those things that are alwaies the same, so far forth as they occur to it. And this affection of the Soul is called, *Wisdom. You speak rightly, Socrates,* in every word. To which Kind therefore, both of these we mentioned above, and those we now describe, is the Soul more like, and more allied? * Any man (in my opinion, saith he) even the most ignorant, will from this way and method of reasoning, grant, that the Soul is more alike, and more cognate to the *All* and *Whole*, that

* Conclusion that the soul is Divine and Immortal; the Body, grois and mortal.

is, to what is ever the ſame; than to what is never exactly the ſame. And what the Body? *To that which is never the ſame.* Thus obſerve alſo, after the *Soul* and *Body* have come together into the ſame [man] that nature commands the body to be ſervant thereunto, and to obey the dictates of its ſuperior, the Soul; and appoints the Soul to rule and give law to the Body. From the reaſon of theſe things, which of the two ſeems to you to be like unto the *Divine*; and which to the *Mortal* [being?] or is that Divine by nature qualified and made to command and govern: but the Mortal, to be ſubject, and to ſerve? *I conceive ſo.* To which is the Soul like? Truly, *Socrates*, the Soul is like to the *Divine*; the *Body*, to the *Mortal*. Obſerve, I pray, ſaith he, whether from all we have already alledged, it be certainly evinced, that the Soul is moſt like unto the *Divine*, and *Immortal*, and *Intelligent*, and *Uniform*, and *Unalterable*: but the Body is moſt like unto the Human, and Mortal, and Non-intelligent, and Multiform, and Diſſoluble, and Alterable. Can we oppoſe any thing

The Affections and Offices conſigned by the inſtitute or law of Nature, that is, of God acting by his ſervant Nature, to both ſoul and body; that the *Soul* is to *rule*, the *Body* to *obey*.

thing to these, as if they were not right and convincing? *We cannot.* These things then being thus established, is it not proper and peculiar to the body, to be capable of Dissolution: and to the Soul, to continue indissoluble; or somewhat next to this? *Why not?* You clearly see therefore, saith he, that when a man is dead, the visible body, (which we call dead, and to which it belongs to be dissolved, and to fall asunder, and be blown out) doth not incontinently suffer any of these, but remain some considerable time, if a man hath by pleasantness and moderation treated his Body to the time of his death. For when the dead Body is fallen, and enbalmed, as they who are enbalmed in *Egypt*, it continues almost intire, for a very long and indeterminable time; and though some members thereof shall have suffered corruption, yet the bones, nerves, and all of the more compact sort, endure (if I may so say) for ever. Do they not? *Certainly.* * But here the *Soul*,

Grand Conclusion; that the *Soul* being indissoluble by death, survives eternally.

* Here he explains the *Emigration* of the *Soul* out of the Body, at the instant of death; subjoyning, that *Souls* after death, go thither, whither the similitudes of their *cogitations, affections*, and *habits* lead them.

n inviſible thing, goes away into another place, a place noble, pure, not to be ſeen by the eyes of Mortals, among the infernal ſhades, really to a good and provident God; whither indeed (if God be ſo pleaſed) my Soul is preſently to go. For the Soul it ſelf being in this manner qualified and freed from the Body; will it, think you, preſently vaniſh into air, and periſh? as many men ſay. No, *Cebes* and *Simmias*; it is very far from all poſſibility of being diſſolved. But truly, in that manner we have explained, the matter is rather diſpar aged than illuſtrated; for the nature of it is more noble: if at leaſt the Soul depart pure, carrying along with it nothing from the contagion of the body: as that which did, whilſt it remained in this life, willingly and of choice hold no communication with the Body, but declined and avoided it; and retired into it ſelf, imployed all its powers by cogitation to avoid it. Which is nothing elſe but to Philoſophize rightly, and in good earneſt to anticipate death by familiar converſat o n of thoughts. Is not this a meditation of d e ath? *Wholly.* * Doth not there-

* From which principle he infers, that a good *Soul*, free from the cor gi n and deluſion of the corporeal ſenſes, goes i mmedia ly after death, to a certain *inviſible* and moſt *bliſful* place, where it is again conjoyn'd to *God*, to whom it is of kin and like.

Felices

[*Felices poſthac Animæ, quas corpora nullis*
Fœdarunt vitiis, nullaq; libidine morſas
Detinuere olim, quæ, dum ſub carne latebant,
Contemplatrices abſtracte a carne volarant
Sæpius ad Cælos, Cælis poſt fata, quibuſcum
Fœdera ſanxerunt viventes ſacra, locantur,
Eternaq; illic Lætantes luce fruuntur.]

fore the Soul being ſo comparated, go to that Divine Being like unto it ſelf? *Divine*, I ſay, and *Immortal*, and *Wiſe?* To which when it comes, it becomes perfectly happy, being freed and exempted from error, from ignorance, from terrors, wild Loves, and all other Human Evils; and as men are accuſtomed to ſpeak of ſuch as have been by ſolemn expiations purged, and initiated to Sacred Rites, living eternally with the Gods. Shall we ſpeak thus, *Cebes*, or otherwiſe? *Thus in all points*, by *Jove*, ſaith *Cebes*. But if the Soul depart out of the Body polluted and impure, as having hitherto converſed wholly with the Body, and ſlaviſhly ſerved it, and being both by its own errors, and by the luſts of the Body faſcinated, eſteemed nothing true but what's corporeal, namely that groſs matter that is touched, ſeen, drunk, and uſed to Venereal pleaſures: and on the contrary,

that which is to the eyes dark and invisible, but may by the power of understanding be perceived, and by the institutes and discipline of Philosophy be comprehended: this, I say, having been accustomed to hate, and abhor, and dread; can we imagine that a Soul thus disposed and vitiated, shall depart pure, and intirely collected into it self?

By no means, saith he. * I think, we ought rather to decree, that such a Soul departs involved in, and contaminate with the stains and infection of the corporeal mass, which the very conversation and familiarity of the Body, because that Soul hath so continually and intirely conversed therewith, and with much

* From the popular Opinion of *Ghosts*, and *Spirits*, he adds that Souls loaden with gross & earthy affections, wander in grief about monuments and Sepulchres; for a certain time only; that is, (according to the *Pythagorean* Dream) they light upon other Bodies suitable to their former affections, inclinations, and manners.

[*At tenebrosæ animæ, nimium quæ carnibus olim*
Demersæ jacuere suis, quos tetra libido
Atq; voluptates, solum quas sensus alebat,
In terris notæ, posthac de carne solutæ,
Aspectum Cæli, cum quo commercia nulla
Viventes habuere, timent, nec luce fruuntur:
Sed tenebris dilectà nimis prope corpora semper
Ferales errant Umbræ, mæstæq; Sepulchra

care

Buſtaq; fœda colunt: Hinc noctu ſpectra videntur,
Quæ terrent homines; animæ ſunt iſta malorum,
Quæ quæniam craſſæ ſunt, corporeaq; videntur.
Majus noſter, in Supplem. *Lucani* lib. 4.]

care and cogitation imployed it ſelf in purſuit of ſuch things, hath as it were ingrafted into it, and made a part of its nature. *Certainly.* This we are to hold, to be with a kind of burden, groſs, heavy, terrene, viſible: wherewith when ſuch a Soul is inveloped, it is weighed down and carried to a viſible place, by fear of that inviſible one, and (as it is vulgarly ſaid) it wanders about Monuments and Sepulchres; where have been ſeen certain darkſom Images of Souls; which Apparitions ſuch Souls repreſent, that have not departed pure, but yet retain ſomething of that groſs and viſible matter, and are therefore beheld. *'Tis very probable, Socrates.* Nor is it leſs probable, *Cebes*, that thoſe are not the Souls of good men, but of Wicked and Impious, that are compelled to hover and flagg about thoſe places, ſuffering the puniſhment of their former vicious Education; and reſtleſly wandring until by deſire of that corporeal following, they are again intangled in, and bound to a Body. And

bound they are (as is probable) to one of ſuch inclinations and manners, as they in life had imployed their thoughts upon. *What are theſe things you ſpeak, Socrates?* How it is probable, that thoſe who have minded gluttony, railing, wantonneſs, &c. nor cautiouſly abſtained from them; may fall on the forms of Aſſes, and of other wild Beaſts. Do not you think it probable? *You ſpeak with great probability.* And that they who highly valued and honoured injuſtice oppreſſion, tyranny, rapine; are turned into the Kindes of Wolves, Hawks, Kites, and other Beaſts of Prey? or ſhall we ſay, that their Souls go to ſome other place? *Truly*, ſaith *Cebes*, *to no other.* We are therefore to hold, that all Souls ſtrive to go, whither the ſimilitudes of their cogitations and inclinations carry them. *'Tis very perſpicuous truly*; and why not? Are then they the happieſt of men, who upon deliberate purpoſe exerciſe civil prudence in a popular way of life, which they call temperance, and juſtice, contracted meerly from converſation and cogitation, without the precepts and diſcipline of Philoſophy? and do they go

* A *conſectary* of the former Doctrin; that the true way to that conjunction with *God*, is not by *Politic* and *Theatrical* virtues, which are but ſhadows, but by the ſerious ſtudy of *wiſdom.*

go to the beſt place? *How can theſe be moſt happy?* Becauſe 'tis likely, that they come again into ſome civil and tame kind of Animals, as Bees, Drones, Piſmires; or return into men, and become moderate. *Very likely.* But to paſs into the kind of *Gods*, is poſſible to none but who hath duly exerciſed himſelf in the ſtudy of wiſdom: for he having been all his life poſſeſſed with deſire of learning, departs out of this world pure and undefiled. And 'tis upon this account, that *Cebes* and *Simmias*, that good and genuin Philoſophers; abſtain from all pleaſures of the Body, and conſtantly and firmly contain themſelves, not permitting their appetites and paſſions to carry them away in purſuit of ſenſual delights; nor fearing the ſubverſion of their private Eſtates, and the invaſion of poverty, as the vulgar and avaricious do; nor dreading the ignominy and reproach of mean ſpirited men, as the ambitious and lovers of great Honours do: but abſtracting and alienating their minds from all ſuch [ſplendid trifles.] *Nor would it be conſentaneous to them to do otherwiſe, Socrates*, ſaith *Cebes*. *No*, by *Jove* would it not, ſaith he. Therefore *Cebes*, ſaith he again, all who take care of their Souls, and

A lively and remarkable deſcription of that *Philoſo-*

imploy

phical life, the ground whereof is the *contemplation* of *God*, and its *work*, to inſtruct men to renounce all exorbitant affections of the body, *&c.*

ploy not their life in pampering and adorning the body; neglecting and repudiating all thoſe things, they walkt not in the way of thoſe we mentioned before, who are wholly ignorant whither they are to go. But Philoſophers being perſwaded, they ought to do nothing contrary to the precepts of Philoſophy, or to the ſolution and expiation thereof; [leave the common road of the multitude] and proceed in the way that [Wiſdom] hath ſhewn to them, and follow the conduct thereof, as of their Leader. *How? Socrates.* I will tell you ſaith he: Men ſtudious of Diſcipline know, that Philoſophy, when it undertakes their Soul really bound and glewed to the body, (which Soul is conſtrained to contemplate things themſelves through the body, as through a Bride-well, and not ſingle by it ſelf able to contemplate it ſelf: and when it wallows in all ignorance, and perceives the power and efficacy of that bond, which exſerts it ſelf even by luſts themſelves; namely that the Soul thus bound and impriſoned doth imploy all itsforce and powers to be by luſts and deſires more cloſely enchained) I ſay, men

men ſtudious of Diſcipline know that Philoſophy, when it hath found their Mind or Soul ſo diſpoſed, is verſed chiefly in this, by degrees to mitigate and compoſe [the Soul] and to deliver it [from thoſe Fetters;] teaching, that that conſideration which is performed by the ſervice of the eyes, is full of error; and that the information of the Ears and all other ſenſes, is likewiſe full of error, perſwading it to retire from them, and not to uſe them, unleſs when neceſſity compels: and declaring and exhorting it, to recollect and congregate it ſelf; and to give credit to none but it ſelf, ſeeing that it ſelf alone can by it ſelf underſtand and comprehend that which *exiſteth by it ſelf*; and that what it conſiders by other things, becauſe ſubject to alteration, it ought not to account true, but only ſuch as the Senſes repreſent it; but that what it ſelf clearly perceives, is intelligible, and unperceivable by Senſe. * When therefore the Soul of a man truly a Philoſopher conceives, that it ought not to oppoſe this deliverance and infranchiſment, comes thus to abſtain from pleaſures and luſts, and as much as it is able, from griefs alſo and errors: thus caſting up its account,

* Deſcription of a *profane* and vicious life. Whereof the greateſt Evil is, that ſuch men are *inſenſible* both of their *ſins*, and *miſery*.

account; When a man is poſſeſſed, and even tranſported with great joy, or aſtoniſhed with exceſſive grief, or inraged by the ſtings of Luſts, he doth not by thoſe [paſſions] ſuffer ſo much of evil, as one would by common and vulgar judgment think: whether (for example) that he ſhould purſue thoſe Luſts, feel thoſe Diſeaſes, and undergo loſs of his Eſtate in vain: but, what is the higheſt of all Evils, he ſuffers this, that he perceives not, nor takes notice that he ſuffers. *What mean you, Socrates?* ſaith *Cebes.* Becauſe every mans Mind is conſtrained to rejoyce and delight vehemently upan occaſion of ſome things, and to eſteem that wherein he ſuffers that [affection] to be moſt manifeſt and moſt true; though the ſame be not ſuch. Now are theſe things diſcernable by the ſenſe, or are they not? *Wholly.* But in this affection, is not the Soul obliged to ſympathize with the Body? *In what manner?* Becauſe every pleaſure, and every grief, as if armed with a nail, affixeth, and as it were with a buckle faſtneth the Soul to the Body, and makes it corporeal, thinking all things to be true, that the body dictateth. For, that it is conſtrained to agree with the Body in opinions, and to be delighted at the ſame time with it (as

I conceive) comes from the conjecture of the one with the other: and thence the Soul is carried about by the common force of education and cuſtomes, ſo as it cannot go to the ſhades below, *i. e.* to a ſecond life, pure and undefiled, but departs polluted with ſtains and infection derived from the body, and then preſently falls into another body, and as if ſowed therein, grows to it, remaining void of that divine, pure, and uniform converſation. *You ſpeak great truths, Socrates,* ſaith *Cebes.* * By reaſon of theſe things, *Cebes*, they who are truly ſtudious, are modeſt and valiant; but not by reaſon of thoſe that are in the opinion of the vulgar. What think you? *Not by reaſon of vulgar things, certainly.* For the Soul of a Philoſopher will not hold it ſelf obliged to free it ſelf from the inſtitutes of Philoſophy, and letting looſe the bridle of its precepts, give it ſelf up to the deſires either of pleaſures or pains, and permit it ſelf to be again chain'd to the body, and ſo render its work imperfect; weaving and unravelling its web, like *Penelope* (as they ſay) but will reſolve it to be moſt decent

* *Concluſion* monitory. With what care and circumſpection a *Philoſopher* ought to beware, leſt he be intangled in the ſnares of Luſts and Corporeal pleaſures, againſt which by his profeſſion he proclaims open War.

cent, to compose all those desires, and follow the conduct and mandates of reason, and to be alwaies conversant herein, to contemplate things true and divine, and such as may not be carryed about by temerity of opinions; and being bred up and nourished with them, conclude, it ought in this manner to live, while life lasteth: and when death comes, to go to a place agreeable and cognate to its nature, and be delivered from human evils. From this Education, it can fear nothing grievous, by its own institution studiously labouring in this matter, *Simmias* and *Cebes*; not fearing, to be, in the moment of its departure from the body, dissipated, and blown out by winds, and so to vanish, as to have no longer existence any where else.

The *second* part of the disputation; wherein *Plato* proposes the chief Opinions *impugning* the Immortality of the Soul; observing the circumstances conducing to the grace of the *Dialogue*.

Socrates having thus spoken, there succeeded a long silence. And he was plainly observed profoundly to revolve in his mind the discourse he had delivered; and thereupon many of us appeared to meditate upon this matter. But *Cebes* and *Simmias* conferred a little betwixt themselves. Whom *Socrates* beholding, what, saith he, is

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the ſubject of your conference? Doth any thing ſeem to be deficient in my diſcourſe? There remain truly many doubts and exceptions, if one would with due ſtrictneſs examine and purſue things more particularly. If your private talk be of any other matter, I ask nothing; but if ye doubt of the verity of ought delivered in my diſcourſe, delay not either to declare your ſcruples, if ye think they may be more commodiouſly and ſatisfactorily ſolved; or to admit me to bear a ſhare in the conference, in caſe ye believe any thing of light or utility may ariſe from my aſſiſtance. And I, ſaith *Simmias*, will ingeniouſly confeſs the truth. Each of us remaining in ſuſpenſe, have been urging one the other, out of deſire of ſatisfaction, to propoſe our Queries to you: but fear reſtrains us, leſt we might give you trouble, and our interrogations prove importune and unpleaſant, in this your calamity. At this *Socrates* mildly ſmiling, O ſtrange! ſaith he: how hard a task ſhall I have, to perſwade others that I am far from eſteeming this my preſent caſe a calamity, ſince I cannot prevail upon you to believe I am ſo: but ye fear, leſt my condition be now more afflicted, and ſad, than at any time heretofore in my whole life. Truly

ye

ye ſeem to think me to be inferior to *Swans*, in the way and faculty of divining.

* They, when they firſt perceive they are to die, as they ſang before, ſo they ſing moſt at that time, rejoycing that they ſhall forthwith come to that God, whoſe ſervants they are. But men, being themſelves afraid of death, feign lies in diſparagement of *Swans*, and report, that they lamenting their own death, for very grief ſtrain their voice more vehemently at the approach of it; not obſerving, that no Bird ever ſings when he is diſpleaſed or pinch'd with cold, or affected with any pain whatever; no not the Nightingal, nor Swallow, nor the Hooper, which they ſay, are wont to ſing for ſorrow: but neither theſe, nor Swans ſeem to ſing for grief; but, as I think, becauſe they are Sacred to *Apollo*, and ſo being endowed with ſome inſtinct of divining, when they fore-ſee the Goods that are reſerved *apud inferos*, they chant forth their joy, and are more

* *Socrates*, in way of *preface*, firſt poſitively profeſſeth his own ſtedfaſt belief of the Souls immortality; alluding to the vulgar tradition of the ſinging of *Swans* (concerning which he ſhews himſelf ſomewhat ſuperſtitious;) and then declares the *diſquiſition* to be of ſo high moment, that we ought not to be exerciſed therein without due attention of mind, and caution, leſt we admit error inſtead of truth.

more delighted that day, than in their whole life before. And for my part, ſeriouſly I conceive my ſelf to be conjoyned with theſe Swans in conſort of the ſame miniſtry, and conſecrated likewiſe to the ſame Deity: and that I have received from that my Lord and Maſter, no leſs power of Divining; and that I depart out of this life with equal quiet, and calm ſubmiſſion. Wherefore nothing remains to hinder you from ſpeaking and interrogating whatſoever ye pleaſe, concerning our former argument, whiſt the *Eleven* [Officers] of the *Athenians* permit. *Socrates, ſaith well*, replied *Simmias*. I will freely declare my doubt: and *Cebes* here will likewiſe let you know how far he doth not embrace what you have delivered. For I think my ſelf to have as certain and confirmed knowledg of theſe things, as you *Socrates*; that either they are in the number of impoſſibilities, or extremely difficult. But as for what things are ſaid concerning them, not to examine them with every reaſon, and all moments of arguments alledged, or wholly to reject them, and to leap back from them, before you have endeavoured with all poſſible contention and equity of mind, even to the laſt effort, and to wearineſs, to per-

pend them: this I think to be the part of an effeminate and incurious ſpirit. And herein, this one thing is to be ſtudiouſly endeavoured, that either we may learn, or find out how theſe things are; or if that cannot be done, chooſing and fixing upon ſuch a reaſon, among thoſe that occur to humane underſtanding, as may be more firm and convincing, *i. e.* as may be leſs ſubject to refutation; ſet up our reſt therein: that being thereby, as by a ſhip, carried ſafely along, we may eſcape the dangers and difficulties of this life; unleſs any can be waſted and tranſmitted over in ſome firmer vehicle, *i. e.* ſome *Divine Word*. Truly I ſhall not be aſhamed to ask, ſince you ſay this: nor will be a cauſe of accuſing my ſelf hereafter, that I had not ingeniouſly explained to you what my opinion is concerning this matter. For, *Socrates*, when I both by my ſelf, and with another, by comparing reaſons, enquire into it: I do not find your arguments to be perſpicuous and convincing. Perhaps, ſaith *Socrates*, this is your opinion: but tell me freely, how far, and wherein my diſcourſe fails of being perſwaſive. *Thus far*, ſaith he: * that any man may ſay the

* The firſt *contrary* Opinion, that the Soul is *Harmony* and *Concent*; and ſo both reſults from, and periſhes with the Body.

ſame,

ſame, with equal reaſon, both of *Harmony*, and of a *Harp*, and of other inſtruments of Muſic: namely that *Harmony* is a ſomething *inviſible*, and *incorporeal*, and moſt *beautiful*, and *divine*, in a well tuned and concordant Harp or Lute: but the Harp it ſelf, and the ſtrings, are bodies compound, and terrene, and of Kin to that *Mortal* [nature.] And when any one hath broken the Harp, or cut the ſtrings; if another ſhould aſſert, and by the ſame reaſon you urged, that of neceſſity that Harmony doth ſtill exiſt, and is not deſtroyed, (for it would be no difficulty at all, that the *Harp* is ſtill in *being*, and that the ſtrings being broken, are mortal; but that the Harmony, which was by community of nature, and by cognation conjoyned with that Divine and Immortal [Being] died and vaniſhed, before the Mortal,) but continue in Being ſome where; and that the wood and ſtrings would rot and fall to duſt ſooner than the Harmony decay, or ſuffer any thing of deſtruction. For truly, *Socrates*, I conceive that you alſo have thought our Soul to be ſomething like this [Harmony:] as if our body being extenſe, were held together by hot and cold, dry and moiſt; and from the mixture of theſe, reſults a certain temperature and con-

ſent, which is the Soul; and this, after thoſe Elements or Ingredients have been exactly and in due proportions mixed and tempered together. If therefore the Soul be a kind of Harmony, namely when our Body ſhall be infinitely extended, and ſo freed from diſeaſes and other evils: that then it is abſolutely neceſſary, the Soul (how Divine ſoever) ſhould periſh, as other Harmonies, that are either in Sounds, or in all the works of Artificers: and there the reliques of every body endure a long time, until it be burned, or diſſolved by putrefaction. Obſerve then what we ſhould anſwer to this diſcourſe, if any ſhould affirm, that the Soul is a certain temperament ariſing from the ingredients of the body; and that in that diſſolution which is called *death*, it firſt periſheth. Here *Socrates*, after he had, as he uſed often to do, caſt his eye round about, and ſmiled; *Simmias* hath reaſon, ſaith he. If therefore any of ye be more copious, and better furniſhed with arguments, than my ſelf, why doth he not anſwer? for *Simmias* ſeems not lightly or raſhly to have touched that diſcourſe. Yet before I anſwer, I hold it convenient, we firſt hear *Cebes*, what he alſo reprehends in my diſcourſe, that gaining time for thoughts,

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we may well consider what to reply; then, that having fully understood their objections, we may either yeild to them, or by observing their impertinency, so defend and make good our own Doctrine. But go to, *Cebes*, saith he; declare to us what troubles you in this argument, so that you cannot assent and give credit to my words.

I will tell you, saith *Cebes*: To me your discourse seems to be involved in the incommodity, and to be guilty of the same fault I observed before. For, that our Soul existed before it came into our Body, I deny not: for that hath been fairly, and (if it may be said without offence) abundantly demonstrated. But that any thing remains to us after death, seems to me not sufficiently proved: For, that the Soul is stronger and more lasting than the Body; I so hold, that I shall not grant that Exception of *Simmias* to be true; because the Soul seems to be far more noble and excellent than all these. Why therefore (saith Reason it self speaking to me) do you yet doubt and refuse to believe? since

The *Second contrary* opinion; that the Soul, tho more firm and lasting than the Body; because more excellent: doth yet at length, after it hath animated and worn out many bodies successively, decay, and through weakness perish; which *Cebes* illustrates by an *example*.

you ſee, that when a man is dead, what of him was more infirm and weak, yet remains: do you not conceive it to be neceſſary, that what is more firm and laſting, muſt at the ſame time remain conſerved? But now do you perpend and conſider this alſo, if I ſhall ſay any thing conſiderable: for I want as much as *Simmias* did (it ſeems) ſome Image or ſimilitude. For, to me theſe things ſeem to be ſpoken, juſt as if one ſhould, an old Weaver being dead, ſay thus of him; the man is not deſtroyed, but remains ſafe ſomewhere: and ſhould bring this argument for it, the garment of his own weaving wherewith he was cloathed, which is yet extant. And if another ſhould, after refuſal of aſſent to that argument, ask, whether of the two is more laſting, man or a garment, which may indeed be conſumed by the very uſe of wearing: and a third ſhould anſwer, that man is much more laſting; and ſo ſhould think it demonſtrated, that that man doth by ſo much the rather remain ſafe, becauſe what is leſs laſting, hath not periſhed. This I conceive not to be ſo. Obſerve alſo what I ſay; for any one may think it to be ſaid fooliſhly and impertinently. For this Weaver having worn out and woven many ſuch garments, died the

laſt

laſt of theſe many, but before the laſt: and yet man is notwithſtanding neither worſe, nor more infirm, as for what concerns that matter. This very Image (I think) the Soul ſhall receive by reaſon of the Body. And he who ſhall ſay the ſame of them, may ſeem to me to ſpeak ſoberly and moderately, if he conclude the Soul to be of long duration; but the Body leſs firm, and of ſhorter duration. But I would ſay rather, that the Soul conſumes and wears out many Bodies, though they all live many years. For if the Body be diſſolved and periſh, the man yet ſurviving, and the Soul alwaies weaves a new what is worn out: it will be wholly neceſſary, that the Soul at that time when it ſhall die, have the garment it laſt wove; and that it periſh before that laſt garment only. But when the Soul once dies, the Body then ſoon demonſtrates the imbecility of its nature, and quickly rotting vaniſheth. Wherefore according to this reaſon, it would be highly extravagant for us to grow proud upon this perſwaſion, and to be confident, that after we are dead, our Soul doth ſtill remain ſome where. For if a man ſhall grant more than what you affirm; namely, that our Soul was pre-exiſtent before it entred into the Body; yea that

nothing hinders but the Souls of ſome may, after they are dead, ſurvive and continue; and that they are often born, and die again, that is, they often come and go (for that ſuch is the virtue and power of the Soul, as that it conſerves it ſelf through the various moments of its birth) though, I ſay, a man ſhall grant all this, he would yet be forced to confeſs this, that the Soul doth not only endure vaſt labour in all thoſe many acceſſions, or approaches of generations; but alſo at length is by one of thoſe decenſions or diſlodgings, that is by ſome one death, wholly deſtroyed and aboliſhed. But this death, and this diſſolution of the Body, which brings deſtruction at laſt to the Soul, let no man ſay he underſtands. For it is impoſſible, any of us ſhould comprehend it by ſenſe. This being thus, it is abſurd for any man living, who cannot prove it, with a certain fooliſh and ignorant ſecurity to be confident, that his Soul is immortal, and exempt from deſtruction. Beſides, 'tis neceſſary for a man drawing near to his death, to fear for his Soul, leſt in that very preſent diſjunction of his Body, it utterly periſh, and be aboliſhed.

When

When we had heard them ſpeak thus, we were all caſt into very great perplexity of thought, as afterwards ſome confeſſed to others; for that having been ſtrongly perſwaded by the precedent diſcourſe of *Socrates*, they ſeemed to trouble us, by deſtroying that belief, and by raiſing ſcruples in our minds; ſo that we not only doubted of what we had embraced, but inclined alſo to deny our aſſent to the like arguments in the future: as if either we were not competent judges of theſe things, or the things themſelves were of that improbable nature, as not to admit belief.

Here *Phedo* pauſeth a little; opportunely intimating, that the immortality of the Soul is a thing both ſo important, and ſo abſtruſe, as that it ought not to be by an empty and unadviſed *credulity* embraced, but ſtedfaſtly rooted in the mind, upon the conviction of ſolid and convincing *arguments*.

Ech. I excuſe you, *Phedo*, by the immortal Gods: for it came into my head to revolve the very ſame thing in my thoughts, whilſt I heard your recital of their [uncomfortable] exceptions and ſcruples. To which reaſon therefore ſhall I give aſſent? for that diſcourſe of *Socrates*, which to me ſeemed the more probable, hath now loſt its title to my belief. For that opinion, that holds the Soul to be an Harmony, hath alwaies wonderful-

derfully prevailed, and doth now prevail with me: and the preſent reherſal recalls to my memory, that the reaſons thereof have heretofore pleaſed me. And I again ſtand in need of ſome other diſcourſe (as a repetition from the very beginning) to perſwade me, that when the Body dies, the Soul doth not die too. Tell me therefore, by *Jove*, how *Socrates* purſued that diſcourſe; whether he, as you have confeſſed, were obſerved to be more offended at the oppoſition; or whether with a mild and compoſed mind, he brought relief to his diſtreſſed aſſertion: and whether that relief were effectually ſtrong and prevalent, or weak and deſtitute of ſolidity: all which (I pray) recount to us as particularly and plainly as you can.

An opportune reflection upon the admirable *modeſty*, and exemplary *humanity* of *Socrates*, ſhewn in Diſputation.

Phe. Truly, *Echecrates*, I have alwaies much admired *Socrates*; but never ſo much as at that time. It was no wonder, he was provided of an anſwer: but well worthy the higheſt admiration, that he firſt received and ſolved thoſe Objections of the Young men pleaſantly, benignly, and ſweetly; and then ſhewed himſelf ſenſible of, and concerned

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in our dissatisfaction and perplexity. Afterward he administred Physic most opportunely to our doubting minds, recall'd us as overcome and flying away, and made us turn our faces again [with courage and hope] that we might follow him, and with recollected thoughts more attentively consider his Discourse.

Ech. How effected he that?

Phe. I will acquaint you how; for I sate at his right hand, near the little Bed, on a low stool, so that he was much above me. When therefore he had rubbed his head a little, and pressed down his hair, (for he used sometimes in that manner to play with his hair) to morrow, saith he, *Phedo*, you will perhaps cut off these fine locks. That, *Socrates*, is convenient. No, saith he, if you believe me. Why? quoth I. This very day, saith he again, both I will cut off mine, and you shall cut off yours, if our discourse be dead, and we not able to revive it. Were I you, and had lost my discourse, I would make a vow, as the *Argives* did, I would never let my hair grow, till I had vanquished and subdued the Harangue of *Simmias* and *Cebes*. But, quoth I, *Hercules* himself is said not to be sufficient to encounter with two at once. But saith he, encourage me

as

as *Iolaus*, while the day lasteth. I do encourage you, said I, not as if I were *Hercules*, and you *Iolaus*: but as if I were *Ioalus*, and you *Hercules*. No matter which saith he; but first let us beware lest we be circumvented by some chance. By what? said I. That we be not, saith he, *haters* of *words*, as they who pursue men with peculiar and personal hatred: for a greater evil cannot fall upon any man, than to be involved in that kind of Odium and Aversion. And both sorts of hatred, of men and of discourses, flow from the same Fountain. For hate towards mens persons flows, and as it were steals in from hence; that if a man hath without due circumspection given full credit to another, taking him to be perfectly veracious, and upright, and faithful: and afterward find him to be a knave, faithless, a turn-coat and time-server; and this happen often to the same man, and from those whom he took for his most loving and most familiar friends; at length he feeling the shock of his wrongs, and as it were bruised, grows to hate all, and to conclude within him-

A previous *caution*, that we entertain no *prejudice* against *words*, as some do against particular *persons:* because Human reason may invent various *exceptions* in this sublime Argument, to elude the force of verity.

himself, that there is nothing of integrity or sincerity in any man. You are in the right, say I. Is not that therefore shameful and odious? and manifest it is, this man would, without skill in Human occurrents, and the practice of the World, hold a commerce with men. For if he made use of men with discretion and art, and estimated things according to their nature; he would find, that there are some men good, and others bad: not many very good, nor very bad; but every man of a middle order betwixt both. *How say you that?* said I. As of things, replied he, that are great or little in extremes; do you think any thing more rare, then a man extremely great, or extremely little; or a Dogg, or any thing else? or than one that is swift, or slow, or beautiful, or deformed, or white, or black to the last degree? Do you not observe, that all extremes are very rare: and that middlerate things are frequent and numerous? *They are so,* said I. Do you then think, that if there were appointed a combat of improbity, that men of the highest rank therein would be found to be but few? *'Tis likely they would,* said I. It is so, said he. But in this manner discourses are not like to men (for you going before me, I tread in your foot-

foot-steps, and follow you (but thus far the reſemblance and cognation betwixt them is to be obſerved, when a man hath firmly aſſented to a diſcourſe as true, without any arguments of that art whereby belief is uſually obtained; and afterward the ſame diſcourſe ſeem to ſome to be falſe, and to others to be true: * and this come to paſs chiefly from thoſe men who are verſed in that kind of diſcourſe which is called [Ἀπολογια] an account of *Cauſes*, (*i. e.* when upon examination of the *cauſes* of things, what arguments can be alledged on either part, are urged and debated) they forſooth at length think themſelves to be the wiſeſt, and alone to have underſtood, that there is nothing of truth and certainty in things or words; but that all are carried and tumbled up and down tumultuouſly, as by ſome *Euripus*, never continuing in the ſame ſtate and poſture. *You ſpeak truth*, ſaid I. Were it not then (ſaith he) a deplorable calamity, if when a diſcourſe is true and certain, and ſuch as may be commodiouſly comprehended

* Againſt the *Sceptics*, who diſputed of things *problematically*, concluding of nothing, but this, that *nothing ſhould be certainly known*. By this very place they may be undeceived, who having not read, or at leaſt not underſtood *Plato*, have yet been ſo bold as to accuſe him of *Scepticiſm*, as if he taught nothing of certainty.

ded and understood: yet afterward any man should fall from the truth of it, and waver in uncertainty, because in those very reasons, which being alledged on both parts, may seem one while true, and another while false, he hath been curiously versed? Would not he, I say, accuse himself? He would not confess his own dulness, but growing at length discontented, would transfer his fault upon the discourses themselves, and during the remainder of his life, pursue them with perpetual hatred and detestation: because it had by their fault happened, that he had been deprived of the just power of Verity and Science. By *Jove*, answered I, it would be very sad and deplorable. * First therefore, continued he, let us avoid this danger, and not perswade our selves of the wrong through prejudice, as if we thought there were nothing of solidity or soundness in discourses themselves: but this rather let us believe, that we our selves are not of sound and upright judgment; and that we are to endeavour with courage and resolu-

* *Socrates* addeth, that when in a Philosophical inquisition, we come to that point, that we cannot understand why a thing is so or so constituted: we ought to accuse, not the Reasons themselves, but *our selves* and our own infirmity; and so in this very Argument.

ſolution to render our ſelves more diſcerning and judicious: you and others, for the remainder of your lives, and I, for my death. But methink, I am not now treating of this Subject, as becomes a Philoſopher, but rather contentiouſly and obſtinately, as the groſly ignorant are wont to argue. For they, when they doubt of any thing, take little care of what properly belongs to the nature and inveſtigation thereof: but apply their whole ſtudy and diligence only to this, to perſwade others to think as themſelves think. And I ſeem to differ from them only in this. I am not ſolicitous to convince others of the truth of what I ſay (unleſs ſo far forth as it comes in my way occaſionally and by the by, to do it) but rather that the ſame things may appear to my ſelf to be really ſuch as I repreſented them to be. Thus, my *Phedo*, I reaſon: and do you look with how great acceſſion of profit and emolument [to others.] For if the things I ſay, be true; 'tis happy for me that I believe them: but if nothing remain to me after death, yet at this time that intercedes before it, I ſhall be the leſs unpleaſant to thoſe who are preſent, than otherwiſe I might be, in caſe I lamented and deplored my death. But the ignorance of this matter

ter will now no longer perſue me (for that would be evil) but be ſoon blotted out. And thus prepared, *Simmias* and *Cebes*, I addreſs my ſelf to ſpeak. Do ye the while ſo govern your aſſent, as to have little conſideration of *Socrates*; and all you can of truth. If I ſeem to ſpeak truth, give me your aſſent: if not, oppoſe me with all your power of reaſon; being chiefly intent upon this, that I may not through this my vehement ſtudy and ardor of thoughts, lead both my ſelf and you into error, & depart, like a Bee, leaving my ſting behind me.

Coming now to the *Refutation* of the *contrary* opinions objected; for more perſpicuity ſake, he firſt *rehearſeth* them faithfully.

To come therefore to the thing in diſpute; firſt do ye recal into my memory what things ye have ſaid, unleſs I ſhal appear to you to remember them of my ſelf. *Simmias*, as I think, diffident of of what I alleged, doubts and fears, that the Soul, though more divine and excellent than the Body, may yet periſh before it, as ariſing from, and depending upon a kind of *Harmony* or conſent [of the organs of the Body.] But *Cebes* ſeems to grant this, that the Soul is indeed more laſting than the Body: and yet holds it to remain uncer-

tain, whether the Soul after it hath paſſed through, and worn out many Bodies by uſe, doth not at a certain time, it ſelf alſo leaving its laſt body, periſh and vaniſh away; and whether that death be not the deſtruction and abolition of the Soul, for as much as the body never ceaſeth to periſh. Are not theſe your Opinions, *Simmias* and *Cebes?* Both aſſented that they were.

* *Refutation* of the *firſt* contrary Opinion, that the *Soul* being only *Harmony*, as it ariſeth from the Body, ſo it periſheth with it.

But, ſaith he, whether do ye reject all my precedent diſcourſes: or do ye repudiate only ſome, and admit others? *Some*, ſay they, we *reject*, *ſome we approve*. What do ye reſolve concerning that part of my diſcourſe wherein I affirmed, that Diſcipline or *Learning* is *Reminiſcence?* which being eſtabliſhed, it would neceſſarily follow, that our Soul hath exiſtence ſome where, before it is conjoyned to the Body. I confeſs, ſaith *Cebes*, both that when you delivered that Doctrine I ſuffered my ſelf to be perſwaded: and that now I wholly adhere to it, if to any other opinion. But you muſt be of another judgment, replies *Socrates*, if you yet continue in that perſwaſion of yours, that *Harmony* is a thing compounded; and the Soul a certain

tain Harmony, constituted of those things that are extended and diffused through the Body. For otherwise you would contradict your self, as having said, that this Harmony was made before those parts and organs of the Body, of which it ought to be composed, were in being. Will you admit this? *By no means, Socrates,* saith he. * Do you conceive then, saith he, that these two affirmations can stand together: namely, that the Soul hath existence even before it takes possession of a Human Body; and that the same Soul consisteth of two things that are not yet in being? For you have no such Harmony to which you liken it: but first the Harp, and the strings, and the sounds, and so the consonances and tunes by certain Musical modes composed, are made: and the Harmony as it is last formed, so it first perisheth. And how can this Opinion of yours agree with your other? *By no means,* saith *Simmias.* And yet notwithstanding, saith he, it is highly reasonable, that if it consist

* An Argument from an *Absurdity*, thus. If the Soul were Harmony, then would it be necessarily consequent, that the Soul was not præ-existent to the Body, which yet was before granted and proved. And this Argument is indeed firm, as to its form; but infirm as to its ground, namely the supposition of the præ-existence of Souls.

and agree with any tenent, it must be chiefly with this concerning Harmony. It is so, saith *Simmias*. That discourse therefore is disagreeable to you: but see which of the two you will take; this, that *Discipline* is *Remembrance*; or this, that the *Soul* is *Harmony*. *Rather the first*, saith he, *Socrates*. For this hath pleased me, without any firm demonstration, only by indication of a probable and elegant example: whence it hath been approved by many others also. * And I, out of conscience of my own experience, saith *Socrates*, am of opinion, that those discourses which endeavour to teach by things only like unto truth, are fitted meerly to ostentation: and that if a man be not very considerate and circumspect, they are highly fallacious, both in Geometry, and in all other Arts and Sciences. But that Doctrine concerning *Reminiscence* and *Discipline* is propt up by the solid firmament of an Hypothesis certain and worthy of belief. For it hath been said, that the Soul is somewhere so existent, before it comes into the Body, as that the Essence of it is qualified to obtain the true appel-

* Because this Opinion defended by *Simmias*, relieth only upon a probable *Example*; therefore *Socrates* occasionally admonishes, that we are not easily to resign up our belief to *Examples*.

appellation of what it is, [*i. e.* of a *Human Soul.*] And this position, as I first admitted it into my thoughts, and perswaded my self of the verity thereof, so have I rightly and fully embraced it. For from the force of these arguments, it seems to me clearly necessary, that neither my self, nor any man else ought to give credit to him who holds the Soul to be *Harmony.* *

* A second Argument, strong and cogent, from a double *Absurdity.*

What? saith *Simmias*, doth it not seem consentaneous both to this Harmony, & to ny another composition, to be of some other nature, than the things are whereof they are composed, or from which they result? *By no meanes.* * Nor can any other thing, I think, do or suffer ought, but what the principles of it do or suffer. *To this he assented.* For it is absurd, the Harmony shoul go before the things out of which it is made or composed, but necessary it should come after them. *To this also he yielded.* Very far then it is from possible,

* First position; that compounds alwaies are the same, in their affections, or actions and passions, with the things whereof they are compounded.

* Second position; that the nature of a *compound* wholly depending upon the nature of its *principles*, cannot be *contrary* to them.

that Harmony ſhould by a contrary reſiſtence be moved, or a ſound, or by any other way be repugnant to its own parts. *Very far* indeed, ſaith he. * What? is it not of the Eſſence of Harmony, that it be ſo far a Harmony, as it conſenteth? *I underſtand you not*, ſaith he. If that Harmony be more and more adjuſted and compoſed, will it then be more and more a Harmony? and on the contrary, if it be leſs and leſs adjuſted and compoſed, will it be leſs and more ſcarcely a Harmony? *Yes doubtleſs.* Is it then incident to the Soul, to be more and more, and leſs and leſs a Soul, from the moſt minute parts of it ſelf [increaſed or diminiſhed? *Not at all*, ſaith he. Go to then by *Jove*. * Is one Soul ſaid to be good, and to be endowed with underſtanding and virtue: and another, to be evil, and polluted with folly and improbity? and are they truly ſaid to be ſo? *Truly without doubt.* But of thoſe who hold the Soul to be an Harmony, who hath affirmed, that theſe things, Virtue and Vice, are in Souls themſelves? Hath any ſaid, that in them are alſo Concord

* From theſe two poſitions, ariſeth a Theorem; that *Harmony* cannot be *more* or *leſs* Harmony.

* That Theorem accomodated to the Soul.

cord and Diſcord? and that the Good is compoſed of a certain concordant conſent, and in the concord it ſelf, containeth another concord: but the Bad is both diſcordant, and containeth not another diſcord in it ſelf? *This in truth*, ſaith *Simmias*, *I cannot affirm*: but manifeſtly, that he who hath laid down this opinion for truth, will affirm it. But that, replies *Socrates*, hath been already granted, that one Soul cannot poſſibly be more or leſs a Soul, than another: and this was the grand article of our common aſſent, that one Harmony cannot by any meanes be more or leſs a Harmony than another. Was it not? *I confeſs* it. And that this is nor more nor leſs a Harmony, nor more nor leſs fitted and adjuſted to the ration of Harmony. Is this ſo? *It is* Now that which is nor more nor leſs adjuſted, hath that at ſometimes more or leſs of *Concent*: or equally? *Equally*. Therefore one Soul, as it is a Soul, is not more or leſs a Soul, than another Soul. and conſequently cannot be, by a certain concent, more or leſs conformed. *Right*. Being thus affected or conſtituted, can it be no otherwiſe participant of concord and diſcord? *No truly*. Being thus affected, can one Soul receive more or leſs of Virtue or Vice, than another:

ther: ſeeing that Vice will be Diſcord, and Virtue Concord? *Nothing more one than another.* Nay rather, *Simmias*, from the rule of right reaſon, no Soul will be participant of Vice, if it be Harmony; for Harmony excludes all Diſcord. * Nor can a Soul, perfectly a Soul, receive Vice. How can this be evinced from our former conceſſions? for by this reaſon alſo the Souls of all living creatures will be equally good; if at leaſt they be all equally compacted. *It ſeems to me*, ſaith he, *they are ſo, Socrates.* And doth that, ſaith he, ſeem to be rightly ſaid; and that theſe Reaſons are pertinent to this diſcourſe, and conſentaneouſly demonſtrated, if this be a true *Hypotheſis*, that the Soul is Harmony? *Not at all*, ſaith he. What then? ſaith he; of all the parts of man, doth any bear rule, and poſſeſs an Empire over the reſt, beſides the Soul, eſpecially if it be prudent? *No truly.* Whether doth it rule, if it indulge and favour the affections of the Body, or oppoſe and contremand

* That *Virtue* is the *Harmony*, and *Vice* the *Diſcord* of the *Soul*. From whence he collects, if the Soul be *Harmony*; ſince *Virtue* and *Vice* in the Soul undergo the ration of *Concord* and *Diſcord*; it muſt follow, that no Vice can have place in the Soul, and ſo no ſoul be vicious; that is, the difference of *Good* and *Evil* would be wholly taken away; than which there cannot be a greater *abſurdity*.

tremand them? for Example: If when the Body ſuffers heat or thirſt, the Soul incline it to abſtain from drink; and when hunger preſſeth the Body, the Soul divert it from eating; and in infinite other occaſions we obſerve the Soul reſiſting and giving law to the ſenſes and appetites of the Body. Doth it not? *Yes doubtleſs.* * And have we not in our precedent enquiry granted, that the Soul, ſuppoſing it to be an Harmony, cannot poſſibly have affections contrary to the organs of the Body by which its preſumed to be ſtrain'd up to a higher, or let down to a lower pitch; or repugnant to the paſſions of the inſtruments of which it is compoſed: but muſt inevitably obey their dictates and commands, not preſcribe and give law to them? *This we have granted*, ſaith he; why ſhould we not? Now then, doth not the Soul appear to do quite contrary, when it exerciſeth Dominion over, and diſpenſeth commands to the various members and organs of the body, out of

* A ſecond *abſurdity*; ſeeing it is evident, that both virtue and vice are incident to the Soul, (as appears from the rational and irrational cupidities thereof) if the Soul were Harmony, it would inevitably follow, that the *Soul* is not a *Soul*, that is, the [ασύστατα] things plainly *inconſiſtent* would be *compounded*; as if a man ſhould abſurdly imagine to mix Diſcord with Harmony.

of whoſe combination and ſyſtem you ſuppoſe it to reſult; and when for the moſt part during life, it ſtrives to control all their inclinations and appetites, with abſolute Soveraignty ruling and moderating them: more ſeverely chaſtiſing ſome, by the rules of ſtrict Diet and Medicine, and more gently and mildly correcting others; with menaces and advices compoſing the luſts, anger, and fears of the Body; as if in man himſelf there were two diſtinct natures, or as it were perſons, one ſpeaking to the other [as Prince and Subject? as *Homer* alſo imagined in his *Odyſſes*, where he ſaith of *Uliſſes*,

Knocking his breaſt, to's Heart he thus did ſpeak.
Be not thou, Heart, in theſe afflictions weak:
But bear them bravely, in thy ſelf ſecur'd.
Thou heretofore haſt greater ills endur'd.

Think you that the Poet feigned this out of opinion, that the Soul it ſelf was an Harmony, and ſuch a frail thing, as to be at the will and conduct of the corporeal affections, and unable to lead and rule them: or rather out of a full perſwaſion, that the Soul was a thing much more noble and divine, than

than a Harmony? *He ſeems to me*, by *Jove*, *Socrates*, *to have ſignified*, *that the Soul is*, *not a Harmony*, *but ſomething incomparably more Noble and more excellent.* * We cannot therefore (believe me) hold the Soul to be an Harmony: for manifeſt it is, that if we do, we ſhall both diſſent from that Divine Poet, and contradict even our ſelves. *You are in the right*, ſaith *Simmias*.

* *Concluſion*; that the opinion of the *Souls* being Harmony, is to be exploded, as many waies *abſurd*.

Well then, ſaith *Socrates*; we have commodiouſly (I think) appeaſed and ſilenced the reaſons of the *Theban* Harmony: but, *Cebes*, how ſhall we, in the next place, ſolve thoſe of the * *Cadmean*? *You*, ſaith *Cebes*, are moſt likely to find out that: for you have admirably, and beyond our expectation, diſcourſed againſt that Harmony [which *Simmias* defended.] For when I heard him propoſing his doubts, I thought it ſtrange even to wonder, if it were poſſible for any man living to find a reaſonable ſolution of them: and it ſeemed admirable to

* Both *Simmias* and *Cebes* being *Thebans*, it ſeems that *Socrates* here facetely alluded to the fable of *Cadmus* the *Theban*, of armed men growing out of the earth; becauſe *Cebes* had many times contradicted and oppoſed him with freſh forces.

to me, that he was not able to ſuſtain the very firſt charge of your ſpeech. 'Twil therefore be leſs admirable, if the *Cadmean* opinion [propoſed by me] meet with the ſame fate. Good *Cebes*, ſaith *Socrates*, ſpeak not thoſe magnific things of me, I beſeech you; leſt envy riſe up, and diſturb our following diſcourſe. But let God alone with that care alſo; while we encountring (as *Homer* ſaith) hand to hand, try the force of what you can allege.

He firſt recites, and ſtates the *ſecond* contrary opinion.

Of all your Enquiries, this is the grand and capital one. You judge it fit to be demonſtrated, that the Soul of man is free and exempt from deſtruction and death: and this, leſt a *Philoſopher*, when at the near approach of death, he is of a reſolved and undaunted courage, and believes that after death, he ſhall be far happier than in the ſhort race of this life; ſhould out of an ignorant and fooliſh confidence, triumph and exſult. Now to affirm, both that the Soul is a thing firm and divine, and that it exiſteth of it ſelf, before we are born: this, I ſay, hinders not but all your arguments may come ſhort of the main queſtion in hand: they may ſerve to evince indeed, not the *immortality* of the Soul, but only

only the *duration* of it: for that an immenſe time before its entrance into the Body, it hath exiſted; and then both knew and did many things: and yet notwithſtanding all this, we are under no neceſſity of concluding from thence, that it is *immortal*: nay rather on the contrary, it ſeems reaſonable, that its very entrance into, and conjunction with the Body, is the beginning of its deſtruction, and a kind of ſickneſs; ſo that it lives a ſad and miſerable life here, tormenting it ſelf with the ſenſe of [various] calamities; and at laſt periſheth by that end which is called death. But you ſay, that as to our ſecurity from fear of death, it makes no difference, whether the Soul come only once into one Body, or into many ſucceſſively. For in truth, no juſt cauſe of fear is given to any, unleſs he be very ſilly, and unable to give a reaſon why the Soul is immortal. And (this I take it) is the ſumm of what you ſaid, *Cebes*: which I induſtriouſly recite, and more than once inculcate, that nothing may eſcape us, and you may add and detract what you pleaſe. But I, ſaith *Cebes*, at preſent demand neither to detract, nor to add any thing: and you have faithfully recounted what I ſaid.

Then

Then *Socrates*, after he had a pretty while recollected himſelf from intent and fixed thoughts: the thing you ſeek, ſaith he, is not to be contemned, *Cebes*: as being that, for the ſake whereof it may concern us, exquiſitely to enquire into the cauſes of *Generation* and *Corruption*. I will therefore, if you pleaſe, purſue my diſcourſe, declaring what are my ſentiments concerning the ſame. *Let it be ſo*, ſaith *Cebes*. Attend you then diligently, while I explain my thoughts.

* I have ſaith he, even from my Youth, been ſtrangely enamour'd and inflamed with the ſtudy of that part of Wiſdom which they call the *Hiſtory* of *Nature*. It ſeemed a magnific and noble thing, to underſtand the cauſes of all things, why this or that particular was made, why it ſhould be again deſtroyed, and by what reaſon it had exiſtence: and I very often turned my ſelf up and down, firſt revolving theſe things in my mind. Why Animals, after hot and cold have undergone a certain ſort of putrefaction (as ſome ſay) are nouriſh-

* Accomodating his Anſwer to the order and method of the opinion he deſigns to refute; he firſt removes the *prejudices* upon which it was grounded; and then teacheth, that the true *cauſe* of the Souls *immortality*, is to be ſought in *God*, who is [αὐτὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος] the very form and fountain of life.

nouriſhed: and whether the *Blood* be that by which we have the power of *Underſtanding* and growing *Wiſe*; or *Aire*, or *Fire*, or *none* of all theſe; but rather the *Brain*, which gives us the *ſenſes* of hearing, ſeeing, ſmelling, *&c.* Whether out of theſe, *Memory* be made, and *Opinion*; and from memory and opinion ſetled by quiet, *Knowledg* be made, in the ſame manner. Perceiving clearly the corruptions of theſe, and obſerving the contingents both in the Heavens, and on the Earth: I at length thought my ſelf to be ſo unfit for theſe contemplations, that nothing can be more unfit. Whereof I will bring a juſt and convenient argument. So far was I amuſed and blinded by this way of conſidering, that what things I had before clearly and certainly (as I my ſelf, and others alſo thought) known; that was I obliged to unlearn and forget, and to doubt of very many others alſo, and chiefly of this, why a man grows and increaſes in ſtature and ſtrength: for this I before thought to be evident to every one, that he was nouriſhed, becauſe he eat and drank: and that ſo he came to be increaſed in bulk and ſtature: and when from meats, particularly from fleſh, there comes an addition of fleſh, and bones are added to bones, and ſo

in

in the ſame manner to all other parts their own proper nouriſhment is brought and aſſimilated: I thought that by this means a man was increaſed, from a little tiny infant, to his full ſtature. Theſe were my thoughts then; and do you think them reaſonable and ſatisfactory? *To me*, ſaith *Cebes*, they ſeem to be ſo. Now conſider alſo what remains: I alſo thought the matter to be ſufficiently evident, when a great man ſtood by a little man, that he was greater by the head; and one Horſe greater than another, and what's yet more evident, that ten were more than eight, becauſe two had been added to eight, and that two cubits were more than one, becauſe of double the length. *And now*, ſaith *Cebes*, *what think you of theſe things?* Far, by *Jove*, ſaith he, very far I am from thinking, that I underſtood the cauſe of them: ſo that now I cannot ſatisfie my ſelf, whether if one be added to one, the firſt one be two; or whether that which hath been added, and that to which it is added, be made two, by the addition of one to the other: for I wonder, if when each of them was ſingle and apart, both were one, and not two; but after their growing neerer one to the other, that very coming together hath been the cauſe why they

they were made one. Nor if a man by cutting divide one into two, can I yet understand, how this cutting asunder of one thing, hath been the cause why they are two: for that cause is then contrary to their being two: for then when they were placed neerer together; and one was put to the other: and now when they are removed and separated one from the other; I cannot perswade my self, that I know, that one is made. Nor do I know any thing else (to speak all in a word) why it is, or why it ceaseth to be, or whether things be made in that manner and order [that Natural History hath delivered:] but I lightly mix therewith some other mode; and this I in no sort embrace. * But when on a time I heard one reading and relaving out of a certain Book (as he said) of *Anaxagoras*, that there is a certain [Nοῦς] *Mind* that

* Here accomodating his last discourse concerning the unreasonablenes of acquiessing in secondary and remote Causes, to his present subject, he reprehends *Anaxagoras*; first for that putting a certain Universal *Mind* (as he called it) for the First Cause of all things, he had notwithstanding by searching more curiously into second Causes, and ascribing more to them, than was fit, destroyed that First Cause or Mind, by himself supposed; then for that in assigning second Causes, he had fixed upon *Remote* ones, such as could not shew what was *Best*; that is, what is proper and peculiar to every thing;

diſpoſeth and governeth all things in order, and is the cauſe of all things: I was much delighted with the Univerſal Cauſe, and thought it to be in ſome degree rightly compared, namely that a *Mind* is the cauſe of all things; and I thus determined with my ſelf, that if there be ſuch a Mind that governs and diſpoſes all things, then certainly it doth diſpoſe all things to the beſt advantage, and place every thing where it is moſt convenient it ſhould be placed. I added, that if any man would deſire to inveſtigate the cauſes of ſingular things, how they are made, and how they periſh; he would be obliged to enquire alſo, by what reaſon, and in what manner it hath been beſt for them to be, or to ſuffer or act any thing; and that from this reaſon, nothing is to be underſtood by man, both concerning himſelf, and of other things, but what is beſt and moſt excellent; and in fine, that it is neceſſary alſo that he underſtand what is *Worſt*: * for that of contrary things there is the ſame Knowledg. When I conſidered this Doctrine, I with very great pleaſure thought, that now I had found a Maſter, who would according to my own hearts deſire, teach me the

* τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν
There is the ſame Science of them.

the causes of things, *Anaxagoras*; and that he would explain to me first whether the Earth were flat and broad, or round; and then would adjoyn also a more copious explication of that *first Cause*, and of *Necessity*; that is, what is *Best* [for every singular nature] and why that should be best. Wherefore if he should affirm the Earth to be placed in the middle, he would more-over give Reasons why it was best for it to have that position. And if he should have sufficiently explained these things to me, I had resolved with my self to lay down no other Theory, or Form of Causes. And now I had prepared my self to enquire of him concerning both the Sun, and the Moon, and the rest of the Planets and Stars; namely of their celerity and conversions, and mutual respects, and other Affections and Apparences; how far it was most commodious for every one of them, to do and to suffer, what they did and suffered. For I did not think, that he who taught, that all things are composed and governed by a *Mind*, would allege any other cause of them, than this, that it was *Best* for them to be as they are. And so when he attributed and assigned a cause to every thing in particular, and in common to all things; I conceived he

would not assign that for a cause to every thing in particular, namely what was properly and peculiarly *best* for each particular thing; and to all in general, what was their common and universal Good. Thus my hopes were great, and I pleased my self with mighty expectations, such as I would not have parted with for a very great sum of money; and with earnest study I took those Books into my hands, and with as much speed as I could, I read them quite through; that I might quickly understand the *Best* and the *Worst*. But (believe me) I soon fell from that lofty hope: for when I had made some progress in reading those Books, I perceived the man to use neither mind nor judgment, nor to assign any Causes to the composition and order of things with conveniency: but putting certain Aerial and Ethererial [influences] and many other absurd [Chimera's] for the true Causes of things. * And me thinks, the same fortune befalls him, that belongs to any other who should say, Whatsoever *Socrates* doth, he doth with a Mind, and with judgment: and then designing to explicate the causes of the particular actions I do, should further say,

* An *Example* fitly remonstrating the folly of assigning Second Causes.

ſay, firſt that I ſit here, becauſe my Body conſiſts of bones and nerves; and that my bones are ſolid and firm, and have their differences and intervals of joynts betwixt them; and that my nerves are ſo contrived and formed, that they may be extended and relaxed again, and environ and bind the bones together with the fleſh and skin, which contains and inveſts them. When therefore the bones are raiſed up in their joynts, the ſinews which are one while upon the ſtretch, and by and by relaxed, cauſe me to have the faculty of moving, bowing, and extending my limbs: and that by this cauſe I come to ſit bowed forwards in this poſture. And that he might explicate the cauſes of this my conference with you, ſhould affirm them to be certain words or voices formed of aire, and hearing, and infinite others equally remote, but ſhould neglect the true and certain cauſe; namely that the *Athenians* having been pleaſed by giving their ſuffrages to condemn me: I am likewiſe pleaſed to ſit here; and it ſeems more juſt, that I ſhould ſuffer the puniſhment they have doomed me to ſuffer. Since, by the * *Dogg-ſtarr*, thoſe bones of mine

* This Oath was familiar not only to *Socrates*, but to *Zeno* alſo. Witneſs *Diogen. Laertius in vit. Soc.* and *Serranus* in his Annotations on this place.

had long ago been carried (as I think) among the *Megarenſians* or *Bœotians*, * by order of that *Beſt*; if I had not judged it more juſt and honorable to undergo, and patiently endure the puniſhment which the City hath decreed for me; than to live a fugitive or exile in another Country. But to call theſe things, Cauſes, is extremely impertinent. Whereas if one ſhould ſay, that unleſs I had both bones and ſinews, I could not do what actions I had a mind to do, he would indeed ſpeak truth. And yet notwithſtanding if any man ſhould affirm, that by reaſon of my bones and nerves, I do the actions I do, and that I ſo far do them with underſtanding and a Mind, but not upon choice of the *Beſt*; truly he would reaſon but negligently and ſupinely. For this in truth, is not to be able to diſtinguiſh and diſcern, that really there is *another cauſe*; and another ſomething, without which a cauſe is not a cauſe. In which error they ſeem to me to be involved and amuſed, who groping as it were in the dark, and abuſing the propriety of that name,

* Here *Socrates* is made to reflect upon, and occaſionally juſtifie his refuſal to fly to the *Megarenſians*, or to the *Bœotians*, when *Crito* would have perſwaded him to eſcape, and aſſiſted him therein; as at large is recorded by *Plato* in his Dialogue intitled *Crito*.

name, call that Second a *Cauſe*. Some therefore, while they place about the Earth a great gulph of Waters beneath the Heavens, will have it that the Earth come thereby to conſiſt and remain firm: others prop up the Aire, its fundament, as with a broad Kneading-tubb. But that virtue or power which hath been able to conſtitute things themſelves in the *beſt* manner, what it is, and how it doth conſiſt; this (I ſay) they enquire not, nor conceive it to have a *Divine* force and Energy: but imagine they have found a new *Atlas* ſtronger than the firſt, and by a kind of immortality much more laſting, and more comprehenſive of all things; and think that that *Good* and *Beautiful* [Being] doth bind together, and contain [and ſupport] nothing. For my part, I would gladly learn from any man, the nature and proprieties of that *Cauſe*, whatſoever they be. But ſince I have not been able, either of my ſelf to find it, or to underſtand from any other, what it is: are you, *Cebes*, willing I ſhould give you an account of the Second Voyage I with exqniſite ſtudy deſigned and attempted, for the finding of that Cauſe? *I vehemently deſire to hear it*, ſaith he.

When my mind was grown weary and faint with considering things intently, I perceived my self obliged to beware, lest that might befal me, which usually happens to those who gaze upon the Sun in an Eclipse. For their faculty of seeing would be taken from them, unless they beheld the image of the Sun in Water, or in some other the like [Diaphanous and Specular] body. Something like this came into my mind, and I feared lest my understanding might be wholly blinded, if I looked upon things themselves with my eyes, and attempted to touch them with my senses. * I held it therefore very well worth my labour, to have recourse to *Reason*, or at least to that discourse which retains the prints of reason; and therein to contemplate the nature and verity of things. But perhaps this Simile or Example whereby I have endeavoured to represent this matter, will not be exactly

* What way *Socrates* took in his re-searches of the *First cause*; coming to knowledg thereof by certain degrees; *viz.* by *Reasons* and *Discourses*; which yet he saith were efficacious and powerful, lest we might conceive some *imaginary* knowledg to be thereby signified. *Plato* therefore affirms, that as *God* is the most *potent* cause of all things, so he is also the *sole* and most *certain* Cause of the *Soul*. Which fundament is to be laid down as necessary to this disquisition, before we come to other reasons nearer to us.

fit

fit and conſentaneous. For I do not fully grant, that he who contemplates things in the [mirror of] reaſon or diſcourſe, doth contemplate them rather in images than in works. Nevertheleſs I took this courſe, and laying for a foundation, that reaſon which I judg to be moſt valid and moſt firm; what things appear to me to have congruity therewith, thoſe I put for true, both as to Cauſes, and to all others: and on the contrary, what have no congruity therewith, thoſe I conclude to be untrue. Which having thus noted in general, I will explain it more fully to you: for yet, I conceive you underſtand it not. *Not very well*, by *Jove*, ſaith *Cebes*. Yet replies he, I here ſpeak nothing a new; but the very ſame I have, both at other times, and in my precedent diſputation perpetually declared. For I am going to ſhew to you the image of that *Cauſe*, in the re-ſearch whereof I have thus long been verſed: and I again return to thoſe [τὰ πολυθρύλλητα] renowned [Excellencies] and from them deduce my beginning; laying this down for a principle, *That there is a ſomething Beautiful, Good and Great, and every way perfect in and by it ſelf.* Which if you grant, I hope I ſhall, from thoſe attributes of perfection, firſt ſhew you an image

image of that Supreme *Cauſe*, and then convince you, that the *Soul* is *immortal*. But ſaith *Cebes*, ſuppoſing I grant this [your Fundamental] there is no need of a longer preface to ſupport your concluſion. Conſider then, ſaith he, what are the conſequences of thoſe Perfections? if at leaſt your opinion be the ſame with mine. For thus I think, if there be any other Beautiful beſides that *ſelf-beautiful*, that it is Beautiful no otherwiſe, than as it is participant of the ſame *ſelf-beautiful*; and the ſame I affirm of all. Do you embrace this Cauſe? *I embrace it*, ſaith he. I therefore, ſaith he again, underſtand no more; nor can I comprehend thoſe wiſe Cauſes: but if any enquire of me, why any thing is beautiful, or why it hath a florid colour, or elegant figure, or any other the like fair quality; I ſecurely paſs by and neglect all other Cauſes, (with all which truly I am amuſed and perplexed) and ſimply, and genuinely without any Sophiſtry, and perhaps alſo fooliſhly, determine with my ſelf, that nothing makes that thing beautiful, but either the preſence, or communication of that *ſelf-beautiful*, by what reaſon or way ſoever that hath come to it. For that I do not yet affirm: but this above all things I maintain, that

* that by the ſole virtue and efficacy of that *Beautiful*, all things are made beautiful: for this I take to be the ſafeſt anſwer I can give both to my ſelf, and to others: and firmly adhering to this truth, I believe I ſhall never be divorced from it; and think it ſafe to anſwer both to my ſelf and others, that by that Beautiful alone all things that are beautiful, are made ſo. Do you think ſo too? *I do.* Likewiſe by *Magnitude*, that thoſe things that are great, are made great; and thoſe that are greater, are made greater; and thoſe that are leſs, are made leſs by ſmalneſs. *Certainly.* Neither would you admit, if any ſhould ſay that ſome other is greater by the head, and another leſs by the head: but profeſs that you ſay nothing elſe but this, that whatever one thing is greater than another, comes to be ſo by no other cauſe but magnitude: and whatever is leſs, comes to be ſo only by ſmalneſs, and therefore is leſs by reaſon of ſmalneſs it ſelf. Fearing, I think, leſt, if you

* An *Axiom*, certain and evident, that whatſoever is in the Univerſity of Nature, hath both its exiſtence and form from *God* alone, who is the *firſt* and *true* Cauſe of all things. And that is the firſt fundament of the Souls immortality, *viz.* that *God hath endowed man with an immortal Soul*; which was before demonſtrated by *Socrates*, who therefore in this place, only brings *Examples* for illuſtration.

you ſhould have ſaid, that ſuch or ſuch a man is greater or leſs by the head; another might contradict you, oppoſing this, that a man otherwiſe little, is bigger in the head than another otherwiſe bigger. Beſides, that you ſay, the greater is greater by t ehead, (which is but a ſmall thing) that is ſome Monſtre, that you ſhould affirm a thing to be great by that which is little. Are you not afraid of this anſwer? *Yes*, ſaith *Cebes* ſmiling. Are you then afraid, ſaith he, to ſay that ten are more than eight by two, and exceed two by that ration, but not by reaſon of multitude: and that two Cubits are greater than one Cubit by the half, but not by magnitude? for there is the ſame fear. *There is*, ſaith he. And what? if one be put to one, will you ſay that that putting or acceſſion is the cauſe why they are made two: or if one be divided, are you not afraid to affirm that diviſion to be the cauſe why one is made two? may you not cry out aloud, that you are ignorant by what other reaſon things exiſt, unleſs ſo far as every thing is participant of its own proper nature: and ſo you have no other reaſon, why two are made, than (that I may ſo ſpeak) the participation of *Duity* or *Twoneſs*. Sothat it is neceſſary, that thoſe things which

which are to become two, participate of that *Duity*: and those that are to be one, partake of *Unity*? But as for those cuttings asunder, those puttings together, and other the like witty trifles; you may very well omit them all; and leave the honor of answering them, to those that are wiser than your self. But you fearing your own shadow (as they say) and diffident of your own ignorance, would you, certainly adhering to the firmness of that Position, in good earnest answer so? and if any man should rely upon that same position, would you neglect him, and not answer, until you had considered the consequents, whether in your judgment some of them agreed or disagreed with others. And when you should be obliged to render a reason thereof, would you in like manner, laying down another Hypothesis, grant those of the premises that seemed best, until you should arrive at what is just and fit? At the same time you would not confound things themselves (as the Contentious use to do) disputing both of the principle resolved upon, and of the consequents arising naturally from that principle: at least if you desired to find out some of those things which truly are; for those perhaps have no consideration, no care

care of theſe things: but are endowed with ſo ſingular a faculty, that they are able by their wiſdom to commix and confound all things, and yet pleaſe themſelves at the ſame time. And as for you, if you be one of thoſe Philoſophers; you will (I think) do what I ſay. *You ſpeak very great truths*, anſwer *Cebes* and *Simmias*.

Ech. They anſwered rightly; by *Jove*, *Phedo*; for it ſeems to me, that he ſpake admirably well, and perſpicuouſly to the ſenſe and capacity of a man, even of a vulgar wit.

Phe. He did, *Echecrates*; and ſo all that were preſent, judged.

Ech. We who were not preſent, are of the ſame judgment, hearing only the rehearſal. But what were his Diſcourſes afterward.

Another *Socratic* Argument of the Souls immortality, taken from the proxim reaſons of *Second* Cauſes, from whence follows the ſame *Concluſion*; after requiſite Poſitions.

Phe. Theſe, as neer as I can remember: When theſe things were granted, and it was agreed upon among us, that ſingle *Species* or Images are ſomething, and that other things which communicate with them, do challenge to themſelves their Sirname: he then proceeds to interrogatio n

gations. Seeing you ſay ſo, ſaith he; do you not in ſaying that *Simmias* is greater than *Socrates*, but leſs than *Phedo*; imply, that in *Simmias* are both Greatneſs and Smalneſs at once? I do ſo. But ſaith he, you confeſs in that that *Simmias* exceeds *Socrates*, it is not in reality ſo, as it is expreſſed in words. * For you think not that *Simmias* is ſo comparated by nature, as he is *Simmias*; but only in reſpect of the magnitude wherewith he is endowed: nor that he exceeds *Socrates*, as he is *Socrates*, but that *Socrates* hath ſmalneſs, being compared to *Simmias* his greatneſs. *Right.* Nor that *Simmias* is exceeded by *Phedo*, as he is *Phedo*; but becauſe compared to the ſmalneſs of *Simmias*, *Phedo* is endowed with greatneſs. *Right again.* Thus then *Simmias* hath the appellation of both great and little, ſince placed in the middle of them, he exceeds the one in greatneſs, and by reaſon of his ſmalneſs, yeilds to the others greatneſs. And at the ſame time ſmiling, I ſeem, ſaith he, to be delighted with words like an Hiſtorian. Is it not as I ſay? *He aſſented.* This I ſay out of deſire, that you may be of the ſame opinion with

* Firſt Poſition; that in the collation of things, the things themſelves are not to be conſidered ſimply, but their *Relations* or reſpects one to another.

with my ſelf. * For I conceive, that Magnitude it ſelf is not only never willing to be both great and ſmall at once; but alſo that the magnitude which is in us, never receives ſmalneſs, nor wills to be exceeded: but of the two, one either vaniſhes and gives place, when its contrary, namely ſmalneſs, approaches; or is deſtroyed, when the other appears: for when it hath once received and put on ſmalneſs, it can be no longer greatneſs, nor is it willing to be other than what it then is. As I, when I have received and put on ſmalneſs, and am yet the ſame that I am; or am this ſame little I. But that hath not dared, ſince it is great, to be little. In the ſame manner alſo that little that is in us, would not be made great: nor will one of two contraries, while it is what it is, become what the other is; but either it gives place, or periſhes in this paſſion. *Very right*, ſaith *Cebes*, as I conceive. * Then one of thoſe who were preſent

* Second *Poſition*; that *contraries*, as contraries, are neither made, nor capable of exiſting together; but either give place each to other, or periſh, when one comes upon another.

* *Objection* from the Doctrine above demonſtrated, which ſeems repugnant to this *Poſition*; for it was before affirmed, that Contraries are produced out of Contraries; but here he ſaith, that Contraries cannot be together.

(who

(who it was, I do not well remember) by the Gods, ſaith he, was it not granted in the precedent diſputation, that one contrary may have being out of the other, *viz.* that a greater hath exiſtence out of a leſs, and a leſs out of a greater: and that this is the generation of Contraries out of Contraries? and now it ſeems to me to be ſaid, that that never is done. Here *Socrates* having inclined his ear to the ſpeaker, you have, ſaith he, manfully remembred what was delivered: but you underſtand not the difference betwixt what is now ſaid, and what was ſaid before. * In the precedent diſpute it was ſaid, that out of one contrary is made another: but here 'tis ſaid, that a contrary cannot be contrary to it ſelf; neither that which is in us, nor that which is in nature. Then we ſpake of thoſe things that have contraries, giving theſe the Sirname of thoſe: Now we ſpeak of Contraries themſelves, whoſe Sirname thoſe things wherein they are, obtain. And theſe contraries we could never affirm to be willing to receive mutual generation one from the other

* That Objection *ſolved*, by reconciliation of the two Poſitions ſeemingly repugnant. Where he alſo diſtinguiſhes betwixt the *form* of a contrary, and the *Subject* that is ſuſceptible of a contrary; making good his *Theſis* by various *examples*.

other. And converting his eyes upon *Cebes*, he ſaid, doth any of theſe things trouble you, *Cebes*? Neither am I diſcompoſed, ſaith *Cebes*, nor doth what you ſay trouble me. * We are then agreed ſaith he, that a contrary can never be contrary to it ſelf. We are ſo, ſaith *Cebes*. Conſider this therefore with me, ſaith he; whether you can aſſent to it. Do you call any thing *hot* and *cold*? *yes*. What? as Snow and Fire? *No*. Is any other thing hot, but fire: any thing cold, but Snow? *yes certainly*. But this you conceive (I think) that Snow, while it continues Snow, will never receive heat (as we ſaid above) but at the acceſſion of it, either yield to it, or be aboliſhed. *Right*. And that fire, at the acceſſion of Cold, will likewiſe go out, or be deſtroyed; but never dare, after the admiſſion of Cold, to be what it was, namely fire and cold. *You ſay true*, ſaith *Cebes*. To * ſome of this ſort alſo it uſually happens, that they not only perpetually account and deſign the ſame Species by the ſame name, but ſome other thing too, which indeed is not that, though it alwaies hath the form thereof, when it exiſteth. But now

* He returns to his *Second* Poſition; and both proves and illuſtrates it by *Examples*.

* In *Numbers*, and their various forms.

now perhaps what I ſay, will be more eaſily explained in this manner. Ought an *Odd* number to have this name wherewith we now mark it, or not? *Yes doubtleſs.* This alone of all things (for this I ask) or ſomewhat elſe, to which though different from Odd, ought nevertheleſs alwaies to call it by its own name; becauſe the nature of it is ſuch as never to defect from *Odd*? This I ſay, is that very thing, as the number of three, and many other numbers ſuffer. Now conſider this in the number Three; are Three to be called both by their own name, *Three*, and by that of *Odd* alſo, though Odd be not the ſame with a *Triad*, or *Ternary*? But thus comparated is alſo a Ternary, and Five, and every half of a number; ſo that though it be not the ſame as *Odd*, yet alwaies every one of them is *Odd*. Two likewiſe, and Four, and again every other Series of number, though it be not the ſame as *Even*, yet muſt alwaies be *Even*. Do you grant this? or not? *Why ſhould I not?* ſaith he. Obſerve then ſaith he, what I deſign to demonſtrate; it is this. * It ſeems, that not only thoſe Contraries are incapable of mutually receiving each other, but all other things

* A Third *Theſis* dependent on the precedents. That what admits a contrary quality, is *One* thing; and the con-

trary quality admitted *another*. The Contrary *Subject* therefore remains, while contrary qualities are variously induced; but so, that contrary qualities cannot be in the same mode. But so long as a contrary quality is present, it communicates its nature and name to the subject; as while an *Odd* number shall be present, that number will be, and be called *Odd*: while *Heat* shall be in a body, the body will be, and be called *hot*, &c.

whatsoever, which though they be not contrary among themselves, yet always have contraries: nor do they seem capable to put on that form which is contrary to the Species wherein they are: but when that contrary form once intervenes, they presently either perish, or give place. Shall we not say, that Three will sooner perish, or suffer any thing else, than endure to be made Even? *Yes*, saith *Cebes*. And yet, saith he again, the number *Two* is not contrary to the number Three. *It is not, truly.* Therefore not only contrary Species admit not the accession of one to another mutually; but some other contraries also abhor, and are incapable to suffer that mutual accession. *You speak with great probability*, saith *Cebes*. Will you then, saith he, that, if we be able, we define of what quality these things are? *With all my heart*, saith he. Will they not be such, *Cebes*, which so conform whatsoever they possess, as not only to force it to retain its own Species of form, but also

suffer

ſuffer it not to admit and put on the Species or form of any Contrary whatſoever? *How ſay you to this*, ſaith *Cebes?* As we ſaid a little before: for you know it to be neceſſary, that that which contains the Species of Three, is not only *Three*, but alſo *Odd. Right.* For this reaſon we ſaid, that the Species contrary to that form which makes this, can never be induced. *By no means.* Hath the Species of *Odd* perfected that form? *Certainly.* And is the Species of *Even* contrary to the Species of *Odd. It is.* Therefore the ſpecies of *Even* ſhall never force it ſelf upon *Three. Never.* Are *Three* then free from the ration of *Even? Free.* Therefore the number *Three* is *odd. Certainly.* What therefore I undertook to define, I have now defined; namely, * that of what ſort thoſe things are, which being contrary to none, yet admit not a Contrary; as now the number Three is not at all contrary to Even, and yet is nevertheleſs incapable thereof. For the number *Two* alwaies infers a contrary to Odd, and Fire a Contrary to Cold; and the like of very many others

* He repeateth what he had above diſtinctly applicated, *viz.* that contrary *qualities* cannot be together in the ſame ſubject; but one of neceſſity expelleth the other. But the *ſubjects* themſelves admit contraries ſucceſſively.

But consider whether you agree that the matter ought to be defined thus; That a Contrary doth not only not receive its contrary; but that also which may adfer any contrary to that, to which it self may come, namely that which adfers it, doth never admit a form contrary to the form of that which is adferred. But again rub up your memory; for 'tis no incommodity to hear the same again. The number *Five* never admits the ration of *Even*; nor the number of *Ten* (the duple of five) the ration of *Odd*. This therfore, being it self contrary to another, will yet never admit the ration of *Odd*. Nor will that number and half that number, or half a number admit the ration of the whole, nor a third part, *&c.* at least if you comprehend my meaning, and assent unto me. *I both understand your sense*, saith he, and assent without the least doubt or scruple.

But tell me again, reflecting upon our precedent positions; (yet I would not have you answer to the questions I ask, expressly

* Here accomodating his precedent Suppositions; and treating of *second* Causes; he first evinceth this, that we are to seek, not remote, but *proxime* causes*; not (as his Interpreters speak) *Accidentary*, but *substantial* ones; as he teaches by the *Examples* alleged.

and

and in the ſame prints of words [as before.] For beſides that certain way of anſwering, of which I have treated before, I find another naturally ariſing from the things ſaid by us juſt now, and this certain and firm; for example, if you ask me what that is, which if it be in a body, the body will be *hot*; I will not give that groſs and ignorant anſwer, that it is *Heat*; but a more elegant and polite one, from our laſt concluſions, namely that it is *fire*. Nor, if you ask, what that is, which if it invade the body, the body will be *ſick*: will I anſwer, that it is a *diſeaſe*, but more preciſely, that it is a *Feaver*: and if you ask me what is that, which if it intervene to a number, the number will be *Odd*: I will not ſay, it is *imparity* or *Oddneſs*, but *Unity*: and of others in the ſame manner. But look if you ſufficiently underſtand me. *Very clearly*, ſaith he. Anſwer me then, what is that which if it be in the body, the body will be *alive*. The *Soul*, ſaith he. And is not that alwaies ſo? *Why not*, ſaith he? The Soul therefore alwaies brings life to the Body it embraceth, whatſoever the Body be? *It doth alwaies bring life*, ſaith he. Is any thing contrary to *Life*, or not? *Yes*, ſaith he.

* Firſt *Theorem*, the *Soul* is the proxim cauſe of *life* in man.

he. What? *Death.* The Soul therefore ſhall never receive the contrary to that which it ſelf alwaies induceth, as hath been granted from our late concluſions. *True*, ſaith *Cebes*. What then? That which admits not the Species or ration of *Even*, by what name do we now call it? *Odd*, ſaith he. And what do we call that which admits not *Juſtice*, or *Muſic*? That we call *Unjuſt*; this *Immuſical*. * What do we call that which is incapable of Death? *Immortal*, ſaith he. Is not the Soul capable of Death? *No.* Therefore the Soul is a thing immortal. *It is immortal.* Well then, ſaith he, ſhall we acknowledg this to be thus demonſtrated? or what think you of it? *Demonſtrated perfectly, Socrates*, ſaith he. * What therefore, ſaith he, if it were

* Second *Theorem*; *death* is contrary to *life*, and therefore contrary to the *Soul*, which is the cauſe of life: and *concluſion*; therefore the *Soul* admits not death; from the conceded ſuppoſition, that one Contrary never admits of another.

* Conſummation of that Concluſion, from adjuncts: the Soul receives not death; therefore it is *immortal.*

* Another *Theorem* of the ſame Concluſion, If what is *Immortal*, be ἀνώλεθρον, exempt from deſtruction; then certainly the Soul is alſo ἀνώλεθρον, exempt from deſtruction, becauſe proved to be *Immortal.*

neceſſary

neceſſary, that *Odd* be free and exempt from all deſtruction, would not *Three* alſo be free and exempt from all deſtruction? *Why not?* Therefore, if it were neceſſary, that that which is wholly void of Heat, be likewiſe free and exempt from all deſtruction; when a man ſhould induce Hot upon Snow, would the Snow go out ſafe and unmelted? for it would not then periſh, when it had once admitted and received heat. *You ſay true*, quoth he. In the ſame manner, I opine, if that which is void of Cold, were free from all deſtruction; when any cold thing ſhould be brought to fire, it would not be deſtroyed or periſh, but go away ſafe and intire. *Of neceſſity*, ſaith he. We are therefore by neceſſity obliged to conclude the ſame of an *Immortal*. For if what is immortal, be free and exempt from all deſtruction, 'tis impoſſible the Soul ſhould periſh, when death comes to it. For from our late Poſitions, it will not ſuffer or undergo death, and ſo not dye: as a *Ternary* will never (as we have ſaid) be *Even*; nor will *Odd* be by any means *Even*; nor *Fire be Cold*, nor the *Heat* which is in fire, be *coldneſs*. But ſome may *Object*, What hinders that *Odd* may not be made *Even*, if *Even* be added, as hath been granted: and *Odd* being

being extinct, *Even* ſucceed into the room thereof? To him that ſhould thus argue, we could not (I confeſs) deny, but that Odd may periſh; for Odd it ſelf is not exempt from all deſtruction: Since, if that were not agreed upon among us, we might eaſily evince, that when Even comes in place, Odd and the Ternary inſtantly fly away; and ſo we might firmly determine of fire and hot, and the reſt. Might we not? *Yes.* * Now therefore of an *immortal* alſo; ſince we are now agreed, that an Immortal is abſolutely free and exempt from all deſtruction; it is demonſtrated beyond all doubt or diſpute, that the *Soul*, ſince it is *immortal*, is free and immune from all deſtruction: but if that be not granted, it will require another diſputation. But, ſaith he, in good truth there is no need of further diſpute, as to that point. For it is impoſſible, that any thing whatever ſhould eſcape death, if this immortal and *ſempiternal* undergo corruption and deſtruction.

* Laſt *concluſion*; that the Soul is both immortal, and free from all deſtruction, which is certainly demonſtrated from the given and proved *Hypotheſis* of *proxim* and cognate cauſes.

That *God*, ſaith *Socrates*, the very form of life (as I conceive)

* A confirmation of the Immortality

conceive) and if there be any other Immortal, can never dye; is confeſſed by all men. *By all*, by *Jove*, ſaith *Cebes*; not only men, but Gods too. I believe An *Immortal* therefore, being incapable of Corruption; what elſe ought we to conclude, than that the *Soul*, ſince it is certainly immortal, muſt be alſo free and exempt from all deſtruction? *It is abſolutely neceſſary.* When therefore death comes to a man, what is in him mortal, doth (as is manifeſt) die: but what is immortal, departs ſafe and free from all corruption, giving place to death. *It ſeems ſo.* Then without all doubt, *Cebes*, the Soul is a thing immortal, and free from deſtruction: and certainly our Souls will eternally ſurvive *apud inferos.* *I can ſay no more to this*, ſaith *Cebes*; nor any way deny my aſſent to your Reaſons. But if *Simmias*, or any other hath any new matter to object, he ſhall do well not to conceal it: ſince I do not ſee to what more convenient time he can differ the handling of theſe things, if he deſire either to ſpeak, or to hear any thing concerning them. I alſo, ſaith

and indiſſolubility of the Soul, from the *firſt* and principal *Cauſe* [God] which being τὸ αὐτὴ ζωὴς εἶδος, the very form of *life*, the Soul alſo muſt be ſempiternal; becauſe Divine? and made after the Exemplar of that primary *Idea*, which is confeſſed in the former diſputation.

ſaith *Simmias*, have nothing that detains me from ſubmitting my faith to all you have explained in your former diſcourſe. And yet by reaſon of the Grandure and Excellency of the things commemorated, while I think Human infirmity not at all worthy of ſo great Endowments and Prerogatives, I find my ſelf conſtrained, not yet intirely to reſign up my belief to your *later* concluſions. You ſpeak with good reaſon, *Simmias*, ſaith *Socrates*, and modeſtly: for thoſe our *firſt* Suppoſitions, though we be perſwaded of their verity, are yet more diligently and accuratly to be conſidered: But if ye ſhall, after they have been decently and with juſt reaſon examined and explicated, once receive them: ye will underſtand the whole matter, as far as mans intellect is capable to comprehend things of that [abſtruſe] nature: and if that be once made clear and evident, ye will require no more. *You have reaſon*, ſaith he.

But my Friends, ſaith he, 'tis fit we make diligent inquiſition into this alſo; that

The *Third* part of the diſcourſe, ariſing from the concluſion of the Souls immortality, and concerning the *ſtate* of it after death; which *Socrates* blindly deſcribes, from the opinion of the vulgar and ſuperſtitious fictions of *Poets*.

if

if the Soul be immortal, we are highly concerned to take care of it, not only in respect of this short time, which we define by the name of life, but of Eternity that remains after this life: and the danger now seems to be great, if any man shall neglect his Soul. For if Death be a separation and dissolution of the whole, it were to be reputed an advantage and emolument to dissolute and wicked men, that when they are dead, they might be freed from their Body and Soul, and improbity all at once: Whereas now it is manifest, that the Soul is immortal; a man hath no other way to avoid Evils, and acquire security from future dangers, but to become as wise and virtuous as is possible. For the Soul departing hence to the Mansions of Ghosts, carries along with it nothing but its former manners and education, which are said to be of very great moment, either to the importance of Utility, or aggravation of loss to him who is dead, when he first arrives there. And Tradition tells us, that every one of the dead is by that very *Demon* that attended on him living, purposely led into a certain place, where it is ordained, all Ghosts assembled together, must receive their Doom, and according to the form of Judgment ratified

tified and conſtituted, go to the Infernal Manſions, with that Guide, to whom command is given to conduct thoſe who are at thoſe places. But when they have obtained thoſe things they ought to obtain, and remained there the time appointed; another Leader brings them back again, after many and long periods of time. But this Journey is not ſuch as *Telephus* in *Æſchylus* deſcribes to be; for he affirms, there is but one way, and that Uniform too, that leads to the Infernal Manſions: whereas to me it ſeems more probable, the way is neither Uniform, nor Single: for if there were but one way, neither would there be any need of Guides, nor could any Soul go out of it. But now this ſeems to have many by-wayes, diverſions, and intricate windings: whereof I make a conjecture from Sacrifices, and other Rites and Ceremonies belonging to Religion, which are here performed. Further, a moderate and prudent Soul, both follows his Guide willingly and chearfully, and knows things preſent: but a Soul fetter'd with ſenſe of Luſts, and commerce with the Body (as we formerly declared) ſtill hankering after the Body with an affrighting and tumultuary error; and ſtriving much, and ſuffering much about a viſible

visible place; is not without extreme difficulty at length led away by that *Demon*, to whom the care of it was committed. And when it comes to that place where other Souls are; from this impure Soul, which hath either committed Murder, or polluted it self with some other crime; or perpetrated some other villanous act of kin to that wickedness, such as are the works of impious Souls: from this Soul, I say, every Soul flies away with detestation, and will be neither Companion, nor Guide unto it; while it self wanders up and down, hardly pressed and hemmed in with the greatest streights imaginable, until certain prefixt moments of time arrive; which being elapsed, it is then by a certain necessity hurried to that place which hath been destined for its habitation. But the Soul that hath led a life of purity and moderation, having obtained the Gods for both companions and Guides, inhabits that place, which hath been peculiarly and properly assigned unto it.

Coments of men concerning the mansions of departed souls, vain and uncertain.

There are many and wonderful places of the Earth: which yet is neither such, nor so great as it is thought to be by some, who are wont to speak of it, as I have heard from

from one. And here *Simmias* interrupting him, ſaith, how ſay you this, *Socrates?* for I alſo have heard many things concerning the Earth: but not the ſame perhaps that that man hath perſwaded you to believe; and therefore I deſire to hear from you his opinion. But *Simmias*, ſaith *Socrates*, the art of *Glaucus* it ſelf ſeems inſufficient to explain thoſe ſo great and abſtruſe things; and to prove by convincing arguments, that they are true, appears to me more difficult, than that *Glaucus* ſhould be able by all his skill to perform. To render ſo great and reſerved myſteries intelligible by diſcourſe, I perhaps may be unable: and if I underſtood them, yet would not the ſhort remainder of my life ſuffice to ſo prolix and copious an Argument. Yet nothing hinders but I may adventure briefly to deſcribe to you the form of the Earth, and its places, ſuch as I have received them to be. And this, ſaith *Simmias*, will be enough, the narrowneſs of our capacity conſidered. This then, ſaith he, I have fixed and eſtabliſhed in my belief; firſt, if the Earth be placed in the middle of the Univerſe, on all ſides encompaſſed by Heaven equally diſtant from it; then it needs not the defence or guard of any thing, either of the Aire, or of any other

other prop or ſupport, to ſecure it from falling; but is able to ſuſtain it ſelf, ſince Heaven that environs it, is in all its parts the ſame, and the Earth it ſelf equally ballanced, and placed in the middle of another thing whoſe parts are all the ſame and equidiſtant; can neither more nor leſs ſwerve or decline to any ſide: and what is alwaies in the ſame manner diſpoſed, is conſtantly permanent in the ſame place, without the leaſt of tendency or inclination to any other. This (I ſay) is my firſt perſwaſion, *And a right one it is*, ſaith *Simmias*. My *next* is, that the face of the Earth is broad and large: and that we inhabit the places from the River *Phaſis* to *Hercules* his pillars, in a very ſmall ſpot, as Pismires about the extended plain of ſome wide field, or as Froggs about the Sea: and various other Nations dwell in other places. For, that there are through the whole Earth, many and various *Concavities*, from both the form it ſelf, and bulk of its magnitude, into which both Aire, and Darkneſs, and Water have followed together. But that the pure Earth it ſelf is ſeated in a pure Heaven, wherein are the Stars, and what very many of thoſe who are wont to ſpeak of theſe matters, call *Æther*: the dreggs and ſediment whereof theſe

things are, and flow together into the hollows of the earth. Yet that we who inhabit in these Hollows, know not that we do so, but imagine that we dwell upon the higher parts of the Earth; as if a man dwelling at the bottom of the Sea, should think he dwelt above upon the Surface, and beholding the Sun and other Stars through the Water, conceive the Sea it self to be Heaven: and by reason of the slowness and infirmity of his understanding, having never come up to the top of the Sea, nor beheld it, nor risen up, and put his head above Water into this our place, could not know how much more beautiful and pleasant this lightsom Region is, than that obscure and deep one is, where he resides: nor heard from any other who had seen our place. This (I say) is exactly our case: For, inhabiting in some Hollow of the Earth, we conceive, that we are seated upon the eminent places thereof, and call the Air, Heaven: as if the Stars really moved through the Air, as Heaven; and we beheld their motions and wayes. And that herein we are so amused and confounded, that by reason of our slowness and infirmity, we cannot penetrate to the highest air. Since, if any should arrive at the top of it, and as with wings fly

up

up thither, when he had gotten his head once above it, he would behold all these things clearly: just as if Fishes mounting up out of the Sea, should behold our places, so would he. And if he were by nature qualified for contemplation, he would soon know, that it is the true Heaven, and true Light, and true Earth; for both the Earth, and the Stones, and all this place are corrupted and eaten away; as things in the Sea are, by the saltness thereof. Nor is any thing of value, any thing perfect bred commonly in the Sea; but Caverns, and Sand, and an infinite quantity of mud and filth are in it, and where Earth is: which are in no respect to be compared to our Beauties. But those Above seem to excel ours. Now to describe what kind of Countries there are in the Earth, I shall think it no trouble to relate to you a Fable pleasant, and worthy your attention. That, saith *Simmias*, would we fain hear. In the beginning therefore, they say the face of the Earth appeared to the sight such, as (if a man looked down from on high, and survey'd it) our little Balls made up of twelve square pieces of Leather put together, various indeed, and distinguished by several colours; not unlike the colours Painters use, as sam-

ples, here with us: That there all the Earth doth conſiſt of theſe various colours, much more ſplendid, bright and pure then ours are: one, purple, exceedingly fair and deep; another, ſhining like Gold; but that which is white, is whiter than Chalk or Snow, and compoſed of other colours alſo, both more and more beautiful than have ever been ſeen by our eyes. Then that thoſe very Cavities of the Earth, being full of Water and Air, repreſent a certain kind of colour, ſhining through in a variety of other colours, ſo that the form thereof may be perceived both ſimple and various at once. That here in thus conſtituted, the ſame things are in the ſame manner produced, Trees, Flowers, Fruits: and Mountains and Stones have the ſame forms and qualities, in perfection, in perſpicuity, and in colours, far more beautiful than our pretious Stones are, which are but thin particles of thoſe; Sardonixes, and Jaſpers, and Emeralds, and all others of great price: and that there is nothing there, but what vaſtly excells all our fineſt Rarities of the ſame ſort. That the cauſe of this vaſt difference is, becauſe the Stones there are pure, not (as ours are) fretted and eaten by putrefaction and ſaltneſs, from the things that flow in together hither,

and

and that produce diſeaſes and decayes in Stones, in Plants, and in Animals of our Earth. That the Earth it ſelf is every where adorned with ſuch fine productions, and moreover with Gold and Silver, and other Mettals: which naturally ſhine in a wonderful manner, as being both very many, very great, and diſperſed through the whole Earth: ſo that to behold it, is a moſt delightful ſight to the happy Spectators. That there are in that Earth, living Creatures alſo of very many Kinds, and Men too: of whom ſome live in Mediterranean places, others about the Air, as we about the Sea; others in Iſlands, which the Air invirons, as ſcituate in the very Continent. In ſumme, in thoſe places, the Air is to them, what the Sea is to us, and ſerves them for the ſame uſes: only this, their Air is our *Æther*. And the ſeaſons of the year are with them ſo admirably conſtituted in point of temper, that the men there live both free from Diſeaſes, and much longer than ours: and in ſeeing, hearing, underſtanding, and other the like faculties, they as far excel us, as Air excels Water, and the *Æther*, Aire, in purity. That there are likewiſe Groves and Temples of Gods, who reſide in them, and give Anſwers and Propheſies from Oracles; and

the men hold familiar converſation and commerce with Gods themſelves. That the Sun, and Moon, and other Stars are behe d by them clearly and diſtinctly as they are, and that they have this one felicity more to accompany them. That this is the form and conſtitution of the Earth, and the things that are about it. That there are places therein, and in the Hollows, and in the circumference thereof, many, ſome deeper and wider, in which we dwell; others deeper indeed, but of narrower mouths than that wherein we dwell: others again leſs profound than ours, but wider. That all theſe Cavities every where perforated one into another, and communicating by underground paſſages, have both by turnings and diverſions, as well in narrower as in broader places; ſo that a vaſt plenty of Water flows out of ſome into others, as into Ciſterns: and very great currents of Rivers, and perpetual ſprings of Waters, both cold and hot. Much fire alſo, whole Rivers of fire, and many ſtreams of Water, Muddy, and Pure, and Dirty: as thoſe Rivers in *Sicily*, which flow from the Torrent called [ῥύαξ πηλοῦ] the *muddy* River; and the Torrent it ſelf. That every one of thoſe places are filled, according to the quantity of Water

ter every day brought in; and that all theſe are moved up and down, like ſome hanging Veſſel upon the Earth. But this Penſil Veſſel, by reaſon of ſome ſuch nature, is ſome one of the Gapings or Chaſms of the Earth; and the very biggeſt of all, piercing from ſide to ſide through the whole Earth; which *Homer* himſelf intimated in that Verſe,

Far hence in th' Earth there gapes a pit immenſe:

Which both he elſewhere, and other Poets call *Tartarus*; and into which all Rivers have their confluence, re-flowing out of it by turns: But all Rivers are of the ſame nature as the Region is through which they run: and this is the cauſe why all both iſſue from thence, and return thither again: becauſe that Humid hath neither bottom nor foundation; but is lifted up, and wavers upward and downward; and the air and breath about it, doth the ſame: but follows it, both when it aſcends, and when it deſcends to us. And as in living Creatures endowed with Reſpiration, the Spirit or Breath is inſpired and expired alternately: ſo here the Breath being raiſed up with moiſture, yeilds winds, ſtrong, & in ungoverned force almoſt infinite, while it ruſheth in and out. But the Water, when ſtirred up by ſome impulſe, it

runs to that place, which is called *Below*; both flows into those gushing Lakes, and fills them; as those who drink full bowls: and when it runs out from thence, in its circulation tending thither again, it replenishesthe places here. They thus replete, it flows on through passages and channels of the Earth. When all Fountains and Streams arrive at those places, whither Seas have more expeditely and opportunely flowed: they produce Lakes, Rivers, and Fountains. Thence going under ground again, some when they have travelled and compassed greater and more places, precipitate themselves again into *Tartarus*, or the bottomless Gulph. some more deeply than whence they were exhausted; others less deeply: but all flow in more deeply, than whence they flowed out. Some pour in themselves through a part contrary to, and disparate from that out of which they had their efflux; others through the same. Some wheeled about in a circle, and once or often, in serpentine windings, Sires and spiral Meanders, infolding the Earth, as much as was possible; bowing downwards, impel themselves forward, to descend where way is given them, to the very middle on each side, and no farther: for at each extreme Confluence

fluence, each part is impervious. There are beſides theſe, many other Confluents of Waters great and various: among all which are four, whereof the greateſt and deepeſt flowing in a round, is called the *Ocean*. By a motion contrary to this, flows *Acheron*; which comes in through other deſert places, and indeed running under ground, paſſes on to the *Acheruſiad* Mariſh, where crowds of departed Souls have their common rendezvous; and whence, after certain periods of time predeſtined by Fate, to ſome longer, to others ſhorter, they are remitted hither again to the generation of Animals. Betwixt theſe two runs the *third* River, and not far from its Sours, diſembogues it ſelf into a certain great place, that burns with much fire, and there ſtagnating, makes a Mere or Lake greater than the Sea with us, and perpetually boyling with water and mudd: hence it guſheth forth with violence, running into a round, troubled and full of filth; and having often fetched a compaſs under ground, pours it ſelf into the deepeſt part of *Tartarus*; paſſing to the Extremes of the *Acheruſiad* Mariſh, but not mixing with the Waters thereof. This is that River which they yet call *Pyriphlegethon*, the *Burning* River of Hell; whoſe Rivulets with violent force

force making way through the broaken Earth, riſe up whereſoever they can drill themſelves a vent. Oppoſite to this; the *Fourth* River falls firſt into a place horrid with mouldineſs and ſtinking damps, wild and ſavage (as they ſay) of a blew colour, which they call the *Stygian* place, that is the diſmal ſeat of *hate*, *fear*, and *grief*; and the River flowing into it, makes the *Stygian* Lake; and falling in there, with mighty ſtrength re-inforcing its Torrent, and thruſting it ſelf under ground, with a contrary flood, and various eddies, it throws it ſelf againſt the *Burning* River, and goes forward till it meets it in the *Acheruſiad* Mariſh: but mixes ſtreams with no other Waters, and here revolved in a circle, diſchargeth it ſelf into *Tartarus*, juſt oppoſite to the *Burning* River; and the name of it is (as Poets ſay) *Cocytus*, i. e. *Sorrow*. Theſe things being thus conſtituted, when *Ghoſts* have arrived whither the tutelar *Demon* of every one conducts them, firſt they are examined, tryed, and judged, both they who have lived well, righteouſly, and juſtly, and they who have lived in vice, injuſtice

The Purgatory of the antient Heathens deſcribed, with their *Repentance* in Hell, and three parts thereof, *Contrition*, *Confeſſion*, *Satisfaction*; all which they ſaw to be neceſſary, by the light of *Nature*.

juſtice and impiety; they alſo who have lived in a middle way, going on to *Acheron*, and mounting into Waggons prepared for them, are therein carried to the Mariſh: where they both remain, and ſuffer puniſhments appointed for the expiation and expurgation of their ſins. After they are thus expiated, they are abſolved and quitted: and every one receives rewards for their good deeds, according to their merits. But if for the greatneſs of their Crimes, they be found incurable, having committed either many or great Sacriledges, or unjuſt and unlawful Homicides, or ſuch execrable Wickedneſſes; a juſt lott caſteth them into *Tartarus*, from whence they never get out. Whereas they who ſtand convicted of, and obnoxious to ſins great indeed, but not inexpiable; as they who have, in heat of anger committed any violence againſt Father or Mother, and truly repented of it all their life after; or who have been Homicides through immoderate paſſion: upon theſe is impoſed a neceſſity of falling into Hell. But when they have been there a year in Torments, the Waves caſt them forth: Homicides, by *Cocytus*; Killers of Father or Mother, by the *Burning* River. And when they come to the *Acheruſiad* Mariſh, then with a loud

loud voice they by name call, ſome thoſe whom they have killed, others, thoſe whom they have wronged, and begg and beſeech them to be ſatisfied with their unfeigned penitence, and grievous ſufferings, and to give them leave to depart out of that Mariſh. If they prevail, they retire thence, and are freed from thoſe miſeries: if not, they are carried back again into *Tartarus*, and ſo returned to the other rivers, not ceaſing to ſuffer their renewed torments, untill they have obtained pardon from thoſe to whom they have been injurious; for this puniſhment is appointed for them by the decree of the Judges. Now they who have been rightly purged by Philoſophy, live ever after without bodies, and come into other habitations fair and delightful; which to deſcribe, is too difficult for my underſtanding, and too long for the ſhort remainder of my life.

But as for the concernment and importance of what we have here related, *Simmias*; we ought to labour with all poſſible ſtu-

Commodious admonitions, concluding the deſcription of Hell; that we are not obliged to give credit to thoſe Poetic fictions; and yet it is uſeful to reflect upon them, that we may be incited to aim at *felicity* after death, and to follow the only path that leads to it, viz, *Wiſdom* and *Virtue*.

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dy and care, that we may follow the conduct of Virtue and Wisdom, in this life. For the reward is great, and the hope good. That the descriptions I have recounted to you of the places and conditions of Souls after death, are true; becomes not a wise man to affirm. But that there are some such, or the like, as for what concerns the state and condition of our Souls, and the places whither they are to go for habitation; seeing it is evident that our Souls are immortal, this also seems both consentaneous, and worthy the danger, to believe they are such. For the danger is honorable and glorious; and we are obliged to inculcate, and as it were inchant these things into our minds; wherefore I have been the more prolix in commemorating that Fable. But yet, as to what concerns a mans own Soul, he ought to be with full confidence perswaded of these things, who while he hath lived, hath repudiated corporeal pleasures, and outward Ornaments, as alien and unnecessary, and so hath resolved to addict himself to any thing rather than to lusts of the body: and hath made it the grand business of his life, to furnish his mind with learning, and to render it polite and brave, not with strange, but its own proper ornaments;

ments; namely with Temperance, Juſtice, Fortitude, Liberty, Truth. Thus armed, let him expect the time, when he is to take his Journey *ad inferos*, to the Manſions of Souls departed, and let him ſo prepare and addreſs himſelf, as to ſet forward redily and chearfully, whenſoever Fate ſhall call him. And for your parts, *Simmias* and *Cebes*, and the reſt that are here, ye ſhall all go this Journey, each in his appointed time: *Fate* (as the *Tragedian* ſaith) *calls me now.* But perhaps it is time for me to go and waſh my ſelf; for I think it more decent to be waſhed, before I drink the poyſon, that I may give the Women no trouble in waſhing my Body, after death.

An Hiſtorical Narration of the manner of *Socrates* his *death*, which was perfectly agreeable to his Life and Doctrine.

Be it ſo then, ſaith *Crito* to him. But do you, *Socrates*, give to theſe here, or to me, any command, either concerning your Children, or about any other matter, wherein we may chiefly gatifie you? *No truly*, ſaith he, *Crito*, I leave no new command with you, beſides what I have alwaies told you, namely, that if ye take due care of your ſelves, you will perform your duty to me, and to mine, and to your ſelves alſo, whatever ye do, though now

now ye make no promiſes, nor enter into new engagements: but if ye neglect your ſelves, and will not order your life according to the prints as it were, of what I now remonſtrate to you, & what I have heretofore enjoyned ye; though ye ſhould even with vehement aſſeveration promiſe to do many, and great things, for my ſake, ye will do (I am ſure) nothing more. This, ſaith *Crito*, we will with courage and alacrity of mind endevour to perform. But in what manner ſhall we Bury you? Even how ye pleaſe, ſaith he; at leaſt if ye can catch me, and I not fly out of your reach. And when he had ſweetly ſmiled, and turned his eyes upon us; my Friends, ſaith he, I cannot perſwade *Crito* here, that I am that *Socrates* who juſt now diſputed, and purſued all parts of the diſcourſe in order: but he thinks me to be the ſame whom after a few hours ye ſhall behold dead; and asketh me how I deſire to be Buried: not remembring, that a good while ſince, I made a long diſcourſe to this very purpoſe, that after I have drank the poyſon, I ſhall be no longer with you, but go away to the Felicities of the Bleſſed. This ſeems to have been ſpoken by me in vain, while yet I endevoured to conſolate both you and my ſelf. Do ye there-

therefore undertake for me to *Critò*, in an obligation quite contrary to what he entred into on my behalf, before my Judges. He was ſurety for me, that I ſhould remain: but be ye my ſureties to him, that I ſhall not remain after I am dead, but fly away; to the end that *Crito* may more eaſily bear my departure, and ſeeing my Body to be burn'd or committed to the ground, he may not be troubled or grieved for me, as if I had ſuffered any great calamity; nor ſay at my Funeral, that *Socrates* is expoſed to ſight, or carried forth, or put into the Grave. But be aſſured of this, my *Crito*, that to ſpeak of theſe [important] matters without due circumſpection, is not only a great offence, but brings detriment alſo to mens Minds. It becomes us rather to be of good courage and reſolution: and I will command that my Body be buried, and buried ſo as ſhall be grateful to you, and you ſhall judge to be moſt conſentaneous to the Laws.

Other Circumſtances conducing to the faith of the Hiſtory.

Having ſaid this, he aroſe and went into an inner room to waſh himſelf: and *Crito* following him, enjoyn'd us to ſtay and expect his return. We therefore expected, diſcourſing among our ſelves of the things that had been commemora-

morated by him, and conferring our judgments concerning them. And we frequently ſpake of the calamity that ſeemed to impend on us by his death: concluding, it would certainly come to paſs, that as Sonns deprived of their Father, ſo ſhould we diſconſolately ſpend the remainder of our life. After he had been waſhed, and his *Children* were brought to him (for he had two Sonns very young, and a third, almoſt a Youth) and his * *Wives* alſo were come; he ſpake to them before *Crito*, and gave them his laſt commands: ſo he gave order to his Wives and Children to retire. Then he came back to us. By this time, the day had declined almoſt to the ſetting of the Sun; for he had ſtaid long in the room where he waſhed himſelf. Which done, he returned, and ſate to repoſe himſelf, not ſpeaking much after that. Then came the Miniſter of the *Eleven*, the *Executioner*; and addreſſing himſelf to him, I do not believe, *Socrates*, ſaid he, that I ſhall reprehend that in you, which I am wont to reprehend in others; that they are angry

* That *Socrates* had indeed *Two Wives*, is plainly delivered by *Diogen. Laertius*, who ſaith, the firſt was *Xantippe*, upon whom he begat *Lamprocles*; the other *Myrto*, the Daughter of *Ariſtides* the juſt, who brought him *Sophroniſcus* and *Meneximus*.

with me, and curſe me, when by command of the Magiſtrates (whom I am by my Office obliged to obey) I come and give notice to them, that they muſt now drink the poyſon; but I know you to be, at all times, and chiefly at this, a man both generous, and moſt mild and civil, the beſt of all men that ever came into this place: ſo that I may be aſſured you will not be diſpleaſed with me, but (you know the Authors) with them rather. Now therefore (for you know what Meſſage I come to bring) *Farewell*, and endevour to ſuffer as patiently and calmly as you can, what cannot be avoided: Then breaking forth into tears, he departed. And *Socrates* converting his eyes upon him, and *Farewel thou too*, ſaith he: we will perform all things. Then turning to us again, How civil this man is, ſaith he! all this time of my imprisonment, he came to me willingly, and ſometimes talked with me reſpectfully, and hath been the beſt of all that belong to the Priſon; and now how generouſly doth he weep for me! But *Crito*, let us ſpare him; and let ſome other bring hither the deadly Draught, if it be already bruiſed: if not, let him bruiſe it. Then *Crito*, I think, ſaith he, the Sun ſhines upon the tops of the Mountains, & is not yet quite gone down; * and

I have ſeen ſome delay the drinking of the poyſon much longer: nay more, after notice had been given them that they ought to diſpatch, they have Supped, and drank largely too, and talked a good while with their Friends: be not then ſo ſo haſty; you have yet time enough. Thoſe men of whom you ſpeak, *Crito*, ſaith he, did well; for they thought, they gained ſo much more of life; but I will not follow their example: for I conceive, I ſhall gain nothing by deferring my draught till it be later in the night; unleſs it be to expoſe my ſelf to be derided, for being deſirous, out of too great love of life, to prolong the ſhort remander of it. But well; get the Poyſon prepared quickly, and do nothing elſe till that be diſpatch'd. *Crito* hearing this, beckned to a Boy that was preſent; and the Boy going forth, and imploying himſelf a while in bruiſing the Poyſon, returned with him who was to give it, and who brought it ready bruiſed in a cup: Upon whom *Socrates* caſting his eye, be it ſo, good man, ſaid he; tell me, (for thou art well skill'd in theſe matters) what is to be done? Nothing, ſaith he;

By the *Athenian* Law, no man was to be put to death, untill after *Sun-ſet*; leſt the *Sun*, for which they had a ſingular veneration, might be diſpleaſed at the ſight.

he, but after you have drank, to walk, until a heavineſs comes upon your leggs and thighs; and then to ſit: and this you ſhall do. And with that he held forth the Cup to *Socrates*, * which he readily receiving, and being perfectly ſedate, O *Echecrates*, without trembling, without change either in the color, or in the aire of his face, but with the ſame aſpect, and countenance intent and ſtern, (as was uſual to him) looking upon the man: what ſaiſt thou, ſaith he? may not a man offer ſome of this Liquor in Sacrifice? We have bruiſed but ſo much, *Socrates*, ſaith he, as we thought would be ſufficient. I underſtand you, ſaith he: but yet it is both lawful, and our duty to pray to the Gods, that our tranſmigration from hence to them, may be happy and fortunate. Having ſpoke thoſe words, and remaining ſilent [for a minute or two] he eaſily and expeditely drank all that was in the Cup. Then many of us endevored what we could, to contain our tears: but when

* *Socrates*, with admirable conſtancy, receives and drinks off the *Poyſon*. Which appears to have been the Juice of *Hemlock*, both from the authority of *Diog. Laertius in vita Socrat.* where he expreſly names it κωνέιον, *i.e. Cicuta*, and from the manner of its operation, whereof conſult *Dioſcorides*; As alſo from that of *Seneca*, *Epiſt.* 13. *Cicuta magnum* Socratem *fecit.*

when we beheld him drinking the Poyſon, and immediatly after; no man wasable lonher to refrain from weeping: and while I put force upon my ſelf to ſuppreſs my tears, they flowed down my cheeks drop after drop. So covering my face, I wept in ſecret: deploring not his, but my own hard fortune, in the loſs of ſo great a Friend, and ſo neer a Kins-man. But *Crito* no longer able to contend with his grief, and to forbid his tears, roſe up before me. And *Apollodorus* firſt breaking forth into ſhowrs of tears, and then into cries, howlings, and lamentations, left no man from whom he extorted not tears in abundance; *Socrates* himſelf only excepted: Who ſaid, what do ye, my Friends? truly I ſent away the Women for no other reaſon, but leſt they ſhould in this kind offend. For I have heard, that we ought to die with good mens and gratulation: But recompoſe your ſelves, and reſume your courage and reſolution. Hearing this, we bluſh'd with ſhame, and ſuppreſſed our tears. But when he had walked awhile, and told us that his thighs were grown heavy and ſtupid; he lay down upon his back: for ſo he who had given him the poyſon, had directed him to do. Who a little time after, returns, and

feeling him, looked upon his leggs and feet: then pinching his foot vehemently, he asked him, if he felt it? and when he said no, he again pinched his leggs; and turning to us, told us, that now *Socrates* was stiff with cold: and touching him, said he would die so soon as the Poyson came up to his heart; for the parts about his heart were already grown stiff. Then *Socrates*, putting aside the Garment wherewith he was covered; we ow, saith he, a Cock to * *Æsculapius*: but do ye pay him, and neglect not to do it. And these were his last words. It shall be done, saith *Crito*: but see if you have any other Command for us To whom he gave no answer: but soon after fainting, he moved himself often [as if suffering Convulsions.] Then the Servant uncovered him: and his eyes stood wide open; which *Crito* perceiving, he closed both his mouth and his eyes. * This, *Echecrates*, was the end of our Friend and Familiar, a man as we in truth affirm, of all whom we have by use and experience

* Intimating, that death was most grateful to him; for which, and for his deliverance now granted to him, he would have a Sacrifice offered to *Æsculapius*. See *Erasmus, Chiliad.* 3. *cent.* 3. *pag.* 1.

* A most august testimony given by *Plato*, of his Master *Socrates*, to vindicate both his person and Doctrine from the prejudice of an ignominious death.

perience known, the *Wiſeſt*, and moſt *Juſt*.

Quid dicam de Socrate? *cujus morti illachrimari ſoleo*, Platonem *legens*. Cicero *de natura* Deor. lib. 2.

Quidni ego narrem, ultima illa nocte Catonem Platonis *librum legentem, poſito ad caput gladio? Duo hæc in rebus extremis inſi menta proſpexerat, alterum ut vellet mori, alterum ut poſſet*, &c. Seneca Epiſt. 24.

Sic longa virtute fuit mens ſancta Catonis
Purgata; atq; illi vitæ immortalis honorem
Jam contemplanti, divini fata Platonis
Phædonem *tradunt. Cum lætus talia fatur.*
Salve ſancte liber, ſuperis demiſſe Catoni:
Dirige tu curſum, vitæq; extrema meantis
Inſtrue: non alium moriturus quæro magiſtrum;
Nec reſtare alias voluerunt Numina curas, &c.

Tho. Maius, in Supplemento *Lucani*, lib. 4.

Quid Ambraciotes *ille* (Cleombrotus *videlicet*) *qui cum* Platonis *illum* Phædonem *perlegiſſet, præcipitem ſe dedit, nullam aliam ob cauſam, niſi quod* Platoni *credidit?* Lactantius.

Certain General

AXIOMS

Collected out of the Precedent Dialogue concerning the Soul.

1. Axioms *Moral.*

1. PAin *and* Pleaſure *are of Kin, and ſo linked together, that they cloſely ſucceed each other by turns.*

2. *No man ought, upon what account ſoever, to deſert the ſtation wherein God hath placed him: but to perſiſt in the duties thereof, contemning all oppoſition.*

3. *Self-murder is a great Crime.* *

[* ——— Ac donec Deus ille Creator
Qui terrena Animam primò ſtatione locavit,
Evocat, haud illa ſtatione excedere fas eſt.]

4. *A Wiſe man ought not only not to fear Death, but alſo to* deſire *it; with ſubmiſſion to to the Divine Will.*

5. Philoſophy *is the perpetual meditation of*

of Death; that is, to recal and divorce the Soul from commerce with the Senses, and alienate it from Corporeal lusts and pleasures. Which is an anticipatton of Death, that is defined to be, a solution and separation of the Soul from the Body.

6. *The Virtues of* Politicians *are not true Virtues, but only faint resemblances of the true.*

7. Philosophy *is the way to true* Felicity: *and the two grand Duties of it are* (1) *To contemplate the perfections of* God, *and* (2) *to alienate the Soul from the allurements of the Senses, and from indulgence to the Body.*

8. Hope *of future* Felicity, *is a very great* Reward; *that is, the best way of passing through both the Temptations and Adversities of this Life, with satisfaction of Mind.*

9. *Decent* Burial, *such as is ordained and prescribed by good Laws of the Country, ought not to be neglected by a* Wise *man: nor Funeral Pomp, affected.* *

* So Epicurus *in his last will and Testament*; Sepeliunto nos quà videbitur in hortis commodissimum, nihilq, interim sumptuosius, quod sive ad sepulturam, sive ad monumentum pertineat, agunto. *Diog. Laert. lib.* 80.

II. Axioms Natural.

1. CONtraries *are produced out of Contraries: but cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt the ſame in one ſubject, at the ſame time.*

2. *To* learn, *is to* remember *what the Soul knew, before it came into the Body: or there are naturally and congenially in the Soul, the ſeeds of all Sciences; which are only cultivated and matured by method of Diſcipline, not implanted or ingraffed at firſt, as* Ariſtotle *taught.*

III. Axioms Theological.

1. GOd *takes care of Men, for that they are his own Poſſeſſion.*

2. God, *according to* Plato's *definition here, is not only the* Cauſe *of his own* Being, *but gives both* Being *and* Well-being *to all things elſe.*

3. *The* Soul *of Man is the* Off-ſpring *of God, in a peculiar manner participant of the Divine* Nature, *incompound, without figure or ſhape, Incorruptible, immortal, as God.*

4. *The* Soul *in this Life, doth indeed uſe the ſervice of the Body: yet is not compoſed organically of the Senſes, and other Faculties there-*

thereof; but simple, and existeth apart by it self, after separation by Death, whereby the Body, being compound, is dissolved; but the Soul *goes away untouched and void of all Corruption, into another Life, and there lasteth* Eternally.

5. *Of our* Souls *departed, there is a* Two-fold *state: some are* happy, *others* unhappy.

6. *Seeing that in this Life things are carried on intemperately, and in confusion; there must be in the next Life* [διαδικασμὸς] *a certain and just* Judgement *of God the Supreme and Universal Judge, whereby* Good *men may be distinguished from* Wicked *: this being an* Axiom *evident by the very Light of Nature, that* God will reward every man according to his works in this life. *

[* ——————— Deus ipse sequendam
Proposuit Virtutem, & præmia debita justis.
Hæc, quoniam justos injusta potentia fraudat
Sæpiùs in terris, & gens humana rebellat,
Solvere post mortem justissimus ipse tenetur.]

7. *Positively and with confidence to describe the* places *whither the* Souls *of the Dead go, and to desine what are the* Rewards *and* Punishments *they there receive; is the part of a man extremely ignorant and superstitious: though it be most certain, there are Rewards and Punishments appointed, and absolutely necessary*

ceſſary for every man here to have his cogitations ſeriouſly exerciſed in the contemplation of them.

8. *True it is alſo, that the Souls of* Good *men, by Death delivered from the chains of the Body and its Senſes, go immediatly to a place, inviſible indeed by Human eyes, but of complete* felicity, *where they are conjoyn'd to* God *for ever: while on the contrary, the Souls of Wicked men ſuffer the puniſhments juſtly due to their crimes, in places convenient.*

9. *Unreaſonable it is, and unworthy a Philoſopher, to pretermit the* Principal *and* Primary *Cauſe*, God, *who is in truth not only the moſt Potent Cauſe, but Cauſe of all ſecondary* Cauſes: *to acquieſce in* Second *Cauſes, which really are no more but concurrent and inſtrumental: and in ſecond cauſes themſelves, to omit the* Proxime, *while he rambles in ſearch of* remote, *namely Conſtellations and Etherial influences, and ſuch like Chimera's; as do thoſe injudicious Profeſſors of Judicial Aſtrology, and as did* Anaxagoras, *who held the great* Mind *of the Univerſe to be utterly void of underſtanding and judgment; as* Plato *affirms.*

10. *The uſe of this moſt excellent Doctrine of the* Immortality *of the Soul, is to induce us to put our ſelves into the way of* Virtue, *as that which alone leads to Eternal* Happineſs: *and to abhor* Vice, *as the direct Road to endleſs* Miſery.

REFLEX-

REFLEXIONS
Upon the *Athenian Laws* mentioned in the Apoligie and Dialogue Precedent.

I.

THe Law which *Socrates* was accuſed to have Violated, and by which he was Condemned, yet extant under the firſt Title of *Athenian Laws* collected and explained by the Learned *Monſieur Petit*; ſeems to be this: *Lex eſto antiquiſſima, æternæq; auctoritatis in Attica, venerandos eſſe Deos, atq; Heroas patrios & indigenas, publice ſecundum patrias ſanctiones, privatim vero bonis verbis, frugumq; primitiis, libis annuis; pro facultatum modulo.*

By this Law was provided, *ne quis novos habeſſit Deos*, that no man ſhould introduce new Gods; and the Tranſgreſſor was called into queſtion before the *Areopagites*; whereof we have two eminent Examples: one in *St. Paul*, who was hurried to the moſt ſevere Tribunal of the *Areopagites*, ὅτι ξένων δαιμονίων εἰσήνεγκε καταγγελεὺς εἶναι, *quod peregrinorum Deorum videretur annunciator eſſe* (*Act. Apoſtol. cap.* 17. *verſ.* 18.) the other in *Diodorus* ſurnamed

named the *Atheist*, whose Indictment upon the same Statute, and convention before the same High Court of Justice, are recorded by *Diogenes Laertius*.

How came it then that *Socrates*, accused to have both denied the Divinity of the Old Gods of the *Athenians*, and endeavoured the insinuation of new; was not likewise tried by the *Areopagites*, but by other Judges, contrary to the tenor of this Law?

I answer with *Monsieur Petit*, (*Commentar. in leges Atticas, pag.* 3.) that perhaps the jurisdiction of the *Arcopagites* extended not to the Citizens of the *Attick* Republic, such as *Socrates* was; but was limited only to Strangers, such as was that ill-conjoyn'd pair, *St. Paul* and *Diodorus*.

II.

Socpates (you may remember) in his defense dissolving that part of his Charge which concerned the Corruption of Youth, puts his Adversary *Melitus* in mind of a certain Law, whereby he was obliged, not to have brought an Impeachment against him to the Magistrates, but privately and in a friendly manner admonished him of that his error, supposing him to be really guilty thereof, not out of malice, but incogitancy. Now the Law it self whereto he then had respect, was this; *Peccantes invite in jus ne rapiuntor, sed privatim officii admonentor*: and the reason of it is obvious, *Talibus enim non pœna opus est, sed institutione*. Which is to be understood of Errors of no great moment, nor likely to bring detriment to the Common-wealth; such as those objected to *Socrates*, in that article of his

his Indictment, Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ, καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλοις ταῦτα διδάσκων; Socrates *doth contrary to right and equity, in that he curiously enquires into things both subterranean and sublime, and by his sophistry turns falshood into truth, and teaches the same to others.* For granting him to be guilty hereof, the fault was but light and venial: *In his enim neq; sitæ erant opes Græciæ, neq; ex iis detrimenti quicquam Respublica capere potuit.* Wherefore he had right to the favour and indulgence of this Law, which his malicious Adversary had, by omitting the private admonition thereby required, violated.

III.

By the Religion of the *Athenians*, no Deity was held more potent and venerable than *Apollo*; none had so many sacred Buildings erected in their City to his Worship, none so many solemn Sacrifices, and public Feasts instituted to his Honor, as he had: and among their Festivals, none were celebrated with more ceremonious Joy, than that of *Inspection* mentioned by *Plato* in *Phædon*. Concerning which they had this peculiar Law; *Deliorum fistos dies, dum Delum itur, reditur, damnatorum supplicüs ne funestato.* And the observance of this Law hath been noted both by *Xenophon* and *Plato*, as the reason why *Socrates* was detained in Prison thirty daies after his Condemnation, before he was put to death: the *Athenians* esteeming it piacular, to darken the publick rejoycing and solemnity of that Feast, by the

the death of any condemned, however notorious a Malefactor. So much was given to the Honor of *Apollo Delius*, whom not only the *Grecians*, but even Foreiners from the remotest parts of the Earth, while in *Greece*, were obliged to Worship with Oblations of their First Fruits; as appears from the History of *Abaris*, a *Scythian*, who is said to have lived in *Greece* about the 52 Olympiad, and wrote *de Oraculis*; and from the example of the *Tyrians* alledged by *Euripides* (in *Phœnissis*) whose Verses in the *Chorus* are worthy the serious remark of Antiquaries, as giving much of light to what hath been obscurely delivered by Geographers and Historians; concerning the Colonies of the *Tyrians* in *Africa*, and the neighbouring Islands.

X.

From the same religious respect to *Apollo* it seems deducible, that within the Attic Territories, *no condemned person suffered death until after the Sun was gone down*: The Law it self, I confess, I have not yet found among all those with such vast labour collected by *Monsieur Petit*: but that they had such a *Law*, may be inferred from the Example of *Socrates*, and from what we read in *Stobæus* (*Sermone* 1. who saith expresly enough; καὶ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἀμερῶν αὐτῷ δοθεισῶν, τῇ προότῃ ἔπιεν. καὶ οὐ προσέμενε τῆς τρίτης ἡμέρας τὴν ἐσχάτην ὥραν παρατηρεῖν ἢ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρῶν.

Mythological Reflections UPON Some Ancient *Rites* and *Traditions* concerning the Soul, mentioned by *Plato* in the precedent *Dialogue.*

1. *Of Lustration.*

AMong the ancient *Grecians* who travelled into *Ægypt*, on purpose to pry into and learn the Sacred Rites, and mysterious Ceremonies used by the Priests of that Superstitious Nation; *Orpheus* is celebrated as the first, by *Diodorus Siculus*: who (*Lib.* 4. *pag.* 162.) saith thus of him; *Orpheus in Ægyptum profectus, multa ibi didicit; ita ut tam Initiationibus & Theologia, quam Poesi & Melodia esset Græcorum præstantissimus*, &c. Now this Poet returning into *Greece*, brought with him [τῶν μυστικῶν τελετῶν τὰ πλεῖστα, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ὀργιαζόμενα

μενα, καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐν ἅδου μυθολογίαν] most of the mysterious Rites used by the *Egyptians*, and the Orgies of *Bacchus*, and the Mythology of the Infernal Mansions: and recommending them to his Countrymen, so far prevailed, that not long after, the very same were introduced as religious institutes among them also, and by most with devote observance embraced.

Of all these thus transplanted Rites, none were held more grateful to their Deities, or of more sacred importance to the Votaries, than those of *Initiation* or admittance, more espececially the [Καθαρμὸς] *Lustration*: which according to the computation of our Second *Selden*, Sir *John Marsham*, from the authority of the *Epicha Marmorea* cited in his lately published *Chronic. Canon* (a work of profound Learning, and vast labour) was first instituted in *Greece*, when *Pandion* the Son of *Cecrops* ruled at *Athens*, about the year 257. of the *Attic Æra*.

This *Lustration* was double: either an *Expiation* from Humane blood spilt by slaughter, or a *Preparation* to Sacrifice, and other religious worship. Of *Expiation*, we have illustrious Examples in *Apollo* himself, who, as *Pausanias* relates (*Lib.* 10. *pag.* 620.) was thereby solemnly purged from the stain

of blood by *Carnanor*: in *Hercules*, whom *Diodorus Siculus* reports to have been in like manner purified by *Musæus* the Son of *Orpheus*, both at his initiation to the *Eleusinian* Sacrifices, and before his descent into Hell, thence to fetch the only Hel-hound *Cerberus*: and in *Theseus*, who, as *Plutarch* in his life hath left upon Record, required the same Expiation after the Homicides he had committed.

To the other kind of Lustration, among the *Egyptians*, and old *Hebrews*, were required Washing, Fasting, and Abstinence from Women. Of *Washing*, let *Moses* be a witness, who when he was to receive the Decalogue from Almighty God, sanctified the people, and commanded them to purge themselves by washing, and not to come near their Wives. Of *Fasting*, we are certified from the very form of the solemn Respons and Profession to be made by the Votary; which *Clemens Alexandrinus* (*Protreptic. pag.* 13.) delivers to be this; Ἐνήστευσα ἔπιον τὸν κυκεῶνα, *Jejunavi, ebibi cyceonem.* And as for *Castimony*; we have an authentic testimony from *Arrianus* (*in Epictetum* lib. 3. cap. 21.) *Hominem ad sacra rite accessurum,* [μετὰ θυσίας, ἢ μετὰ εὐχῶν, ἢ προκυνήσεως, *post sacrificium, & post preces,*

&

& premissa castitate. The High Priest therefore alwaies abstained from Matrimony: and those of *Ceres Eleusina* were anointed with the juice of Hemlock, to extinguish the heat of Concupiscence, as the old *Scholiast* upon the 5*th.* Satyr of *Persius* observes; and *St. Hierome* (*contra Jovian.* lib. 1.) remembers, that the *Hierophantæ* among the *Athenians* were castrated by frequently sipping the same juice of Hemlock, losing their virility to obtain the Pontificate. A custom repugnant to the *Mosaic* Law, by which none but perfect men are capable of Priesthood: and to the Constitutions also of the *Papacy*, none having been (as they say) for many Ages together heretofore admitted to sit in *St. Peters* Chair, until he had undergone the Scrutiny of the *Sella Perforata*, now laid aside as unnecessary; whereof a witty Poet made this Tetrastich.

Non poterat quisquam reserantes æthera claves
Non exploratis sumere testiculis.
Cur igitur nostro mos hic jam tempore cessat?
Ante probat sese quilibet esse Marem.

In ancient times, none was Elected Pope,
Till he had paſs'd the Sex-diſcerning grope.
Why is that ſcrutiny now us'd no more?
Now Prieſts approve their Man-hood long before.

But not further to digreſs, evident it is, that this inaugural Luſtration with its Ceremonies, was common to all Religions; though perhaps not without ſome difference in the inſtruments, or outward means: it being a remark of the moſt learned Sir *John Marſham*, out of *Procopius Gazæus*, (*in Deuteronom.*) that the purifications ordained in the *Levitical* Canons, differed from thoſe of the *Grecians* in this, that *theſe* were performed uſually with incantations, ſalt, bay leaves, barly, ſea-water, and paſſing through fire; but *thoſe* not.

Of theſe three parts of Luſtration inaugural, that accounted moſt efficacious, ſeems to have been *Baptiſm* or Waſhing: a thing of ſacred eſteem in all ages, and in all religions; and among the *Hebrews*, ſtrictly enjoyned by their wiſe Law-giver *Moſes*. For we read (*Exod.* 19. *v.* 14.) that when the Iſraelites were to be initiated to the holy Diſciplines by him inſtituted, he came down to the people, and ſanctified them, and they

waſhed

waſhed their Garments: and by this ablution of their cloaths, Interpreters unanimouſly underſtand the waſhing of their bodies alſo; according to the very letter of that precept given, (*Levit.* 15. *ver.* 11. πλυνῶ τὰ ἱμάτια, λέσεται ὃ σῶμα ὑδατι, *Lavabit veſtimenta, & lavabit corpus aqua.* Hence the Jews at this day deduce the origine of their *Baptiſm*; which that Nation hath ever ſince uſed with ſolemn Reverence, not only to the purgation of their external impurities, or to the ablution of their ſins; but alſo to the *Regeneration* of their *Proſelytes*, when they give up their names to *Judaiſm*; of whom *Jethro*, the Father-in-law of *Moſes*, is accounted the firſt. For, the three rites of initiation to be obſerved by a Gentil converted, at his admiſſion into the *Hebrew* Church or Congregation, are well known to be *Circumciſion*, *Baptiſm*, and *Oblation*. Concerning which our Prince of Antiquaries, Mr. *Selden* profeſſedly diſcourſing, proves by many credible teſtimonies, that the Baptiſm of a Proſelyte was celebrated in the preſence of at leaſt three Elders, ſo ſoon as the wound of Circumciſion was healed, and in ſome river or fountain of living water, not in any veſſel or artificial Bath, and never but once (on that occa-

sion) either by the Proselyt himself, or by any of his posterity. Hereof the *Effect* was this, that a Proselyt thus inaugurated, was held perfectly regenerate, and a new man, as an infant born of a new Mother, and inspired with a new Soul from Heaven: so that being utterly devested of all former cognation, he was thenceforth reputed to have no kindred, no affinity, either in right of Espousal, or succession to the goods of the deceased, besides those who likewise had the character of Baptism. Upon which distinguishing character it was, that *Arrianus* reflected, when (in *Epictetum*, lib. 2. cap. 9. he said; *quum quispiam induerit sibi affectum Baptizati & inter sectatores asciti, tunc & est revera, & appellatur Judæus.*

Now though the *Hebrews* may have derided this Lustration by Baptism, from the institute of *Moses*: yet it is not improbable, but he might first derive it from the example of the *Egyptians*, among whom he had so long lived, and in whose Learning as well sacred as civil, he had been from his childhood educated. For, *Apuleius Metamorphos, Lib. 9.*) being himself to be initiated to the Mysteries of *Isis*, expresly declares, that washing was in use among the *Egyptians*, in all their sacred Admissions: and describing

ſcribing the ceremonies of his own admiſſion, *Sacerdos* (ſaith he) *ſtipatum me religioſa cohorte deducit ad proximas balneas; & prius ſueto lavacro traditum præfarus Deum veniam, puriſſime circumrorans abluit*, &c. Nor is it to be doubted, but this was then done to him, *de more antiquo*, according to the moſt ancient uſe of that Nation. Which while the *Iſraelites* remain'd in bondage among them, were much more likely to give Examples to them, than to receive any from them: it being ſeldom obſerved, that Lords imitate their Slaves. But this is confirmed by *Tertullian* (*de Baptiſmo cap.* 5.) where he writes, *Nationes ſacris quibuſdam per lavacrum initiantur, Iſidis alicujus, aut Mithræ* [ſummi apud Perſas numinis] *ipſos etiam Deos ſuos lavationibus efferunt*, &c. And whenceſoever *Moſes* borrowed this rite, we have it under the hand of *Diodorus Siculus* (*lib.* 1.) that it was traduced from *Ægypt* to *Athens* by King *Erechtheus*.

Nor is there juſt cauſe, why the traduction of the like Baptiſm from the *Jews* to *Chriſtians*, ſhould be urged to the diſparagement of our Myſtical Ablution at the font, when by the Church we are admitted to Chriſtianiſm: as well becauſe ours was changed

changed from a mere rite to a bleſſed Sacrament, by *Chriſt* himſelf, the Author of our faith, honored by his Example, and ſanctified by his Benediction, and the Divinity of its conſtitution confirmed by the miraculous deſcent of the moſt Holy Spirit, in form of a Dove; as becauſe, tho the External act of waſhing continue ſtill the ſame, yet the *Signification* and *Efficacy* thereof is become infinitely more noble and excellent. Again, if it be true (as ſome very learned men have held) that thoſe Articles of faith, and thoſe religious Rites and Ceremonies, that are embraced by men of all Religions, and as it were ſeal'd by univerſal conſent of Mankind, in all Ages, be leſs obnoxious to exceptions and diſpute, than others that are proper and peculiar only to ſome one Religion, Age, or Nation. then certainly by how much more antique and common to various Religions and Nations, this Rite of Expurgation by Water hath been; by ſo much more ſacred ought it to be eſteem'd. But this is only a Digreſſion from my Theme, the Luſtration of *Ethnics*, and more particularly of the *Grecians*.

Whereby thoſe who were legitimately initiated, were eſteem'd not only more honorable then others in this life, but more happy

happy after death. For, their Wiſe men taught, and the Vulgar therefore believ'd, that by virtue of ſuch Luſtrations, the Souls of men were rendred more defecate and pure from the contagion of the body, refined as it were from the droſs of ſenſual affections, and made more fit and expedite for contemplation of Divine things. Whence *Sophocles* the Tragedian, writing of Myſteries, is ſaid by *Plutarch* (*de audiendis Poetis*) to have compoſed theſe verſes.

——————— Ὡς τρισόλβιοι
Κεῖνοι βροτῶν, ὁι ταυτὰ δερχθέντες τέλη,
Μολωσ' ἐς ἅδου. τοῖς δὲ γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ
Ζῆν ἐστὶ; τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' ἐκεῖ κακά.

——————— *Felices nimis*
Initia quotquot iſta cum conſpexerint,
Eunt ad Orcum. Namq; eos ſolos manet
Ibi vita: reliquos, miſerias præter, nihil.

and the *Chorus* in *Ariſtophanes*'s Comedy named the *Froggs*, was made to ſing theſe;

Solis nobis Sol
Et lux hilaris eſt,
Qui initiamur, &
Piam degimus vitam, &c.

This

This perſuaſion therefore being ſo univerſally diffuſed among the Grecians, and rendred ſo plauſible by Superſtition; no wonder if *Plato*, in this Dialogue, put this as an Axiom into the mouth of *Socrates*: *Whoever not expiated, nor with due rites initiated, ſhall deſcend to the Manſions of Souls departed; ſhall there lye rowling in mudd: but who ſhall after expurgation and initiation, come thither, ſhall for ever dwell with Gods.* Nor this altogether without reaſon, becauſe the *Initiati* were both obliged to newneſs of life, and reformation of manners; and inſtructed in Philoſophy as well Natural as Moral.

II.

The Antiquity and Traduction of the opinion of the Souls Immortality.

THough *Strabo* (*Geograph. lib.* 15. *pag.* 713:) ſpeaking of the Indian *Brachmans*, be ſo raſh to ſay of them [παραλέλυκεν μύθοις, ὅσοι καὶ Πλάτων, περὶ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς, καὶ κατ' ἄλλα κρίνων] that they, as *Plato*, compoſe fables of the incorruptibility of the Soul, and of judgements in the infernal ſhades: yet

yet to me it ſeems not to be doubted, but the belief of the *Immortality* of mans *Rational Soul*, is fully as ancient as Mankind it ſelf. For, methinks, the Excellency of its own Faculties and Operations, above all Material Agents, ſhould be alone ſufficient to afford to every contemplative man, certain glimpſes of both the divine *Original*, and *Immortality* thereof: and the deſire of poſthume glory, an affection congenial and natural (*Ariſt. 2. de Anima*, calls it πάθος φυσικώτατον, moſt natural) to all noble minds, together with a ſecret fear of future unhappineſs, common to all; to give pregnant hints of its *ſempiternal Exiſtence* after death.

And yet notwithſtanding, ſuch has been the cruelty of Time, in the deſtruction of Books and other Monuments; and ſo far hath Oblivion ſwallowed up the Tenents and Doctrines of the yonger World: that of this ſo reaſonable and comfortable an opinion, we can find no prints remaining, but what the *Grecian* Sages obſerved among the *Ægyptians*, and from them tranſmitted down to poſterity. From them alone therefore, we are to trace the tradition thereof.

Con-

Conſentaneous it is, that the *Eleuſinian Myſteries* and other ſacred Rites ſo ſolemnly obſerved and celebrated by the ancient *Ægyptians*, more particularly that of *Luſtration* juſt now explicated, were grounded upon a belief of, and had their chief reſpect unto a future life, and the different ſtate of good and bad Souls therein. For, to what end could that religious Ablution and Expurgation ſerve, but (as they were perſuaded) to rinſe away the ſtains of guilt from the Soul, or (as *Tertullian de Baptiſmo cap.* 5. expreſſeth it) *in regenerationem, & impunitatem perjuriorum ſuorum*: if they were not poſſeſſed with a belief even to confidence, of the Eternal Duration of the Soul after death; and that in a condition of Felicity or Miſery, according to its virtuous or vicious Affections and Actions in this life? Had they admitted the extinction thereof by death, vain certainly, and abſurd had been all their care and ſollicitude about the purification of it from the pollutions of Sin, and from the dreggs of ſenſual inclinations, before death. The ſame may be by like genuine conſequence inferred from their moſt magnificent *Sepulchres*, their exquiſite *Embalmings* of the dead, and their *Amenthes* or ſubterraneous place into

into which they held the Souls of the Defunct to be received. But what need we range into their *Mythologies* in ſearch after evidence of their being ſtrongly poſſeſſed with this opinion; when we have proofs from Authority unqueſtionable, that their Prieſts and other Learned men expreſly taught it?

Hear then *Herodotus* (*lib.* 2. *cap.* 123.) ſaying, *Ægyptij primi ſunt, qui Animam hominis immortalem eſſe dicerent,* ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθανατός ἐστι: *ejus tranſmigrationem in alia animalia terreſtria, marina, volueria, rurſumq; in corpus humanum, docuerunt: hunc circuitum ab ea fieri intra* 3000 *annos,* &c Upon which he elſewhere reflecting, hath this pertinent remark: *Hinc tantum condiendi cadaveris ſtudium, tantæ in ſtruendis repoſitorijs impenſæ.*

This Doctrin being brought from the Ægyptian Schools by *Orpheus*, and from him deſcended to *Homer*; he thence taught, that Eternal Souls are from Heaven conveyed into human bodies, and that after death they return to the Gods; for a Symbol of this region of Corruption, feigning his *Antrum Nympharum*, wherein ——

—— —— Δύω δὲ τὰ οἱ θύραι εἰσὶν, &c.

Janua duplex:

Hæc

Hæc Boream ſpectans homines demittit: at illa Odyſſ. 13. v. 109.
Reſpiciens Auſtrum divinior, invia prorſus
Eſt homini, præbetq; viam immortalibus unis.

Of which Poetical fiction *Porphyrius* giving the Mythology, wrote an excellent Book, publiſhed by *Holſtenius*, *de Antro Homerico*: wherein he tells us, that the *Cave* it ſelf carries [εἰκόνα καὶ σύμβολον τοῦ κόσμου] an image and ſymbol of the *world*: that the *Naiades*, or Nymphs, are *Souls* [εἰς γένεσιν καλοῦσαι] entered into bodies newly generated: that one *Gate* is for the admittance of Souls deſcending into bodies; the other for, not Gods, but Souls aſcending from bodies to the Gods again. Wherefore he call'd it the road or way, not of the Gods, but [ἀθανάτων] of *Souls*, which are by their very Eſſence *Immortal*.

From this commonly embraced Exiſtence of Souls departed, aroſe the Εἰδωλοποιΐα or *Image-making* of the Ancient Ethnics; whereby they attributed to Souls ſeparated from their bodies, *Effigies quaſi Corporeas*: whereunto *Virgil* ſeems learnedly to allude, where he makes *Dido*, as ſhe was dying, ſay,

Et

Et nunc magna mei ſub terras ibit imago :

and *Lucretius* (*lib.* 1.) in theſe verſes;

——— *Eſſe Acheruſia templa ;*
Quo neq; permanent Animæ, neq; corpora noſtra ;
Sed quædam Simulacra, modis pallentia miris.

From the ſame fountain, and at the ſame time alſo, were derived into *Greece* the Comments concerning the *Manſions* of Souls delivered from their bodies, and the *Rewards* and *Puniſhments* to come. For *Diodorus Siculus* (*lib.* 1. *pag.* 61.) hath left this record thereof: *Dicunt Orpheum, dum impiorum palmas apud inferos, & piorum prata, & pervulgatas ſpectrorum fictiones introduxit, funebres Ægyptiorum ritus imitatum fuiſſe* : adding, that from the old inſtitute of the Ægyptians, *Mercury* was made [ψυχοπομπὸς] the *Conductor* of *Souls ad inferos.* Wherein *Homer* long after carrying on the tradition of *Orpheus*, promotes the credit of the fiction, by inſerting it into his immortal Poem (*in initio Odyſſ.* ω̃.)

Ἑρμῆς ὃ ψυχὰς κυλλήνιος ἐξεκαλεῖτο
Ἀνδρῶν ἠρώων. ἔχε δ' ῥάβδον μετὰ χερσίν, &c.

The Souls of Hero's, Mercury *the God*
Calls forth [*and guides t'* Elyſium] *with his rod.*

But leaving the most ancient Grecian Poets, who yet were then the only Theologues; let us persue this tradition of the Souls Immortality, among their most eminent *Philosophers*, as men less prone to Credulity, and therefore more worthy of credit.

Of these, the eldest we can find, is *Thales Milesius*, who (as *Plutarch. de placitis lib.* 4. *cap.* 2. attesteth) first defined the Soul to be [φύσιν ἀεικίνητον, ἢ αὐτοκίνητον] a nature perpetually moving, and self-moving. Which argument *Cicero* indeed afterward borrowing from *Plato's Phædrus*, most judiciously explained, in the first book of his *Tusculan* Questions: but fathers the opinion it self upon *Pherecydes Syrius*, in these words. *Credo equidem etiam alios, sed (quod literis exstet) Pherecydes Syrus* (*Syrius* rather, from *Syros*, an Island of the Ægean Sea, the place of his birth) *primum dixit, Animos hominum esse sempiternos: hanc opinionem discipulus ejus Pythagoras maxime confirmavit.*

But (by *Cicero's* favour) *Pythagoras*, who seems to have been yonger then *Homer* by almost 400 years, (for he was among the Ægyptians carried away captive by *Cambyses*, as appears from that place in *Apuleius Florid.*

Florid. lib. 2. *Pythagoram aiunt, inter captivos Cambyſæ Regis, doctores habuiſſe Perſarum Magos; ac præcipue Zoroaſtrem, omnis divini arcani antiſtitem*) drew this Doctrin, not out of the ſtreams of either *Orpheus*, or *Homer*, or *Phercydes*, but from the very ſpring-head of Ægypt. And he taught, that the Soul was [ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα] a ſelf-moving Number, and [ἄφθαρτον] incapable of deſtruction, returning after its departure from the body, to its original the Univerſal Soul of the world: as we find in the records of *Plutarch*, *de placit. lib.* 4. *cap.* 2.

Next comes *Heraclitus* the *Epheſian*, whom *Porphyrius* (*de Antro pag.* 257.) makes the Author of that memorable ſentence concerning our Souls [ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐκείνων θάνατον; καὶ ζῆν ἐκείνας τὸν ἡμέτερον θάνατον] that *this our life is the Souls death, and our death the Souls life*; that the Soul deſcended from Heaven to animate the body, ſuffers Exile in this loweſt and darkſom region, and remains as it were dead, during its impriſonment in fleſh.

Then *Empedocles Agrigentinus*, a Pythagorean; who (as *Plutarch de Exilio* commemorates) ſpeaking likewiſe of the deſcent of his Soul, as a Baniſhment from its

Celeſtial home; *Ego jamdudum* (ſaith he) *eo exul a Deo, & vagus:* and of the Eternal Society of the juſt, that they ſhould be after death, *immortalium aliorum contubernales, & convivæ, expertes humanarum miſeriarum, incorruptibiles, immortales.* Whence it may be with good probability conjectured, that *Pindar* took the main argument of his 2d. *Olympic ode*; wherein he ſings, that the Juſt enjoy eternal light, and life exempt from cares and labour among the Gods: whereupon *Plutarch* excellently deſcanteth, *de facie in luna.*

And at length our *Plato*, whom our beſt Antiquaries and Chronologiſts agree to have flouriſhed about the 100 Olympiad, in the reign of *Artaxerxes Mnemon* over the *Perſians.* This Father of the *Academics*, though he would have *Homer* ejected out of his Common-wealth, as a Poet; yet both embraced his doctrin of the immortal Exiſtence of the Soul, and added no little authority to his deſcription of the Infernal Manſions; eſpecialy in this Dialogue, where he introduceth *Socrates* diſcourſing moſt profoundly of the Immortality of the Soul. Whereupon *Cicero* perhaps reflecting (*in lib.* 1. *Tuſculan.*) ſaith; *Platonem ferunt, ut Pythagoræos cognoſceret, in Italiam veniſſe;*

& in ea cum alios multos, tum Architam Timæumq; cognoviſſe, & didiciſſe Pythagoræ omnia; primumq; de Animorum æternitate, non ſolum ſenſiſſe idem quod Pythagoras, ſed rationem etiam attuliſſe.

From *Plato* down to his Diſciples and Succeſſors the *Academics*, we need not further deduce this conſtant Doctrin: it being of it ſelf ſufficiently manifeſt to all men not inconverſant in the writings of the ancient Philoſophers devolved to our late hands, that whatſoever either the Author of that laudable Dialogue entitled *Axiochus* (vulgarly adſcribed to *Plato*, and inſerted into his works) or *Cicero* in his noble Dialogue *de Senectute*, *& Contemnenda morte*; or *Seneca* in his Epiſtles, and elſewhere; or indeed St. *Auguſtin* and *Tertullian*, or any other hath written of this Subject, either *ex profeſſo*, or only *in tranſitu*; hath been borrowed from him. And yet notwithſtanding, it may not be thought impertinent, nor vulgar, if we obſerve; that among the *Jews*, the *Phariſes* (whoſe original our univerſally learned Sir *John Marſham* hath moſt plainly traced out, in *pag.* 151. of his *Chronic. Canon*) impoſing only new terms upon the Philoſophy of the *Academics*, conſented to the common opinion of the Greeks

cerning the Soul; as *Joſephus* himſelf atteſteth (*Belli Judaici lib.* 2. *cap.* 7.) who there delivers the belief of the *Eſſens*, concerning the happy ſtate of Good Souls ſeparated from their bodies, in the very words of *Homer*. Nor is it obſcure, that the *Jews* themſelves believed the μετενσωμάτωσιν, or Tranſmigration of Souls from one human body into another: when ſome thought our bleſſed Saviour *Jeſus Chriſt* to be St. *John* the *Baptiſt*, ſome *Elias*, others *Jeremias*, or one of the Prophets (*Math.* 16: *v.* 14.)

Digreſſion

DIGRESSION.

How far the Souls Immortality *may be proved by human* Reaſon.

BUT is it not of more importance to know, how *ſtrong* and *reaſonable* this Opinion of the perpetual duration of ſeparate Souls appears to be, than to inveſtigate the age and tradition of it? Certainly yes, and ſhould my Reader here require my eſtimate of the force and validity of the various Arguments or pretended Demonſtrations brought by *Plato* in the precedent Dialogue, to evidence the verity thereof: I might juſtly enough make uſe of the licence thereby given me, to examine what I deſigned only to tranſlate. But becauſe it may be thought an indecency, if not ingratitude in a mere Interpreter, to cenſure the power and extent of the reaſonings uſed, and the concluſions thence drawn by his Author, and becauſe this laudable curioſity of the Reader (whom I preſume to be poſſeſſed with ſuch) may perhaps be more fully gratified, by a frank communication

of my ſentiments concerning that more general Enquiry, viz. *How far the Immortality of the Soul may be proved by ſimple reaſon, or the ſole light of Nature, without the illumination of ſacred Writ, or revelation Divine*: I ſhall therefore with the freedom belonging to a Philoſopher, and due ſubmiſſion to more elevated Wits, adventure to acquaint him briefly with thoſe my thoughts; chooſing rather to expoſe them to his ſevereſt ſcrutiny, than by animadverſions upon the arguments of *Plato* in particular, to ſhew the leaſt umbrage or irreverence towards his memory.

I confeſs then, that tho I have read, and with due attention of mind conſidered the utmoſt rigor of many Diſcourſes profeſſedly compoſed for, and ſpecioufly promiſing a ſufficient eviction of the ſempiternal Exiſtence of the Rational Soul after death, by reaſons drawn only from her own excellent *nature*, *faculties*, *affections*, *operations*, &c. yet I could not perceive, that any one of them taken ſingle, or all put together, had the force of a perfect *Demonſtration*; ſo that were not the Light of the Holy Scriptures infinitely more clear and convincing, as to that among many other important truths concerning the Soul, I ſhould ſtill remain unaſſured of the endleſs Duration of my nobleſt part. For

Firſt, as to the *Origine* of this excellent Being; the Doctrines of Natural Philoſophers concerning this, are no leſs various then their Sects; and all but darkſom opinions, or precarious con-

conjectures. Nay even those few among them, who held it to be of Divine Original, tho therein they hit the very white of truth, appear notwithstanding to have shot wide, when they conceived it to have been Eternal *ex parte ante*, a particle of the Divine Essence it self, and pre-existent to its conjunction with the body. Whereas that sacred Oracle, the Word of God plainly teaches, that the Soul of the first man was created immediately by God himself, and united to the body then already perfectly formed and prepared to receive it.

Secondly, As to the grand Difficulty, the natural *Exemption* of it from the power of *Death*, when thereby divorced from the body; the Arguments brought from *Physical Mediums* for probation hereof, do indeed suffice to convince us of the *Spirituality* and *Seperability* of the Soul: but suffice not (in my judgement at least) to demonstrate the *impossibility of its destruction*, or that *absolutely* it shall survive the dissolution of the body for ever the same.

I grant, that some, and chiefly that most rigid of Physico-Mathematicians, *Des Cartes* (*in meditat. Metaphysic. de Anima, & respon. ad object. secund.*) have gone so far, as fairly to convince any man of competent understanding, that the Soul, tho in this life obliged to act for the most part, by the Organs of the Senses, doth yet discover its excellency, by actions proper and peculiar to her spiritual nature, wholly independent upon, and distinct from the Senses: and thence by genuine consequence inferred, that the same

ſame Soul, tho by a ſtrict and intimate conjunction with the body, united into one *Compoſitum* therewith, is yet nevertheleſs a thing or *ſubſtance diſtinct* from the body. I grant alſo, that by this very Argument the Immortality of the Soul may be ſufficiently proved againſt *Epicureans* and *Atheiſts*. For theſe men taking the Soul to be, not formally and truly a Subſtance, but only a certain *Modification* of body; thereupon concluded, that it muſt of neceſſity periſh, or ceaſe to be the ſame, when the fabrique or frame of the body, from whence it reſulted, is deſtroyed by Death. If therefore from ſome *intellectual operations* of this Soul, ſuch to which matter or body, however modified, or organized, cannot poſſibly reach; it be made appear (and *Des Cartes* ſeems to have done it) that ſhe is a Subſtance diſtinct from, and independent upon the body: there will remain no reaſon, much leſs an abſolute neceſſity, why the diſſolution of the body ſhould infer the deſtruction of the Soul, as they imagine; more eſpecially if the latter be conceived to be (what moſt certainly it is) a ſimple and ſpiritual ſubſtance, as incapable of deſtruction, as themſelves hold matter to be.

But I dare not grant, that this *Carteſian* Demonſtration holds good, as againſt *Epicureans* and *Atheiſts*, who exclude God from having any hand in the creation and conſervation of the Soul; ſo likewiſe againſt thoſe who acknowledge God to be the ſole Creator and preſerver of all things. For, admitting the Soul to be both

both a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body, and immediately created, and continualy conſerved by God: yet can we not lawfully infer from thence, that it is not poſſible for ſuch a Soul *ever to ceaſe to be.* For what aſſurance can ſimple reaſon give us, that God hath not ordained, that this Soul, as it had a beginning when it was created to be infuſed into the body, ſo at the time of its ſeparation from the body, ſhall loſe its being, and vaniſh into its primitive nothing? That the duration thereof neceſſarily depends upon Gods conſerving power and influence, is undeniable: and it ſeems conſentaneous, that as the Union or Aſſociation of the Soul to the Body was at firſt made, not by any Agents meerly Natural, but upon conditions depending ſolely upon Gods free and arbitrary inſtitution; ſo (for ought we can learn from the weak light of Nature to the contrary) one of the Conditions may be, that at the diſſolution of that Union, both Body and Soul ſhould ceaſe to be. Eſpecially ſince to the Souls relapſing into its firſt nothing, no more is required, but Gods withdrawing his conſerving influence, by which alone all his Creatures are ſupported, and their Being is preſerved. Here then we find our ſelves left in the dark by human reaſon; ſo that were it not for the brighter beams of Revelation Divine, how fair ſoever our *hopes* might be of *Immortality*, we ſhould want a full *aſſurance* of it. To conclude therefore this *Parergon*, with the concordant judgement, and in the moſt elegant words of that moſt excellent

Phi-

In Pag. 30. of his Book concerning the Excellency of Theology.

Philoſopher and Chriſtian, the noble Mr. *Boyl*; all that meer Reaſon can demonſtrate concering this Subject, may be reduced to theſe two things: *One*, "That the Rational Soul "being an Incorporeal ſubſtance, there is no "neceſſity that it ſhould periſh with the body; "ſo that if God hath not otherwiſe appointed, "the Soul may ſurvive the body, and laſt for "ever: The *Other*, That the Nature of the "Soul, according to *Des Cartes*, conſiſting in its "being a Subſtance that *thinks*; we may con-"clude, that tho it be by death ſeparated from "the body, it will nevertheleſs retain the power "of *thinking*. To more then this *Des Cartes* was both too circumſpect, and too conſcious of the dimneſs of human reaſon to pretend, tho ſome of his Sectators, miſtaking the deſign and ſcope of that his diſcourſe, have conceived it to extend even to an eviction alſo of the Souls abſolute Immortality. For (*in artic. 7. reſpon. ad object. 2.*) he makes this ingenuous profeſſion. *Cur de immortalitate animæ nihil ſcripſerim, jam dixi in Synopſi mearum meditationum; quod ejus ab omni corpore diſtinctionem ſatis probaverim, ſupra oſtendi. Quod vero additis, ex diſtinctione animæ a corpore non ſequi ejus immortalitatem; quia nihilominus dici poteſt, illam a Deo talis naturæ factam eſſe, ut ejus Duratio ſimul cum duratione vitæ corporeæ finiatur; fateor a me refelli non poſſe. Neq; enim tantum mihi aſſumo, ut quicquam de ijs quæ a libera Dei voluntate dependent, humanæ*

humanæ rationis vi determinare aggrediar. Docet quidem naturalis cognitio, mentem a corpore esse diversam, ipsamq; esse substantiam, &c. Sed si de absoluta Dei potestate quæratur, an forte decreverit ut animæ humanæ iisdem temporibus esse desinant, quibus corpor a quæ illis adjunxit, destruuntur; solius est Dei respondere. Cumq; jam ipse nobis revelaverit, id non futurum; nulla plane, vel minima est occasio dubitandi.

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of

III.

Of the Comments of the ancient Ethnics, concerning the infernal Manſions *of Souls departed.*

THo the deſcription of *Tartarus* and *Elyſium* here in the latter part of this grave Dialogue made by *Plato*, be by himſelf declared to have been borrowed for the moſt part from the Fictions of others, chiefly *Poets*; and that he expreſly affirms, that to deliver any thing poſitively concerning the future ſtate of Souls, and the qualities of Rewards and Puniſhments in the next life, is the part of a raſh, not a wiſe man: yet foraſmuch as the deſign and utility of thoſe fictions, is not more conſpicuous, than the firſt invention of them is to men inconverſant in the monuments of Antiquity, obſcure; and becauſe there are, even at this day, not a few who entertain and promote as groſs, and in many things the like ſuperſtitious conceipts of *Hell:* I think it worth the expence of a few vacant minutes, to deduce them briefly from their original, as high at leaſt as my little reading reacheth.

The

The first Natural Philosophy, whereof the envy of Time hath spared some little fragments to be handed down by tradition to this our so distant age; seems to be that which supposed *two Contrary Principles* of all things that had beginning. Of these, one was *God* the *Maker*, in the Grecian Theology named Ζεῦς (concerning the Etymology of which name, t'will be no lost labour, nor impertinent, to consult the most learned *Vossius*, *in Etymologico Linguæ Latinæ*, *in verbo*, *Juvo*) and the *Author* of *Life*: The other, *Matter*, call'd Ἅδης, which hath the power of Dissolution or *Death*. To the *First* was ascribed *Light* and *Day*; to the Latter, *Darkness* and ἀφανισμὸν, *Non-apparence*: for Ἅδης signifieth privation of Light. Under the Empire of *Zeus* or *Jove*, was placed the *upper* part of the World: the *inferior* was assigned to the dominion of *Pluto*: the *middle* betwixt these two contrary Principles, was imagined to be agitated by perpetual reciprocations, or alternate changes; so that Life and Death, Light and Darkness, Good and Evil rule by turns. Congruous whereunto is that assertion of the Prince of Physicians, *Hippocrates* (*lib. de Diæta*) *nihil gigni*, *neq; prorsus interire*. That as to Matter,

Matter, nothing is either generated or deſtroyed: and that to be generated, is to grow out of *Hade* into light; men thinking that to periſh, which from light decreaſed into *Hade* or darkneſs again. For, it hath been an univerſal Axiom of ancient Philoſophers, *nihil ex nihilo fieri, aut in nihilum redigi:* aud therefore they who allowed the World to have had a beginning, held the *Matter* of it to have been pre-exiſtent from all Eternity.

Now this which the *Grecians* named *Hades*, the *Ægyptians* call'd *Amenthes*, which ſignifies a place *giving* and *receiving*, viz. Souls; as *Plutarch* (*de Iſide*) interpreteth it. Which notion, together with the opinion of the Souls Immortality, and future rewards and puniſhments, being by the *Ægyptian* Prieſts communicated to *Orpheus:* he from thence, after his return into *Greece*, feigned a Hell, in imitation of the Funeral Rites he had obſerved among them, as is expreſly averred by *Diodorus Siculus* (*lib.* 1. *pag.* 71.) formerly quoted: who addeth, that the other Comments of the Grecians *de inferis*, were in moſt things conformable to the manner and place of Obſequies performed by the *Ægyptians*, even in his own

own time. For (ſaith he) the boat wherein dead bodies are uſually carried to burial, is call'd Βάρις, and a half-penny is given for a fare to the Boatman, who in the tongue of that Nation is call'd *Charon*: not far from the Ferry, there ſtands (they ſay) a Temple of *Hecate* the *Darkſom*; and the gates of *Cocytus* and *Lethe*, made faſt with braſen barrs; and other gates of *Verity*, by which ſtands an image or ſtatue of *Juſtice*, without a head, *&c.*

And *Servius* (*in Virgil. lib. 6. ad hunc verſum*; *ſic demum lucos Stygios, regna invia vivis, aſpicies*) delivers, that *Seneca* in a certain book he wrote *de ritu & ſacris Ægyptiorum*, reports, that about *Sienes*, an extreme part of *Ægypt*, is a certain place which they call *Philas*, that is, the Female Friends; becauſe there *Iſis* was appeaſed and attoned by the Ægyptians, after her diſpleaſure conceived for that ſhe had not found the limbs of her husband *Oſiris*, whom his brother *Typhon* had ſlain. Which being afterward found, when ſhe deſired to bury them, ſhe choſe the ſafeſt place of a neer Mariſh, whereunto the acceſs was extremely difficult,

and embarraſs'd; the Mariſh being full of Mudd and Papyr-flaggs. Beyond this is a ſhort Iſland, inacceſſible to men: whence it was call'd *Abatos*, and mentioned by *Lucan*; *Hinc Abatos, quam noſtra vocat veneranda vetuſtas.* This Mere is named *Styx*, becauſe it raiſeth *Sadneſs* and *Sorrow* in all that paſs over it: and hither on certain daies, come ſuch who have been initiated to the ſacred Rites; and that it had been written, that the neighbouring people carry over their dead to the other ſide of the Lake: but if any chance to periſh in the difficult paſſage, and his body be not found; his Funeral Obſequies are to be deferred untill a hundred years be expired. Whence that dream, *Centum errant annos, volitanq; hæc littora circum.*

Farther, well known it is, even to yong Students of *Homer*, that his Ἅιδης is divided into *Tartarus* (deſcribed at the 13*th. Iliad v.* θ) and *Elyſium* (deſcribed *Odyſſ.* δ. *v.* 563.) and both according to the doctrin of the *Ægyptians*, who placed both the Bridewell of the wicked and the Mulberry Gardens of the Juſt' ἐν Ἅιδῃ, in a ſubterraneous place or region'

But

But where to fix his πέρατα γαίης, hath puzzled all his Commentators. *Strabo* (*Geograph. lib.* 3. *pag.* 150.) thereby underſtands the remoteſt part of *Spain*, and contends for the placing his *Elyſium* there. More recent Poets take the [μακάρων νήσους] Iſlands of the Fortunate, for the ſeats of the bleſſed: whereof ſee *Heſychius*, *ad verbum* ΗΛΥΣ, where you ſhall read this alſo. "Some ſay, *Elyſium* lyes "in *Ægypt*, ſome in *Lesbos*, others in a "place guarded with thunder and light-"ning, and not to be approached by "Mortals. So that a man would think, *Eden* to be turned into *Elyſium*, nor doth it ſeem to be either more or leſs than what *Diodorus* juſt now related from the Ægyptians, that the gates of *Cocytus* and *Lethe* were ſecured by braſen barrs. But *Plutarch* removes this Paradiſe from the Hollows of the Earth, into the globe of the Moon (*lib. de facie in Luna.*) So various are the conjectures of men, ſo uncertain their imaginations, ſo eaſie their credulity; eſpecialy when they are blinded by ſuperſtition. What pleaſure others may find in reading theſe various Comments upon Fictions, I cannot divine:

but this I will adventure to confeſs, that to me they appear as idle and extravagant, as the works of *Didymus* a Grammarian did to *Seneca*, Who (*in Epiſt.* 88.) derides him for writing 4000 Volumes, wherein he chiefly enquires about the native Country of *Homer*, the true Mother of *Æneas*, whether *Anacreon* were more addicted to wine or women; whether *Sappho* were a common proſtitute, and other the like ridiculous impertinences, which were to be forgotten, if you knew them. Wherefore leaving theſe diſſenting Expoſitors, let us reſume our clue, and follow the trace of the Fiction it ſelf.

Though *Homer* conſtituted *Rhadamanthus* and his brother *Minos* Judges in the infernal Arches (*Odyſſ.* 4. *v.* 567.) and fetch'd thoſe names from *Crete*: yet the ground or example was derived from *Ægypt*, as appears from this relation of *Diodorus Siculus* (*lib.* 1. *p.* 58.) Among "the Ægyptians (ſaith he) when a dead "body is to be interred, the Kindred of "the deceaſed give notice of the day to "the Judges, and to the friends and ac-"quaintance of the defunct; and proclam "that he is at that time to be wafted "over

"over the Lake. At the day prefix'd, "more then 40 Judges aſſembled toge- "ther, ſeat themſelves in a Semicircle or "Half-moon, on the brink of the Lake: "and a Boat ready prepared for that uſe, "is lanched, with a man therein to row "it, whom they in the Ægyptian language "call *Charon*. Then, before the body is put "aboard, it is permitted to every man "preſent, to bring in what accuſations he "thinks juſt, againſt the party deceaſed. "If any prove, that he lived an evil life, "the Judges immediately give ſentence "upon him, according to the nature and "quality of his tranſgreſſions: and the body "is forbidden to be buried. But a falſe "and malicious accuſer is obnoxious to "to great penalties. When no juſt im- "peachment is brought in, the kindred "laying aſide the mourning and laments, "praiſe the defunct, in their laudatory "harangues, not mentioning the nobility "of his blood and extraction (as the "the Grecians uſe to do) becauſe they "hold, that all in Ægypt are equaly no- "noble; but his good Education in youth, "and the piety, juſtice, continency, and "other virtues of his maturer age, all

"which they particularly recount and "celebrate. This funeral Oration ended, they addreſs their Oraiſons to the infernal Deities, beſeeching them to receive him into the Society of the Pious: with no ſmall devotion making this prayer, the form whereof hath been preſerved and tranſmitted down to us by *Porphyrius* (*de Abſtinentia lib.* 4. *Sect.* 10.)

"O Lord Sun, and all ye Gods who "give life to men, receive me, and deliver "me a companion to the immortal Gods. "For while I lived here in this age, I "piouſly worſhipped the Gods whom my "Parents taught me to worſhip: and ho-"nour'd thoſe who begat me: nor have "I killed any man: nor defrauded any "that truſted me: nor committed any "inexpiable evil. But if at any time of "my life, I have offended by eating or "dtinking any thing forbidden; I offen-"ded not by my ſelf, but by thoſe bowells "of mine there (pointing to a little "Coffin wherein the ſtomach and gutts are "repoſed apart.)

Which ſaid, the ſpeaker throws the little Coffin into the water, as containing the

the offending parts; and the whole assembly with loud and ingeminated applauses recommending the defunct (that is, him who had performed all the dueties of life) as one that shall enjoy the everlasting conversation of pious Souls *apud inferos*; the body is put into the Boat, and ferried over the Lake to be inhumed.

Here reflecting upon this Ægyptian praier, or Apology rather, made in the name of the dead, we may *en passant* observe, both a touch of Pharisaical arrogancy and self-justification; and precepts exactly concordant with those given, first (as the tradition of the Talmudical Rabbines teacheth) to the Sons of *Noah*, and afterward by *Moses* to the *Hebrews*, in the second Table of the Decalogue, and from them descended down to us. So that that saying of *Salomon*, that *nothing is new under the Sun*, was true many hundred of years before his daies, yea and before *Moses*'s too. But I have made a digression of a praier; and must return into the little remainder of my way.

From these Ægyptian obsequies it was (as the same *Diodorus* in the same place

obſerves) that *Orpheus* having, while he ſojourned among their Prieſts, curiouſly remarked them, firſt invented his fiction of Hell; in ſome things keeping cloſe to the original he copied, and adding others from the mint of his own Poetical phancy: and ſo divulging the ſame to his admirers in *Greece*, tranſmitted it to poſterity, as matter of Faith.

From their belief, that Good Souls were after death advanced to the honour and felicity of converſing with the Gods, firſt aroſe the Ἀποθέωσις of the Ancients: and firſt of all *Hercules* was, for his Heroic virtues, accordingly Deified. Whence *Homer* deſcribing the tranſcendent happineſs of his condition, ſaith, *apud Deos immortales oblectatur in convivijs, & habet pulchris talis Hebem*: by aſſigning him *Hebe* or *Youth* for a Wife, intimating his *Immortality*.

And from the Ægyptian cuſtom of interdicting ſepulture to the bodies of men convicted of great crimes, came the opinion of the Grecians, that the Souls of men whoſe bodies want interrment, are repulſed by *Charon*. Whence in *Homer*, the Ghoſt of *Elpinor* appearing to *Uliſſes*, com-

complains of his repulſe, becauſe his body yet remained unburied. So doth that of *Patroclus* to *Achilles*, begging the human office of inhumation: *ſepeli me quam citiſſime; ut intrem portas Plutonis.*

To theſe remarkable inſtances of Similitude betwixt the old Ægyptian rites of burial, and the Grecian fictions *de inferis*; I might, were not my pen already blunted with the drudgery of tranſcription, add many others collected by *Diodorus Siculus*. But from what I have alleaged, it ſeems clearly evident, that the original of the Grecian traditions and doctrin concerning Hell, was fetch'd from Ægypt: and that the grand pipe through which they were tranſmitted and diffuſed, was the pen of *Homer*, who flouriſhed about the year 676 of the *Attic Æra*.

Nor is it leſs manifeſt, that ſome *Philoſophers* alſo, and thoſe too of great name and autority in their times, laboured by their Writings to propagate the belief of the ſame Phantaſtical comments in the minds of the ſuperſtitious vulgar. For, *Diogenes Laertius*, in the lives of *Democritus* and his Scholar *Protagoras*, of *Antiſthenes* and *Heraclides Ponticus*, expreſly delivers, that each

each of them wrote whole Volumes [ ] of the regiment and judicial proceedings *apud inferos*: the loſs whereof, the Common-wealth of Letters hath no great reaſon to lament. And as for *Plato*, we have already peruſed his ample Chorography and deſcription of the ſame infernal regions, in this Dialogue of *Phædo*; wherein whoever is not ſatisfied, let him at his leiſure have recourſe to the ſixth book of *Virgil's Æneids*; where he ſhall find even the Topography of *Hell* and *Elyſium* moſt accurately painted, according to the patterns of *Homer* and *Plato*. More particularly, at verſe 327. he ſhall find *Charon* refuſing to tranſport the Souls of bodies unburied: at verſe 426. he ſhall behold the *Limbus* or apartment of *Infants*: at verſe 430. the receptacle of men *condemned unjuſtly*: at verſe 434. the Newgate of *Self-murderers*: at verſe 440. the melancholy walks of *unfortunate Lovers*: at verſe 540. the *Campus Martius* of Warriours: at verſe 548. the burning river and other torments of the *impious*: at verſe 638. the Paradiſe of *Mahomet*, at verſe 738. a moſt cruel *Purgatory*, wherein polluted Souls being cleanſed and whitened, by aire,

aire, fire and water, are after a long tract of time, removed into *Elyſium*, there with impatience to expect [παλιγγενεσίαν] *Regeneration.* All which being compared with the deſcriptions of the ſame places, extant in *Homer* and *Plato*: he will at length be convinced, that *Virgil* therein imitated them moſt exactly; and that *Purgatory* is no ſuch modern invention as the unlearned take it to be. The Sandy foundation whereof lying ſo expoſed to all eyes not blinded with the miſt of Bigotiſm: I cannot but applaud the Wiſdom of our Divines aſſembled in the Convocation houſe by K. *Henry* VIII. in the year 1536. Who among ſome Eccleſiaſtical Conſtitutions then made, delivered their judgement concerning *Purgatory*, in theſe memorable words.

" Foraſmuch as according to due order " of Charity, and the book of *Macchabees*, " and divers ancient Writers, it is a very " good and charitable deed to pray for " Souls departed: and foraſmuch as ſuch " uſes have continued in the Church even " from the beginning, that all Biſhops and " Preachers ſhould inſtruct and teach the " people not to be grieved with the con- " tinuance of the ſame: But foraſmuch as " the

"the place where thoſe departed Souls be,
"the name thereof, and the kind of pains
"there alſo, be to us uncertain by Scripture,
"that therefore this and all other ſuch things
"were to be remitted to God Almighty, un-
"to whoſe mercy it is meet and convenient
"to commend them, truſting that God ac-
"cepteth our praiers for them; referring
"the reſt wholly to God, to whom is known
"their ſtate and condition. And therefore
"that it was neceſſary that ſuch abuſes ſhould
"be clearly put away, which under the
"name of Purgatory have been advanced,
&c. As is recited by the Lord *Herbert*, in the life of K. *Henry* VIII. *pag.* 468.

F I N I S.